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Incentives are fundamental and often powerful motivators of human behavior. Considerable 
research has focused on financial rewards as a tool to encourage “good” decisions. This dissertation 
examines the psychology and efficacy of monetary incentives—compared to multiple nonmonetary 
incentives—with respect to individuals’ choices, performance, and habits. I document and explore a 
variety of interrelated effects that cash, relative to noncash, incentives can incur in four major areas 
of behavior: habit formation, choice (specifically, tradeoffs involving risk and delay), goal setting, 
and integrity. In three longitudinal field experiments, I devise and empirically test a novel incentive 
program based on self-reward, where individuals defined and administered their own rewards for 
reaching a goal. I find that this system outperforms cash on several consequential metrics, including 
task engagement and longer-term persistence. I further place these behaviors in the context of a 
greater focus on compensation when incentivized with cash: People become fixated on attaining the 
reward over the process of expending effort. Although this mentality fuels efficient goal attainment, 
it can also lead to—as I show using a series of online studies—distortionary effects on other aspects 
of goal pursuit, such as the tendency to choose easier effort streams and the willingness to forgo a 
reward’s magnitude for its certainty or immediacy. Combined, these findings suggest that 
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1.1 Motivation  
 
 
Incentives motivate us. Whether externally imposed or internally generated, they often serve as 
strong reinforcers of human behavior. A central concern for researchers and practitioners interested 
in promoting individuals’ wellbeing in the marketplace is the design of incentive systems that 
galvanize enduring healthy habits. Over the past several decades, a vast literature has sought to 
better understand the role of incentives in motivation and self-control, attracting a swath of 
perspectives—from economics and marketing to organizational behavior, psychology, philosophy, 
political science, and behavior therapy.  
The customary approach in economic theory, a “gold standard” widely practiced by scholars 
and organizations, has been to use monetary incentives as a means of inducing desired outcomes 
(e.g., exercising more, eating healthier, achieving better grades, and so forth). This is hardly 
surprising, since monetary rewards (especially cash) command significant lay appeal thanks to the 
flexibility and liquidity they confer. On the other hand, they are not without their disadvantages. For 
example, many financial-based efforts have found little success in generating sustained effects, 
causing gains accumulated in the short run to evaporate once incentives are withdrawn (e.g., John et 
al. 2011). Further, from a psychological standpoint, cash rewards can sometimes undermine positive 
change by “crowding out” intrinsic motivation (i.e., an individual’s desire to perform a task for its 
own sake; for reviews, see Bénabou and Tirole 2003 and Deci, Koester, and Ryan 1999).  
2 
 
Despite the wealth of information on the effects of financial compensation, our 
understanding of the efficacy of nonmonetary relative to monetary (cash-based)1 incentives in 
shaping behavior remains fairly impoverished. In the present investigation, I attempt to shed some 
more light on this matter.  
 
1.2 The Present Research  
 
 
My dissertation examines the consequences of cash incentives—compared to multiple noncash 
reward structures—on shaping behavior along various stages of goal pursuit. I dissect this question 
in the next two chapters, which are motivated by two broad, related problems: First, I ask how well 
noncash incentive programs (and specifically a novel one predicated on self-rewards) might fare, 
relative to cash-based programs, in improving performance and habit formation. Second, I explore 
the peculiarities of cash incentives in particular and document the myriad ways in which cash can act 
as a disincentive. Unifying these two strands of research, I claim, is a connective tissue characterized 
by a heightened preoccupation with securing a reward (as opposed to fully engaging in the effortful 
activity at hand)—what I call compensation focus. Such a mindset2 is, perhaps, well illustrated by the 
expression “getting the most bang for the buck,” an idea that encompasses maximizing expected 
outcomes while concurrently minimizing effort expenditure.  
 
                                                     
1 I use the terms “cash” and “monetary incentives” interchangeably throughout this dissertation. Certainly more granular 
distinctions can be made between the two (e.g., cash can often operate differently from credit cards, discounts and 
promotions, and the like), but I leave this as an important empirical question to be answered in future work. 
2 I use “mindset” here in the colloquial sense of the term—referring to a general mentality, attitude, and mode of 
reasoning. There exists a large and growing literature on mindsets in consumer behavior and psychology (e.g., Keinan and 
Kivetz 2011; Wyer and Xu 2010), including their associative triggers and spillovers to (often unrelated) tasks; whether 
the compensation focus I refer to throughout this dissertation indeed constitutes a mindset as the literature understands it 
is less clear. 
3 
 
Chapter 2 investigates people’s habit formation “in the wild,” under noisier but more 
naturalistic settings. The questions I tackle are straightforward: How can we encourage people to 
engage in a healthy behavior more often, like walking or going to the gym? Given a desired 
performance goal (e.g., walking 10,000 steps a day), will people work harder when they enter a 
reward program that offers cash incentives, noncash hedonic incentives (of equivalent retail value), 
or self-defined and self-administered rewards? Further, which of these incentive contracts will 
generate more longevity of effort after the intervention is over (i.e., upon the cessation of extrinsic 
incentives)?  
The results of three longitudinal field experiments, which looked at physical fitness (walking 
and going to the gym), suggest the viability of self-rewards as an effective incentive system. By self-
rewards, I refer to indulgent rewards defined and administered by the individual himself at his own 
cost3 in return for meeting a predefined effort criterion, in contrast to rewards imposed by an 
external agent (e.g., a firm paying its employees to visit the gym). Specifically, participants who 
rewarded themselves for reaching a weekly goal performed equally well as those who could earn 
cash during the incentive period and, more notably, demonstrated greater sustained effort thereafter 
for several weeks. Financially-incentivized participants, by contrast, although more likely to meet the 
prescribed goals during the incentive period, tended to revert to baseline (control) activity levels 
immediately thereafter. These findings offer some cautionary insight into the use of cash rewards to 
alter habits, with clear implications for the design of incentive contracts that aim to stimulate 
meaningful behavior change.  
In Chapter 3, I place the aforementioned behaviors within a broader framework centered 
around the greater compensation focus that monetary incentives engender. Turning here to more 
                                                     




controlled tests under single-shot decision settings, I attempt to understand how cash, relative to 
noncash rewards with equal monetary value, can affect a number of interrelated behaviors 
corresponding to various stages of goal pursuit. Specifically, I propose that by shifting people’s 
priorities toward the outcome of reward attainment (over the process of engaging in a focal task),  
cash incentives lead them to favor “safer” alternatives that guarantee payoff. This has implications 
for what kinds of reward contracts people choose (when risk or delay is involved), the types of goals 
they set, and how much integrity they exercise when completing a task.  
Empirical evidence from seven series of studies found that compared with noncash 
(hedonic) rewards, individuals who could earn cash incentives were more likely to: (i) select smaller-
certain and smaller-immediate rewards over larger-uncertain and larger-delayed rewards 
(respectively); (ii) settle for easier (i.e., “low-risk, low-reward”) performance goals and tasks; and (iii) 
cheat more to secure compensation.  
These patterns, taken together with the insights from Chapter 2, contribute to our 
understanding of the part that different kinds of incentives play in shaping habit formation, effort 
streams, and integrity. The outcomes I study in this dissertation (using participants sampled from the 
lab, online, and in the field) capture a diverse but interconnected array of behaviors—ones that span 
hypothetical as well as consequential choice, short-term as well as long-term performance, and 
decision spaces that often feature real effort with real incentives. Recognizing these areas of 
behavior as manifestations of a possibly excessive focus on compensation may help clarify why 






EXERCISING SELF-CONTROL THROUGH SELF-REWARD  
 
 
A fundamental goal of many (including scholars, firms, and policymakers) is to change people’s 
behaviors—whether they be those of the consumer, the employee, or their own. Overcoming inertia 
presents a significant challenge; humans are naturally creatures of habit, particularly when it pertains 
to matters of self-control. Because individuals generally respond to incentives,4 a commonly 
employed method to incite motivation is to directly reward good decisions or punish bad ones. 
Interventions in this tradition have predominantly relied on financial (i.e., monetary or cash) rewards 
to encourage good behavior, as when researchers pay people to go to the gym or to quit smoking 
(e.g., Charness and Gneezy 2009; Donatelle et al. 2004).  
Extensive study on the motivational reach of monetary incentives points to a largely mixed 
effect on positive behavior change (see, e.g., Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011), with many 
interventions based on financial compensation finding transient success at best (and some finding a 
net negative impact). Despite this, experimental tests that directly compare monetary with 
nonmonetary reward structures in the context of improving individuals’ effort and performance 
remain scarce. A relevant empirical question, then, concerns what kinds of incentive schemes are 
effective in promoting healthy habits like walking more or going to the gym regularly—both during 
and after the intervention. I attempt to dissect this problem in the subsequent sections.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: First, I review relevant literature on 
performance-contingent incentives (particularly monetary ones) as they relate to intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation. I next develop a conceptual framework that attempts to map cash incentives, 
                                                     
4 An oft-cited tenet in economics. 
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tangible noncash rewards, and what I call self-rewards along a “compensation-reward” continuum, in 
which incentives categorized along the compensation end are likely to evoke extrinsic motivation, 
while those categorized along the reward end are more conductive to intrinsic motivation. Then, I 
formulate testable hypotheses based on this continuum and present three longitudinal field 
experiments, each featuring a reward program that directly pit self-rewards against cash incentives in 
improving people’s physical activity.5 The empirical evidence suggests that allowing individuals to 
define and impose their own rewards generated better performance with respect to both 
engagement in the focal task (either walking or going to the gym) as well as persistence and habit 
formation in the weeks following the intervention. I conclude by discussing the implications, both 




2.1 The Ubiquity and Limitations of Monetary Incentives  
 
 
When engineering tools to change human decisions and behavior, a customary (and usually default) 
approach, reflected in both economic theory and industry practice, has appealed to cash or monetary 
incentives as impetus. A wealth of interventions relies on financial remuneration to encourage good 
habits or curb bad ones (for a review, see Gneezy et al. 2011), whether it be paying people to go to 
the gym (Charness and Gneezy 2009), to improve academic performance (Levitt, List, and Sadoff 
2016), to buy healthier food (Schwartz et al. 2014), to boost worker productivity (Lazear 2000; 
Prendergast 1999), or to quit smoking (e.g., Donatelle et al. 2004). 
 
                                                     
5 In the first of these experiments, I also examined the effects of tangible noncash rewards in the form of hedonic prizes. 
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Despite the many benefits conferred by monetary incentives (among them universality, 
fungibility, and flexibility), multiple streams of research suggest that they also carry notable 
disadvantages. As I prefaced earlier, work in economics and other disciplines has uncovered 
somewhat mixed results on the efficacy of cash incentives in motivating both short-run 
improvement and long-term performance (e.g., Gneezy et al. 2011). I review a handful of cases 
below. 
First, many financial-based interventions spanning a host of domains have struggled to 
generate sustained progress, with people often reverting to their old ways once incentives are 
withdrawn (e.g., Charness and Gneezy 2009; Giné, Karlan, and Zinman 2010; John et al. 2011; Volpp 
et al. 2008).6 For example, participants who faced monetary compensation for losing weight 
responded positively during an 8-month incentive period but subsequently regressed during the 
post-intervention period, resulting in substantial weight regain after 32 weeks (John et al. 2011). 
These findings are echoed in a number of studies in this area, which have documented an 
overarching failure (or at best modest success) by price-based incentive programs—including ones 
incorporating behavioral economics principles such as loss aversion—to help individuals maintain 
their weight loss (e.g., Jeffery et al. 2000; Jeffery, Thompson, and Wing 1978).7 Conceptualizing the 
interaction between rewards and individual motivation using a principal-agent framework, Bénabou 
and Tirole (2003) conclude that performance incentives serve as “weak reinforcers in the short run 
and negative reinforcers in the long run.” 
 Second, even when price-based incentives are potent when present, they can sometimes 
distort behaviors or undermine meaningful change by “crowding out” intrinsic motivation (for 
                                                     
6Although some debate persists on the extent and magnitude of these post-reward effects (Goswami and Urminsky 
2017; see also Kivetz, Urminsky, and Zheng 2006). 
7 In the context of consumption, too, there have surfaced similarly mixed results on the longer-run efficacy of deals, 
discounts, and price promotions and whether they may ultimately decrease brand loyalty upon retraction (e.g., 
DelVecchio, Henard, and Freling 2006; Dodson, Tybout, and Sternthal 1978). 
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reviews, see Bénabou and Tirole 2003 and Deci, Koester, and Ryan 1999; see also Deci 1972; 
Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973). That is, individuals may attribute their interest in the focal 
activity to an external factor (i.e., a cash bonus) rather than deriving inherent pleasure or fulfillment 
from engaging in the activity itself. I review this phenomenon further in Section 2.2. 
Other documented anomalies in the success of incentive systems include counterproductive 
effects on performance when an agent offers financial rewards for prosocial behavior, when s/he 
provides too many options, and when s/he pays too much or too little (for a review, see Kamenica 
2012). Drawing from research on the relative difficulty of justifying the consumption of hedonic 
relative to necessity goods (e.g., Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Okada 2005), Jeffrey (2009) documented 
in one laboratory study that cash incentives led to less productivity among university staff on a word 
game task compared to tangible noncash prizes such as a luxury massage. Finally, in the context of 
compensating participants in experimental economics and psychology, Read (2005) cautioned 
against requiring the use of real (monetary) incentives, as they do not always guarantee the 
researcher’s desired effects above those obtained in hypothetical studies.  
 
 
2.2 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation  
 
  
As Section 2.1 relayed, monetary incentives do not always work when it comes to changing people’s 
behaviors. Why, then, do they sometimes backfire or fail to achieve their desired end? A major 
stream of research on intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation suggests that extrinsic incentives can 
sometimes undermine, or “crowd out,” intrinsic motivation8 (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole 2003; Deci 
                                                     
8 The question of why monetary incentives can disincentivize behavior has been the subject of considerable scrutiny in 
the economics literature (for review, see Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011) and lies outside the scope of this 
dissertation. In Appendix A1, I briefly discuss a few alternative perspectives to the “overjustification” account that may 
govern when cash or financial incentives can lead to ostensibly perverse effects. 
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1971; Deci et al. 1999; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Higgins et al. 1995; Kivetz 2005; Kruglanski, 
Friedman, and Zeevi 1971; Lepper et al. 1973). To the extent that a person derives no reward except 
for the activity itself, s/he is said to be intrinsically motivated in performing that activity. By 
contrast, if the same individual is (or perceives him/herself to be) driven to engage in an activity for 
some reason or motive outside the task, s/he is said to be extrinsically motivated.  
The seminal crowding out (or “overjustification”) effect reported in the literature occurs 
when individuals attribute their interest in the focal activity to an external source (e.g., “cold, hard 
cash” or the threat of punishment) rather than to inherent pleasure or meaning from pursuing the 
activity. In a classic experiment, Deci (1971) observed that undergraduates in the laboratory spent 
less free time working on interesting puzzles when they had been temporarily paid $1 per puzzle in a 
previous session than when they solved them for free. By the same token, paying people to donate 
blood may counteractively reduce the supply of blood donors by crowding out existing motivations 
of altruism and civic duty (Titmuss 1970; cf. Mellström and Johannesson 2008). Because individuals 
often prefer to construe their behavior as intrinsically motivated, incentives have also been shown to 
arouse reactance if the reward is not congruent with (i.e., is unrelated to) the promoted consumption 
effort (Kivetz 2005). 
Notably, the work on overjustification by Lepper and colleagues (1973) suggests that 
incentives can undermine or crowd out intrinsic motivation only when they are superfluous—meaning 
if the individual would have engaged in a focal behavior in the first place or possessed an internal 
motivation to do so. External incentives, importantly, can still be tremendously useful tools in 
motivating actions that a decision maker struggles to perform or improve upon. This, I believe, is 
particularly true in the context of self-control dilemmas, where people too often fall short of their 
desired longer-term goals. 
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In the current research, I draw from and build on the well-established literature above, and 
in particular on the fundamental tension between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, to derive a 
framework that seeks to categorize different types of incentives (monetary and nonmonetary) along 
a continuum corresponding to their mental representation—that is, as compensation on the one 
extreme or as reward on the other. I directly assess the relative influence of cash and noncash 
incentives on several performance metrics associated with goal pursuit (e.g., goal attainment, task 
engagement, and longer-term persistence and habit formation). Of particular interest—and, indeed, 
the crux of this chapter—is the efficacy of a novel incentive mechanism I designed based on self-
reward, in which people gave themselves something that they defined in advance as a reward for 
meeting a prescribed goal. I elaborate on these ideas in the sections that follow. 
 
 
2.3 The Compensation-Reward Continuum and Self-Reward  
 
 
A core argument I advance, and test, is that different types of incentives can change how people 
encode, almost instinctively, the value attached to effort expenditure when pursuing a goal and, in 
turn, differentially affect various aspects of their performance (e.g., whether they attain the goal vs. 
how much they engage or persist in the activity). Consider an individual who struggles in 
maintaining regular physical fitness and would therefore benefit from enrollment in some sort of 
exercise incentive program. Taking the set of all externally-mediated rewards this person could face 
(i.e., rewards which lie outside the focal behavior as opposed to rewards s/he may derive from the 
behavior itself9), I suggest that a useful exercise is to further classify these incentives along a 
                                                     
9 Such internally-mediated rewards might come in the form of inherent enjoyment from exercising, or the pleasure of 
investing effort for effort’s sake. 
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continuum, from ones that signify “compensation” on the one extreme to ones that signify 
“rewards” on the other extreme. 
Specifically, by compensation I refer to the quality (or perception) of being entitled to a 
reward conditional on investing effort or meeting a goal. In other words, a person who interprets an 
incentive as compensation will tend to view it as due payment for their work; the focus becomes less 
on the activity or effort stream itself but rather being rewarded for that activity (“doing A to get B”). 
Consistent with the overjustification effects discussed previously (Section 2.2), imposing incentives 
that make people feel as if they are being compensated to perform at a certain standard will likely 
cause them to attribute their actions to the reward as opposed to the task at hand—and to behave 
accordingly.  
On the other end, I posit that some extrinsic incentives can evoke perceptions and responses 
in terms that are less about compensation and more about reward. That is, a person who interprets 
an incentive as simply a reward will tend to view it as a by-product of engaging in an effortful 
activity—here the focus rests not so much on a “tit-for-tat” understanding of effort and reward, but 
rather on performing the focal task and subsequently being rewarded (“doing A, and then getting 
B”). Under this lens, I reason, intrinsic motivation is less likely to be undermined compared to a 
compensation-oriented perspective.10 
The notion of a “compensation-reward” continuum is in line with some work that 
distinguishes between “outcome” versus “process” motivation, according to which people can 
pursue an activity either as a means to an end or for its own sake (e.g., Touré-Tillery and Fishbach 
2011; Shen, Fishbach, and Hsee 2015).11 Previous research on goal setting and self-regulation has 
                                                     
10 I revisit and expand this idea of a “compensation focus” in Chapter 3. 
11 This literature, however, has tended to compare the effects of monetary incentives against unrewarded controls; direct 
comparisons of the relative effects of cash compared to noncash (e.g., hedonic yet similarly extrinsic) rewards in altering 
behavior remain understudied.  
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similarly studied the influence of outcome-oriented compared to process-oriented goals on 
performance. For example, Zimmerman and Kitsantas (1999) gave high school girls the task of 
combining a series of kernel sentences into a single nonredundant sentence. Those assigned to an 
outcome goal (focus on minimizing the number of words in the combined sentence) performed 
worse in their post-test writing revision skill compared to those assigned to adhere to a process goal 
(focus on a 3-step method for combining sentences). In one intervention conducted on obese adults 
using financial incentives for weight loss, emphasizing the goal of the desired outcome (to lose 
weight) led to less weight loss improvements compared to emphasizing the desired effort or 
behavior (to eat healthily; Mahoney 1974). Referring to extrinsic incentives, Condry and Chambers 
(1978, p. 66) posited that “rewards often distract attention from the process of task activity to the 
product of getting a reward.”  
Integrating the logic of the above perspective, I hypothesize that different incentive 
currencies are likely to yield different degrees of attention to one end of the “compensation-reward” 
continuum or the other. And, in particular, individuals’ priorities will tend to shift toward either the 
outcome of securing compensation (in which the incentive is viewed as entitlement or due payment) 
or the process of engaging in the effort stream (in which the incentive is viewed as simply a reward 
for doing something virtuous). I separately evaluate three such currencies below.  
 
2.3.1 Cash Incentives 
 
As delineated in Section 2.1, cash is intuitively appealing precisely because it possesses so many 
advantages—at once universal, fungible, and flexible. These same characteristics that make cash 
compelling as a reward, however, also render it incredibly extrinsic. Of all incentives, cash is perhaps 
the furthest removed from the domain of effort and the most likely to feel akin to an external 
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inducement (or even bribe, in extreme cases). I posit, therefore, that it also serves as the currency 
most likely to be associated with—indeed, intertwined with—compensation.  
Incentive systems that feature cash may pose the most threat to intrinsic motivation, as cash 
represents the ultimate example of a reward that is denominated in a currency unrelated to any type 
of effort. Using the context of loyalty programs, Kivetz (2005) found that people tend to prefer 
rewards that are congruent with (i.e., related to) the required consumption effort as a means of 
coping with their reactance to marketing promotions. Choosing effort-congruent rewards (e.g., 
earning a music CD for reviewing songs) reaffirms autonomy by enabling individuals to perceive 
their actions as intrinsically motivated rather than externally influenced.  
Denominating incentives in cash, more so than in other currencies, should tend to focus 
people on attaining their compensation—a concern that invariably comes at the expense of truly 
engaging in a given effortful task. As a result, I expect that an individual faced with the prospect of 
earning cash will care more about surpassing the minimum effort threshold (as a means of 
guaranteeing the reward) over choosing to immerse him/herself in the activity itself. 
 
2.3.2 Noncash Incentives 
 
Another type of incentive worth investigating consists of noncash rewards—by these I refer 
specifically to tangible rewards that include luxury prizes or in-kind hedonic items (e.g., gourmet 
chocolates or movie tickets). This category merits further examination for several reasons. First, 
such motivators are frequently deployed in the marketplace and workforce.12 Rather than offering 
higher pay for better performance, companies often offer employees prizes in the form of travel 
packages, restricted-use gift cards, products and services, and other benefits (e.g., Culpepper and 
                                                     
12 Albeit a practice due more to lay intuition rather than based on empirical evidence.  
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Associates 2008; Famulari and Manser 1989; Kivetz and Simonson 2002a; Kivetz, Urminsky, and 
Zheng 2006). Eighty-three percent of firms in one survey reported using rewards such as 
merchandise or travel items with their sales personnel (Incentive Federation 2005), and 55% of 
participants in another survey pointed to noncash awards as a “vital component of sales 
performance management” (Aberdeen Group 2013). 
Second, beyond their widespread use, noncash tangible rewards can possess an advantage 
over their monetary counterparts in a variety of circumstances. When asked to explicitly choose 
between the two, a substantial segment of consumers—“hyperopic” individuals who feel a need to 
precommit to indulgences—preferred hedonic rewards to cash prizes of equal or greater value 
(Kivetz and Simonson 2002b). Further, because many people perceive choosing, acquiring, and 
consuming luxuries as more guilt-invoking and harder to justify (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2012; 
Kivetz and Simonson 2002b; Okada 2005; Prelec and Herrnstein 1991), the presence of greater 
effort requirements in reward programs tends to justify and enhance choices of noncash hedonic 
rewards over cash-equivalent incentives (Kivetz and Simonson 2002a). Kivetz and Zheng (2017) 
similarly demonstrated that the greater need to justify hedonic (vs. utilitarian) consumption means 
promotions have a greater positive influence on purchase likelihood of hedonic luxuries compared 
to necessity products. Drawing on this asymmetric justification effect, Jeffrey (2009) found in one 
study that tangible prizes (e.g., a 5-minute massage coupon valued at $10) caused participants in a 
laboratory study to improve by more points on a word game task relative to equivalent cash awards 
(e.g., $10).  
Although the kinds of noncash tangible rewards described above are objectively extrinsic 
(i.e., stemming from outside the focal behavior), because they are not denominated in the universal 
currency that is cash, I suggest that they may nevertheless be perceived as less extrinsic relative to cash 
incentives. That is, when confronted with the prospect of earning a $10 voucher redeemable for a 
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massage or fancy chocolates (as opposed to being paid the equivalent amount in dollars), people are 
likely to tend to treat the incentive as less of a compensation or an exchange of labor but instead as 




Lastly, I consider a novel type of incentive currency that I view as furthest from the compensation 
end of the proposed continuum—namely, self-rewards. In my paradigms and throughout this 
dissertation, this term is used to refer to rewards that people define and provide for themselves, at 
their own cost of time or money, in return for good behavior (such as reaching a prescribed goal). 
Because the incentive in this case is entirely self-imposed rather than provided by an external source, 
as with both cash and noncash tangible incentives, it is likely to be viewed even less as a form of 
“compensation.” Hence, individuals should tend to ascribe their actions to the focal behavior more 
than to attainment of the prize.    
Although I leave the precise details of the reward fairly open-ended to accommodate 
preference heterogeneity, I specifically asked participants in my experiments to define indulgences—
which could be either items or experiences—that they would otherwise feel guilty about, and hence 
attempt to avoid, consuming. To put it more concretely, an individual could make a promise to him 
that for every week he walks a certain number of steps, he will award himself by spending a night 
out with friends—an indulgence he would otherwise feel guilty about. As Kivetz and Simonson 
(2002a,b) found, people who suffer from excessive overcontrol (hyperopia) in certain aspects of 
their lives, and who tend to deprive themselves of indulgence, are more likely to precommit to such 
indulgence when given the opportunity. In this respect, a self-reward incentive system may act as 
one such “precommitment contract.” By recognizing and attempting to bridge instances of 
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intrapersonal myopic (shortsighted) and hyperopic (farsighted) behavior, self-rewards can potentially 
overcome the “one step forward, two steps back” problem that externally funded financial rewards 
often suffer from. 
The incentive scheme I have designed and will later test is inspired by—but in many ways 
distinct from—the kinds of self-regulation techniques and strategies employed by previous research 
in behavior therapy and clinical psychology. Results attesting to the efficacy of self-reinforcement 
systems in this literature (for review, see Bandura 1976) have been mixed. A handful of studies on 
the influence of self-administered consequences (in comparison to externally-generated rewards) on 
outcomes such as weight loss and classroom behavior has shown guardedly optimistic results (e.g., 
Bandura and Perloff 1967; Humphrey, Karoly, and Kirschenbaum 1978; Mahoney 1974; Mahoney, 
Moura, and Wade 1973; but cf. Castro and Rachlin 1980; Felixbrod and O’Leary 1974; Greiner and 
Karoly 1976). Notably, however, the paradigms used in this space have largely focused on the study 
of children’s reinforcement schedules, on the use of financial incentives within token economies, 
and on the comparison of self-administered rewards to a no-reward (or delayed-reward) control. For 
example, in one intervention (conducted by Mahoney 1974) frequently cited as evidence for the 
effectiveness of self-reward, participants were instructed to award themselves portions of their own 
monetary deposit ($35), left at the beginning of the program, based on their weight loss progress.  
To date, I do not know of any studies that have systematically examined the efficacy of self-
rewards (i.e., indulgent rewards both self-defined and self-administered by individuals at their own 
cost) relative to cash incentives on motivating and sustaining chronic habits. The empirical tests I 
conduct in this chapter attempt to address this gap.  
 





A foremost objective of this chapter is to experimentally assess the motivational effectiveness of a 
self-reward incentive program relative to other (arguably more “default”) systems based on cash and 
tangible noncash rewards. In the three studies that follow, I tested whether an indulgent self-
reward—again, defined and administered by individuals at their own cost—contingent on reaching a 
performance goal can, more so than cash incentives, prompt greater engagement in a “virtuous” 
activity (e.g., walking more) and ultimately enact lasting (or at least less ephemeral) behavior change. 
If indeed there exists some correspondence between the types of incentives outlined in 
Section 2.3 and the extent to which they are interpreted as “compensation” versus “reward,” we can 
generate a number of testable predictions for performance during and after the intervention. A key 
supposition here is that the effects of a given incentive will not reflect equally across all relevant 
metrics. Rewards that are perceived as more externally induced and thus more like compensation 
(e.g., cash) may motivate people to work hard and do better on some dimensions but perform worse 
on others. This has several implications for goal pursuit. Specifically: 
(i) Goal attainment. Whether or not people meet their goals or achieve a certain performance 
standard is a common (if not dominant) primary outcome that interventions typically attempt to 
target. On this metric, I predicted people incentivized with cash to perform quite well over the 
course of the reward program. Precisely because their compensation depends on reaching a 
minimum effort threshold (e.g., walking 50,000 steps a week), they should tend to meet their goals 
frequently—perhaps more so than those incentivized with self-rewards of their own definition and 
provision.  
(ii) Engagement. However, equally informative and perhaps more interesting measures to 
consider are ones that speak to the process of goal pursuit during the intervention. In particular, to 
what extent are people engaged in the effortful activity itself: walking more steps, visiting the gym 
more times, and spending more time during each visit? Here I anticipated self-rewards—which are 
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arguably less susceptible to crowding out effects—to stimulate greater engagement, while cash-based 
incentive programs would engender more demotivating effects overall.  
(iii) Persistence and habit formation. Finally, we can ask whether people continue to persist in 
their efforts once the reward program concludes (i.e., when extrinsic incentives are withdrawn) or 
whether their progress evaporates over time. Because self-rewards lie toward the “reward” as 
opposed to “compensation” end of the continuum introduced in Section 2.3, I expected these 
incentives to produce greater persistence and habit formation during this period. By contrast, cash 
incentives (and the accompanying focus on compensation they bring to mind) will tend to provoke a 
dramatic decrease in performance, as people no longer have a “reason” to exert significant effort.  
Tangible noncash rewards, due to their combined monetary and nonmonetary character, are likely to 
fall somewhere in between.  
 
 
2.5 Overview of Studies 
 
 
I tested the propositions delineated in Section 2.4 in a series of three incentive-compatible, 
longitudinal field experiments that compared the effects of self-rewards against primarily cash 
incentives (and noncash hedonic prizes in one study) on increasing regular physical activity.  
 Sedentarism is a major contributing risk factor to adverse health outcomes like obesity, 
hypertension, and cardiovascular disease (e.g., Tudor-Locke and Basset 2004). To assess the 
effectiveness of different incentive structures in targeting this issue, I used a pedometer-based 
intervention in Studies 1 and 2 to measure how many steps participants walk, a technique that has 
been used in many health-related studies, both cross-sectional and longitudinal (e.g., Croteau 2003; 
Richardson et al. 2008; Rooney et al. 2003; Sequeira et al. 1995; Tudor-Locke et al. 2004). Compared 
to more traditional methods relying on questionnaires or “food diary” surveys, pedometers allow 
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both participants and researchers to more accurately and readily observe their activity levels from 
day to day. Study 3 used a smartphone fitness app to log and track gym activity. 
Participants across the three studies consisted of Columbia University students (drawn 
almost exclusively from the undergraduate population) recruited from the Behavioral Research Lab 
at Columbia Business School. I enlisted between one to three research assistants to help in the role 
of experimenter, which involved weekly contacts with each participant (i.e., scheduling appointments 
for check-in sessions, administering online surveys, and distributing treatment-specific rewards 
during the incentive period). The research assistants had no advance knowledge about the specific 
nature and direction of the experimental hypothesis, although they could not be blinded to 
condition due to the nature of the intervention. Sample sizes were determined in advance.   
 Each study encompassed two major stages, or periods (see Figure 1 for a flow of 
participants through enrollment, intervention, and post-intervention). In the first stage, participants 
were recruited at the university behavioral lab and asked to self-monitor their walking activity 
(Studies 1-2) or gym attendance and activity (Study 3) for a month. I randomly assigned participants 
during enrollment into a control and treatment groups; they had the chance to be rewarded on a 
weekly basis during the next three weeks comprising the incentive period. Those in the control 
group received additional compensation (in cash) regardless of how they performed, whereas those 
in the treatment arms qualified for a bonus reward contingent on meeting a predetermined goal. 
Following the intervention window, participants were informed that the study was over and that 
they would no longer need to check-in at the lab every week (in addition, all external compensation 
would be discontinued). A post-incentive period, lasting approximately one month, then 
commenced in which I continued to unobtrusively monitor and gauge performance.   
 A central objective of the present research is to analyze the influence of different reward 
programs in the context of personally relevant and naturalistic settings by studying the kinds of 
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repeated decisions that people face in their everyday lives. Taken together, the findings across the 
three field experiments delineated in this chapter suggest that contingent self-rewards, where 
individuals are allowed to define and administer their own rewards, can be a viable tool in 
galvanizing positive behavior change. 
 
 






Study 1 was a pedometer-based intervention I launched in the winter of 2015 that encouraged 
people to walk more on an everyday basis. I expected that participants to average more steps each 
week in the presence (vs. absence) of contingent incentives. Notably, self-imposed rewards should 
yield greater sustained performance than cash incentives, with participants exposed to the self-
reward treatment showing the most long-term (i.e., as observed in the post-incentive period) 
improvement. Moreover, I anticipated that this pattern would deviate from lay intuition: People will 
predict, on the contrary, that exercise incentive contracts featuring cash incentives are more likely to 
be successful and effective (both in the short- and long-term) than contracts based on self-rewards.  
Before elaborating on the procedural details, I first highlight and discuss some key design 
features of the intervention. 
Sample and participant flow. A power analysis using Charness and Gneezy (2009) as a guideline 
indicated that, with 40 participants per group, I would able to detect a minimum effect size of .63 
standard deviation in daily steps walked (assuming 80% power and an α of .05). As a buffer against 
anticipated attrition, I aimed to recruit at least 25% more participants in each cell.  
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Participants in Study 1 consisted of 231 Columbia students recruited from the Behavioral 
Research Lab at Columbia Business School (average age = 22.4 [SD = 4.2], 35% male, average BMI 
= 26.2 [4.0]). I randomly assigned individuals to one of four conditions: a no-incentive control and 




Figure 1: Flow of participants (Study 1). 
 
Incentive period time horizon. A meta-analysis of the intervention windows of pedometer-based 
studies (Richardson et al. 2008) found a range of four weeks to one year, with a median of 16 weeks. 
In my experiment, I set the intervention (i.e., intervention) period to last four weeks in total 
(including the first week of recruitment and enrollment), followed by another four weeks of 
observation without externally-imposed incentives. I reasoned that for the purposes of this 
experiment, a month-long intervention allowed for ample time to capture individuals’ repeated 
behaviors without cutting into extended breaks in the academic calendar, as well as to give 
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participants an opportunity to develop walking habits that could potentially persist once the 
incentive period concluded. 
Target effort expenditure. I imposed a target effort threshold that was fixed across all 
participants, since allowing them to define their own goals would have made it hard to separate any 
effect of individual differences in goal setting on performance from the pure effect of incentives. 
How many steps per day are enough? Existing work featuring pedometers have converged on a 
benchmark of about 10,000 steps per day as the “active amount” standard (Croteau 2004; Rooney et 
al. 2003; Tudor-Locke and Basset 2004). To decrease the chances of obtaining floor or ceiling 
effects, I chose a threshold that exceeds participants’ average step count but not so high as to be 
disincentivizing due to the perceived infeasibility of meeting the goal (leading to a “what-the-hell” 
effect, e.g., Cochran and Tesser 1996). To that end, I set a minimum step goal of 50,000 steps total 
per week during the incentive period. Note that this built-in flexibility effectively allows individuals 
two days of rest, permitting them extra “slack” in goal pursuit (see, e.g., Sharif and Shu 2017).  
Reward interval. I set both performance thresholds and rewards at the weekly level: 
Participants were instructed to check-in to the lab every week (i.e., on a day exactly seven days from 
their first session) for a total of four times to collect a small attendance fee as well as any rewards 
coinciding to their incentive condition.  
Measurement tool. To reliably measure behavior not only at one point in time but over the 
course of (and indeed following) the intervention program, I needed an instrument that was 
objective (i.e., not reliant on self-reports), comparable across individuals, and as inobtrusive as 
possible. Therefore, in lieu of a wearable device such as a Fitbit, I used a pedometer smartphone 
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application called Moves13 to track people’s step count throughout the study. I had all participants 
install the app and carry their smartphones on their person as often as possible.14  
While mobile fitness tracker apps (including Moves) can often imperfectly capture 
individuals’ true behavior, several features of Moves in particular afford some advantages over 
pedometer devices or similar apps. First, Moves is free to download for both iPhones and Android 
smartphones, models that cover the vast majority of our sample, and runs in the background 
(requiring no user input or interaction) so long as tracking is turned on. Second, it uses a 
combination of the mobile phone’s built-in accelerometer (motion-based) as well as GPS (location-
based) data to record more accurate measurements than apps that use the accelerometer alone. To 
further assess accuracy, I conducted a pretest (see Appendix A2 for details) where I found that the 
app was quite accurate in comparison to a wearable Fitbit device (and if anything, slightly 
underestimated rather than overestimated steps).    
Third, Moves has a minimalistic design (see Figure 2) that limits the display to step count 
(and location) data, reducing the likelihood that participants could be influenced by app-specific 
factors stemming from extraneous content, social comparison, or any implicit “nudges” (e.g., 
information about sleeping and dietary habits, leaderboards or other social cues that could lead to 
spillover effects, etc.).  
                                                     
13 Unfortunately, the app has since been shut down (as of 2018). 




Figure 2: Screenshot of Moves app interface (Studies 1 and 2). 
 
Fourth, the app can reliably differentiate between times when participants are walking or 
running (in which case steps are counted) and when they are on transport (in which case steps are 
not counted). Fifth, users cannot retroactively enter or alter their recorded step data, nor can they 
easily accumulate a large number of steps by, for instance, flexing the arms while holding the phone 
to essentially cheat or “game” the system. Finally, Moves kept a complete and running history of a 
given individuals’ steps since installation of the app, along with an online user interface synced to 
users’ accounts from which step data can be readily downloaded. By assigning each person a unique 
alias account tied to their phone, this allowed me to nonintrusively monitor participants’ walking 
activity online so long as they carried their phone on their person (e.g., in a pocket, jacket, or bag)—
even when the experiment was ostensibly over.  
Outcomes. The primary outcomes of interest for each individual consisted of, for both the 
intervention and post-incentive period, (i) the total number of steps walked each week, as measured 
by the Moves app, and (ii) an indicator for whether the step goal was met (or exceeded) that week.  
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Conservative control. To ensure that a difference in absolute payment does not drive any 
treatment effect, those assigned to the control group received the same amount of compensation 
(but independently of their step count) as those in the cash incentive arm who earned the bonus 
reward. Previous literature has documented increases in physical activity, consistent with a mere 
measurement effect, with the use of a pedometer alone (e.g., Croteau 2004). In the present design, 
any effects of the treatment groups I detect would capture differences over and above any beneficial 
effects of self-monitoring. 
Enforcement policy. Incentive structures are liable to unravel without a suitable enforcement 
mechanism to discourage noncompliance. To diminish this concern, I imposed an enforcement 
policy whereby failure to redeem a reward would result in its forfeiture to a randomly selected 
charity or foundation from a list of several organizations. To increase the changes that such a 
donation “threat” would indeed be perceived as undesirable and threatening from participants’ 
perspectives, I selected social and political organizations with a diverse— and hence more likely 
contradictory—range of goals. Notable among these was the National Rifle Association, an 
organization rated as highly disliked by the vast majority of Columbia college students (as confirmed 




 Recruitment and enrollment. I recruited participants from the Columbia student lab pool during 
a 5-day (Monday to Friday) window as part of an advertised month-long study about walking, 
ostensibly to provide feedback on a pedometer app. To qualify for the study, all participants had to 
own an iPhone or Android smartphone compatible with the Moves app, which I used to track daily 
26 
 
walking activity. I instructed eligible participants to download the application on their phone in 
advance of their first appointment.  
During the initial session, I randomly assigned participants to one of four conditions (i.e., a 
control and three treatment arms). I first administered an intake survey that measured baseline 
fitness habits and interests (including perceived physical activity levels) to help account for some 
individual characteristics. Participants read an overview of the study, reiterating that their 
participation meant that they would commit to attend the next three weekly sessions. Each of these 
sessions would act as a 5-minute check-in where they would receive a $3 show-up fee (see Appendix 
A4 for full instructions). I then asked participants a series of questions about their exercise and 
physical activity levels, habits, and routines (e.g., Godin 1985), followed by their evaluations (1 = 
Dislike very much; 7 = Like very much) of a series of 18 randomly ordered nonprofit organizations, 
including the National Rifle Association (see Appendix A5).  
Next, I informed people about the “pedometer program” they would be enrolling in as part 
of the study. Specifically, they read:  
To stay active, researchers and health professional experts (including the U.S. surgeon general) recommend 
walking at least 10,000 steps per day. Many studies have also shown that people who increased their daily step 
count to around 10,000 steps tended to experience several health benefits (e.g., Tudor-Locke & Basset, 2004). 
To help improve your health by walking more on a daily basis, you will be participating in a program for the 
next week. This program will use a pedometer, which tracks the number of steps you walk each day. 
 
Participants further learned that over the course of three weeks, they would be asked to monitor 
their steps using Moves, a smartphone app that uses accelerometer and GPS data to track step 
activity. They were then instructed to get the attention of the experimenter, who would create and 
set up an alias account for them. The purpose of the alias account, they read, is to connect their 
individual Moves data to a randomly generated account that can’t be traced back to their identity; in 
this way the researchers would be able to verify their pedometer activity during the study without 
accessing any personal data or accounts. To preserve participants’ privacy, I generated a batch of 
unique emails to serve as alias accounts in advance. At this point the experimenter randomly 
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assigned each participant one of these pre-generated accounts (with a username and password) and 
linked it to the app on that individual’s phone; this allowed me to remotely and unobtrusively 
monitor daily activity on the Moves server.  
Upon setting up their Moves account, all participants were encouraged to walk at least 
10,000 steps per day, after which they saw instructions specific to the condition they were randomly 
assigned (see Appendix A4 for detailed instructions). Participants assigned to the control (i.e., self-
monitoring only) group read that they would, as part of the program, also receive $20 (in cash) at the 
end of each week. Hence, a weekly reward would be distributed to each participant in this condition 
but, crucially, would not be contingent on his/her expended effort (i.e., walking a certain number of 
steps). Over the course of the incentive period, control participants could receive net earnings of 
$69 in cash.15  
Those assigned to one of the three treatment arms earned a bonus for each week that they 
attained a target (minimum) step goal of 50,000 steps. Specifically, those in the cash incentive 
condition read that if they “meet or exceed the target goal of 10,000 steps per day for at least 5 days 
(out of 7) OR 50,000 steps total over 7 days,” they would earn $20 in cash as a bonus reward at the 
end of each week. Thus, these individuals could earn a maximum net earnings of $69 if they 
successfully met the goal every week thereafter and attended the check-ins.  
In the noncash reward condition, participants read that if they met or exceeded the target step 
goal (the same goal as in the cash group), they would earn a bonus reward consisting of their choice 
of one item, with an equivalent retail value of $20, from a predetermined 7-item gift catalog. The 
displayed catalog included an assortment of indulgent, hedonic tangible prizes such as a box of 
gourmet chocolates, a gift card to a local coffee shop (frequently visited by Columbia students), two 
                                                     
15 This figure does not include the $5 Amazon gift card participants could earn for completing the post-incentive 
debriefing final survey. 
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movies tickets, and a gift card for a “Spa Day.” (I chose these items based on open-ended responses 
provided by a separate sample of lab participants in a pretest.)  Participants then indicated which 
reward they would prefer from the menu provided.16  
Finally, those in the self-reward condition read that if they met or exceeded the target step 
goal, they would earn their choice of a reward they have defined and will give themselves. 
Specifically, I presented them with the following instructions:  
[T]his reward should be anything that you find pleasurable but not really necessary—something you would 
like to “indulge in” more but would normally feel guilty about indulging in.  
 
This reward can be either a tangible item (e.g., an allowance you give yourself to spend on a good or service) 
or an experience (e.g., a few hours to read a book, take a long walk, or catch up on television, etc.). Most 
importantly, it should be something you feel you don’t currently afford for yourself as much as you would 
like—some indulgence you really feel is “missing 
 from your life.  
 
The reward you define needs to be within your ability and resources to give yourself within the next 7 days 
from today.  
 
Participants then described a reward satisfying the criteria described above. I added that they would 
be free to define a different reward for future weeks but to first describe a reward for the current 
week. Unlike the control, cash, or noncash conditions, the cost of this self-defined, self-administered 
reward is borne fully by the participant rather than the program sponsor.  
After learning about the condition-specific incentives, I implemented the enforcement policy 
by informing participants what would happen should they fail to redeem their reward each week. I 
stressed to everyone the importance of attending the next weekly check-in (which would take place 
in exactly seven days) to claim their rewards. In particular, those in the control group read that if 
they failed to claim their $20 payment, that $20 would be forfeited to a “randomly selected nonprofit 
organization” from the list of nonprofits they rated earlier (these 18 organizations were displayed 
again on the same page). Among those assigned to the cash incentive treatment arm, I explained that 
only in the event that they successfully met the target step goal but fail to claim the $20 bonus 
                                                     
16 If they so desired, these participants had the option of switching their reward choice from week to week. 
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reward would that $20 be forfeited to one of the randomly selected nonprofits from the same list. 
Importantly, no donation would be enacted if they did not meet the goal. Participants in the 
noncash reward condition read similar instructions as those in the cash incentive group, except that 
the forfeiture (should they meet the goal but fail to claim the bonus) would consist of their chosen 
reward from the catalog worth approximately $20. Finally, in addition to emphasizing the need to 
attend the weekly sessions, I informed participants assigned to the self-reward treatment arm that 
during these sessions they would be asked to write about their experience of consuming the reward 
they defined for themselves if they met the goal. To verify reward redemption, I further instructed 
participants that should they qualified for the bonus self-reward, they must submit documentation 
that they either consumed or plan to consume the reward they defined for that week (e.g., a picture 
or receipt of the experience or product) during each check-in.  
After seeing the enforcement policy terms, all participants proceeded to what appeared to be 
a loading screen intended to simulate a random selection of one of the organizations by the system. 
In reality, the National Rifle Association (NRA) served as the chosen nonprofit for everyone. 
Participants were run separately or in separate rooms, limiting the possibility of any social spillover 
effects. I presented this “threat” only to incentivize people to truly reward themselves should they 
earn it and did not actually donate to the NRA (a deception I revealed during debriefing at the 
conclusion of the study—that is, after the post-incentive period).  
Finally, participants provided measures of BMI (calculated based on height and weight17), 
and relevant individual differences consisting of trait hyperopia, indulgence guilt, self-efficacy, and 
general self-control (see Appendix A6 for scale items), followed by basic demographic information. 
After being thanked and compensated for their participation, they received from the experimenter a 
                                                     
17 Participants self-reported their own height and used a scale to measure their weight. A malfunction of the scale 




packet containing instructions and reminders corresponding to their assigned condition, as well as an 
activity log for the next week where they were asked to write down their step counts (as recorded by 
the Moves app) along with any other exertion-intensive exercises they engaged in (see Appendix 
A7). The experimenter instructed them to take the packet home and bring it with them to the next 
appointment, where they would turn it in. Participants were also told to expect weekly emails 
reminding them to track their progress and collect their rewards by attending each check-in session.  
Incentive period. Over the next three weeks—that is, the incentive period—, participants 
monitored their walking activity using the Moves app and turned in a weekly exercise log of their 
daily step count and activity to the experimenter at the end of each week. During each weekly check-
in, they claimed the rewards corresponding to their assigned incentive condition, collected a $3 
additional cash payment simply for showing up, and received a new packet to take home with an 
updated exercise log.  
Post-incentive period. The experiment officially concluded from the participants’ perspective 
after three weeks following the first session. All extrinsic rewards were discontinued, and 
participants were told that they will no longer receive any additional rewards, weekly email 
reminders, or have the “threat” of charity donations as an enforcement policy. Notably, however, 
the experimenter instructed everyone to keep their Moves account active for the foreseeable future 
until notified otherwise for “data calibration” purposes.18 Unbeknownst to participants, I continued 
to remotely access and monitor their daily walking activity and performance over the course of the 
next five weeks. 
Finally, following the post-incentive period, I administered one final, 10-minute survey that 
participants could fill out online remotely in exchange for a $5 Amazon gift card to be delivered 
                                                     
18 As part of the cover story, the experimenter told participants that the data from their phone would take a while to 
sync properly to the online interface. Hence, it would be important to refrain from making any changes to their account. 
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electronically upon completion. The exit survey included a memory test of what rewards they were 
exposed to as part of the pedometer study as well as a number of individual difference measures 
encompassing judgment (satisfaction, perceived success of achieving goals, perceived difficulty and 
effort expenditure, and situational intrinsic motivation) and behavior (changes in steps/day). In the 
last set of questions, I presented the three incentive program contracts (cash, noncash, and self-
reward) and asked participants to provide their preferences for each reward program under joint 
evaluation (see Appendix A8 for the full instructions). I distributed the survey link to all participants 
who first enrolled in the program, even if they attrited during the incentive period; the response rate 
was high (recovering 81% of the initial sample) and did not differ in proportion across the four 




Randomization check. Comparisons of relevant self-reported characteristics (e.g., frequency and 
baseline levels of physical activity, desire to improve activity levels, chronic traits, etc.) indicated that 
random assignment achieved sufficient balance across the four incentive groups; no measure 
differed significantly by condition (all ps > .1; see Table 1). Note that only 32% of our sample 
consisted of Android users (the rest used iPhones); device type did not substantially influence the 
main results. 
 


























































































Table 1: Baseline summary statistics (Study 1). Standard errors are in parentheses below the means for each 
incentive condition. The scales used for each measure are indicated in parentheses.  
 
Attrition. I lost around 14% of the original sample to follow-up over the course of the 
incentive period, defined as those who failed to show up to an in-person session at the lab. I 
excluded participants who attrited during the incentive period, although including those who 
dropped out during the first three weeks did not substantially change the results. Considerably more 
people attrited during the post-incentive period, defined as those whose Moves accounts recorded 
no activity, indicating that they had stopped using the app (or had disconnected their alias account).  
Although attrition rates in both periods did not vary by experimental condition in any week during 
the entire observation window (see Appendix A9), a limitation is the extent to which I can 
confidently interpret the results during the later weeks (e.g., weeks 7 and 8) of the post-incentive 
period. To further address this concern, I conducted a robustness check following the 
recommendation of Dumville and colleagues (2006), in which I separately compare the baseline 
characteristics across incentive conditions among participants lost to follow-up (see Appendix A10). 
None of these measures differed as a function of incentive condition (all ps > .1), suggesting that 




Self-rewards defined. What kinds of rewards did participants define for themselves? Open-
ended responses (see Appendix A11 for a tabulation of sample rewards) indicated that many 
individuals defined rewards that were not costly in terms of money but rather time (e.g., catching up 
on a television series, reading a book for fun, or sleeping in). Participants’ elaboration of their 
reasoning process for why they defined the specific reward they wrote revealed that such rewards 
were indeed perceived as guilt-evoking and constituted consumption items and experiences which 
they did not usually afford for themselves. 
Goal attainment. Figure 3 shows the proportion of participants who met (or exceeded) the 
step goal (50,000 steps) for each incentive condition from week to week. Weeks 1 through 3 




Figure 3: Percentage of participants who met the step goal (50,000+ steps) each week (Study 1). The vertical 
dotted line denotes the transition window from the incentive to post-incentive period. 
 
Turning first to the incentive period (weeks 1-3), we can discern a greater overall propensity to meet 
the goal in the cash condition relative to not only the control but the two treatment conditions as 
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well. In week 1, compared to 24% in the control, 59%, 54%, and 47%, in the cash, noncash, and 
self-reward groups, respectively, walked at least 50,000 steps total (χ2(3) = 16.79, p = .001); this 
difference was driven by the overall effect of the three treatment arms over the control. For 
example, more participants in the self-reward condition met the goal relative to control levels (B = 
1.04, SE = .41, χ2(1) = 6.30, p = .01), as was true for the cash and noncash groups. I observed a 
similar pattern for weeks 2 and 3 of the incentive period, where the relative advantage of monetary 
incentives became more readily apparent (week 2: 31%control vs. 67%cash vs. 48%noncash vs. 46%self-reward; 
χ2(3) = 15.15, p = .002; week 3: 24%control vs. 77%cash vs. 60%noncash and 61%self-reward; χ
2(3) = 27.18, p 
< .001). Averaging across the three weeks of the incentive period, 68%, 54%, and 51% of those in 
the cash, noncash, and self-reward groups met (or exceeded) the prescribed 50,000 total steps each 
week, respectively, compared to only 26% in the control.  
However, as soon as the post-incentive period began, a conspicuous change in behavior 
occurred. During week 4, compared to 37% in the control, 32% and 33% among those in the cash 
and noncash incentive conditions, respectively, met the goal. By contrast, 54% of participants 
assigned to the self-reward treatment arm did. Only participants in this group fared (marginally) 
better on this measure compared to the control (χ2(1) = 2.4, p = .12). Those in the cash and noncash 
conditions performed no differently than their control counterparts and performed worse than 
participants in the self-reward treatment (cash: χ2(1) = 3.8, p = .05; noncash: χ2(1) = 3.3, p = .07). 
Looking several weeks beyond into the post-incentive period, participants who rewarded themselves 
during the intervention continued to maintain fairly high levels of goal attainment relative to the 
control, while no such advantage appeared for those who were incentivized with cash or noncash 
hedonic rewards. 
Steps walked. Given the continuous nature of the dependent measure, a perhaps more 
instructive outcome (beyond the binary metric of goal attainment) consists of how much people 
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walked over the course of the intervention and thereafter. Figure 4 displays the total number of 
steps participants walked each week on average for each incentive condition.  
 
 
Figure 4: Average total steps walked each week (Study 1). The vertical dotted line denotes the transition 
window from the incentive to post-incentive period. The horizontal dotted line denotes the prescribed goal 
of 50,000 steps per week. Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). 
 
During the first week of the incentive period, the number of total weekly steps walked 
differed as a function of incentive condition (Mcontrol = 39,807 steps [SDcontrol = 15,859]
19; Mcash = 
51,057 steps [16,468]; Mnoncash = 50,707 steps [17,031]; Mself-reward = 47,717 steps [17,795]; F(3,221) = 
5.36, p = .001). Planned contrasts revealed that compared to the control group, each of the incentive 
treatment arms yielded a greater step count (cash: t(221) = 3.56, p < .001; noncash: t(221) = 3.38, p 
= .001; self-reward: t(221) = 2.50, p = .01). Combined, the three treatment conditions lead to more 
steps walked than the control (t(221) = 3.84, p < .001). The same pattern emerged in the next two 
weeks of the incentive period (see Appendix A12 for a summary of these results).  
                                                     
19 Standard deviations are henceforth denoted in closed brackets following their corresponding means. 
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Averaging across the incentive period (weeks 1-3), the amount of steps walked varied by 
condition (Mcontrol = 41,463 steps [SDcontrol = 12,704]; Mcash = 53,013 steps [13,918]; Mnoncash = 52,407 
steps [14,116]; Mself-reward = 51,923 steps [14,512]; F(3,195) = 7.95, p < .001), with participants in the 
cash incentive, noncash incentive, and self-reward groups accumulating more steps than the control 
(t(195) = 4.86, p < .001) but not differing from each other (all pairwise ps > .1). Individuals in the 
treatment conditions walked on average nearly 11,000 more steps a week than those in the control, 
suggesting that contingent incentives indeed “worked.” Notably, those in the self-reward arm—who 
fully funded their own rewards—performed equally well as those who could earn (externally 
imposed) $20 cash bonuses. 
The stronger test of my central hypotheses, however, concerns performance when I remove 
the explicitly articulated incentive structure (i.e., in the post-incentive period). In other words, how 
do people fare once they are no longer offered weekly rewards or being monitored as part of an 
experiment? During the pivotal transition from week 3 (incentive period) to week 4 (post-incentive 
period), those in the cash incentive treatment suffered an immediate and sharp decline, reverting to 
activity levels (M = 42,305 [20,888]) no different from the control (M = 40,587 [21,077]; t(153) 
= .38, p = .70). This was also true of the noncash condition (M = 45,172 [19,689]; t(153) = 1.03, p 
= .31), albeit to a slightly lesser extent. However, participants exposed to the self-reward 
intervention maintained their improvement in step count (M = 51,118 [18,146]) relative to the 
control (t(153) = 2.36, p = .02) and to the three other conditions combined (t(153) = 2.28, p = .02), a 
trend that persisted for several weeks thereafter. Further, a simple effects analysis of period (i.e., 
from week 3 to week 4) within each condition found while neither the control nor the self-reward 
group exhibited any significant decline from week 3 to week 4 (control: F(1,153) = 2.52, p = .11; 
self-reward: F(1,153) = 1.45, p = .23), both the cash and noncash incentive conditions saw 
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considerable drops in performance during this interval (cash: F(1,153) = 11.90, p = .001; noncash: 
F(1,153) = 4.30, p = .04).  
I analyzed the number of steps participants walked as a function of incentive condition, 
averaging over the two periods (incentive and post-incentive). A 4 (incentive condition) × 2 (period) 
mixed analysis of variance, with incentive condition as a between-subjects factor and period as a 
repeated factor, revealed a main effect of period (F(1,153) = 33.78, p < .001) qualified by a condition 
× period interaction (F(3,153) = 4.65, p = .004). Decomposing this interaction further, the simple 
effects of period found that unlike the control and self-reward groups, who did not differ in step 
count across the periods, those in the cash (F(1,153) = 31.37, p < .001) and noncash (F(1,153) = 
11.53, p = .001) conditions dramatically reduced their activity once the experiment concluded from 
the participants’ perspective.  
Note that in both outcome measures examined above (goal attainment and steps walked), 
participants tended to experience a particularly stark dip in week 5, followed by a gradual climb in 
performance. I suspect that these movements are most likely due to (i) university-wide midterm 
exams, which aligned with week 5 (and which I further corroborated with self-reports by 
participants themselves during their check-in appointments); and (ii) a combination of spring break 
immediately afterward, compounded by noticeably warmer weather. The overall lift toward the end 
of the post-incentive observation window may therefore be partially inflated by seasonality. Despite 
adding measurement noise, however, these exogenous variations should not interact with the 
incentive conditions to account for the relative differences I observe within these conditions.  
Clustering around the goal. It is noteworthy that we do not witness a perfect correspondence 
between goal attainment and walked intensity. The differences in performance between whether 
people met the step goal and how much they walked speak to an important manner in which cash 
incentives, unlike noncash alternatives, can “distort” behavior. Figure 5 illustrates this point by 
38 
 
showing the full distribution of steps across all participants in each incentive group. For simplicity, I 
present the distributions for week 3 (Figure 5) and week 4 (Figure 6) only, as they most clearly depict 
the contrast in behavior among those in the cash condition as they transition from incentive to post-
incentive period (the other weeks exhibit similar patterns; see Appendix A13).  
 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of steps in week 3 (Study 1). Each dot is an individual. Average number of steps for 
each incentive condition are overlaid. Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). The horizontal dotted line 
denotes the prescribed goal of 50,000 steps per week. 
 
Taking a closer look at the cash incentive group in Figure 5a, one feature that becomes readily 
apparent is a “bunching around” the goal of 50,000 steps (i.e., the minimum effort threshold 
required to earn the reward)—and, by comparison, a sparseness in data immediately below the 
threshold. In other words, among cash-incentivized participants, a considerably higher proportion 
just barely reached the goal compared to those who just barely missed it. This discontinuity is 
notably muted (if not absent altogether) in the control, noncash, and self-reward conditions—there 
we observe smoother distributions overall, suggesting that these individuals may have been less 
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concentrated on meeting the goal (and attaining compensation) and more focused on simply walking 
more. Unsurprisingly, once the experiment ended and external incentives discontinued, the same 
“bunching” around the goal is no longer present among those in the cash incentive arm (Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of steps in week 4 (Study 1). Each dot is an individual. Average number of steps for 
each incentive condition are overlaid. Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). The horizontal dotted line 
denotes the prescribed goal of 50,000 steps per week. 
 
As an alternative visualization to further capture these differences in “clustering” behavior, I 
looked at the underlying shapes of each distribution using a series of density plots20 (Figures 7-8). 
Examining first the incentive period (week 3, Figure 7), the three treatment arms (cash, noncash, and 
self-reward) each walked on average more steps compared to those in the control.  
 
                                                     
20 These are essentially “smooth” or continuous histograms that illustrate the overall distribution shape (in this case, 




Figure 7: Density of steps walked in week 3 (Study 1). The vertical line of each density curve denotes the 
average steps walked corresponding to the incentive condition. 
 
Consistent with the patterns shown in Figure 5a, the signature “bunching” among individuals in the 
cash condition is again visible here in the pronounced peak centered slightly above the 50,000-step 
threshold (characterized by lower variance around the mean). By contrast, I observed considerably 
wider peaks, with higher variance, for each of the other three conditions (and especially for the self-
reward treatment arm). And, as expected, no such peak appears in the cash condition once the 





Figure 8: Density of steps walked in week 3 (Study 1). The vertical line of each density curve denotes the 
average steps walked corresponding to the incentive condition. 
 
Goal gradient behavior. The data above suggest that cash-incentivized participants were fairly 
motivated to reach the goal but substantially less motivated to surpass it. A related question is when 
people tended to meet their goals from week to week. To answer this, I examined participants’ step 
activity at the daily level to see whether any systematic fluctuations prevailed from day to day. 
Figures 9 and 10 display the daily number of steps walked in each incentive condition aggregated 





Figure 9: Average steps walked each day during the incentive period (weeks 1-3; Study 1). Error bars are 
standard errors (±1 SEM). 
 
While there was considerable variation how many steps participants walked over the course 
of a week, one idiosyncratic feature emerged among those in the cash condition during the incentive 
period (Figure 9). In particular, only among those who encountered cash incentives did a 
pronounced increase in steps appear on the last day, immediately prior to their check-in session 
where they would claim their reward (if they qualified to earn it). The simple effect of day (i.e., day 6 
to 7) revealed a significant difference only among those exposed to cash incentives (F(1,195) = 6.5, p 
= .01) and in no other incentive condition. By comparison, once extrinsic rewards are withdrawn in 





Figure 10: Average steps walked each day during the post-incentive period (weeks 4-8; Study 1). Error bars are 
standard errors (±1 SEM). 
 
This pattern, I propose, is consistent with the “goal gradient” behavior that previous work has 
documented (e.g., Kivetz et al. 2006). In this case, participants who faced cash incentives appeared to 
accelerate their effort as they approached the focal goal or reward—waiting until the last minute 
before meeting the minimum requirement that secures them payment. Those assigned to the 
noncash and self-reward conditions, however, did not share this same inclination, instead smoothing 
out their effort stream from day to day. 
Individual characteristics. Previous research suggests that financial incentives are primarily 
effective only for those who were previously lacking in the domain of interest (Charness and Gneezy 
2009; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011; John et al. 2011). For instance, Charness and Gneezy 
(2009) discovered that paying people to go to the gym helped ex ante nonregular attendees but in 
some cases backfired for regular attendees during the post-incentive period. I expected, therefore, to 
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see in my data the strongest results for the self-reward among those who indicated at baseline  
higher levels of physical activity.  
However, when I analyzed performance as a function of both incentive type and “resting” 
fitness, the regression revealed only main effects of incentive condition and perceived physical 
activity: Participants who scored higher (vs. lower) on the perceived physical activity measure at the 
beginning of the intervention indeed walked more throughout the program, but this did not interact 
with incentive condition (see Appendix A14 for details, including supplementary analyses of other 
individual difference measures such as the type of self-rewards defined as well as gender). 
Lay predictions under joint evaluation. How well do people’s intuitions map onto their behavior? 
Recall that in the online exit survey I administered to participants after the post-incentive period, I 
directly presented a choice among the three reward programs (cash, noncash, and self-reward) and 
asked for their preferences under joint evaluation (see Appendix A8 for instructions and stimuli).21 
Responses from 165 participants22 revealed that choice shares of incentive program differed overall 
(χ2(6) = 14, p = .03). This effect was driven by an asymmetric preference to join the cash-based 
program in particular, as Figure 11 depicts. That is, regardless of what program they were randomly 
assigned to during the incentive phase, participants in each incentive condition chose the program 
offering contingent cash incentives over hedonic prizes or self-rewards as the one they would 
personally prefer to enroll in.  
                                                     
21 I also posed similar questions for a separate sample of participants who did not participate in the experiment; these 
results are described in Appendix A15. 
22 Given that the experiment had already formally concluded from the participants’ perspective, I was not able to capture 





Figure 11: Choice shares of the three reward programs among participants assigned to each incentive 
condition (Study 1). 
 
I similarly observed a clear ranking from first cash to noncash and lastly to self-reward when 
asked to judge the relative motivational effectiveness of each program, as well as the percentage of 
members who would meet the goal in each program. Those assigned to the cash incentive treatment 
group further expressed that they would be more likely to rejoin the same program they participated 
compared to those assigned to the self-reward treatment group. Overall, then, people appeared to 
midpredict how effectively an incentive regimen predicated on self-reward would stimulate positive 
behavior change, even when they experienced just such objective gains relative to receiving cash 
incentives.  
Self-reward in-depth interviews. An interesting metric to observe is whether participants in the 
self-reward treatment group continue to reward themselves after the experiment ended. To get a 
better (qualitative) sense of people’s underlying motivations, judgments, and intuitive reasoning, I 
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conducted follow-up interviews on around half of the participants assigned to the self-reward 
condition (N = 25). During these in-depth sessions (each 30-45 minutes in length), I polled 
individuals about their retrospective evaluations of the pedometer study as well as the specifics 
concerning the self-reward program. Only two people in the self-reward condition said they kept 
running the program on themselves after the experiment was over. Participants seemed on the 
whole reluctant to attribute any effects (particularly longer-lasting ones) to the intervention or 
rewards themselves. When I probed them further, almost no one explained their behavior change or 
improvement in walking activity in terms of or in consequence to the reward structure, but many 
mentioned that the program helped them enjoy walking for its own sake. The majority claimed that 
meeting the goal and being able to self-monitor themselves during the study using the tracker tool 




In Study 1, I conducted a longitudinal field experiment using real incentives and real behavior. 
During the incentive period, although people who could earn cash incentives tended to meet the 
goal more compared to those who faced noncash hedonic rewards or self-rewards, the latter two 
incentive systems proved equally motivating as cash in prompting people to walk more. Given that 
the cost of these self-rewards was fully born by the participants themselves, I argue that this 
constitutes a somewhat “impressive” effect in itself. Moreover, during the post-incentive period, 
self-rewards outperformed cash incentives, yielding greater sustained improvement for multiple 
weeks. Finally, there arose a clear dichotomy between how people behaved and what they intuit: 
People overwhelmingly favored cash, despite their objective performance. 
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From a policy perspective, the dissipation of incentive “fuel” poses a problem, as it becomes 
economically inefficient, indeed intractable, to rely on monetary rewards in perpetuity. The self-
reward incentive structure I have tested in this experiment, which employs an indulgence reward or 
vice to encourage a virtue, suggests a potential alternative way to foster a healthy habit formation 
without the counteractive effects of crowding out intrinsic motivation.  
 
2.7 Study 2: Incentives to Walk More (Reprise) 
 
 
Study 2 aimed to test the robustness of the previous results to a few changes in design parameters. 
Recall in Study 1 that participants in all incentive conditions walked more overall toward the end of 
the post-incentive period, particularly following the sharp “dip” in week 5. While I speculated that 
warming temperatures and midterms accounted for these respective patterns, it is possible that 
people simply experienced a temporary “post-reward” pause and adjusted their habits upward 
thereafter—even among those incentivized with cash (e.g., Goswami and Urminsky 2017). If 
seasonality was indeed the culprit, then we should no longer observe a rising trend during the post-
incentive period when the temperature conditions are reversed. Do people continue to persist once 
external remuneration is withdrawn, even under adverse climates and when facing a higher target 




Study 2 was a second pedometer-based intervention conducted in the fall to winter of 2016-2017. I 
used the same procedure as Study 1 but made the following design modifications:  
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(i) Because the experiment began under relatively warmer climes, participants were 
encouraged (or incentivized) to walk 60,000 steps/week rather than 50,000 steps/week;  
(ii) I omitted the noncash treatment arm altogether, as I wanted to concentrate on the 
relative effectiveness of contingent self-reward, which provides the strongest contrast against 
offering cash rewards; and  
(iii) I decreased the payment and bonus amount for the control and cash conditions, 




I recruited 185 participants from the Columbia Business School Behavioral Research Lab (average 
age = 23.2 [SD = 6.2], 43% male, average BMI = 23.3 [4.2]). Aside from the changes I mentioned 
above, participants followed the same procedure as Study 1 (outlined in Section 2.6.2). Specifically, I 
randomly assigned individuals to one of three groups—a control, cash incentive, and self-reward 
incentive condition—and asked them to track their steps over the next three weeks using the Moves 
mobile application (again using an anonymous alias account I generated in advance that was synced 
online).  
Participants in the control read that they would, as part of the program, receive $5 (in cash) 
each week regardless of their performance. Those assigned to the cash incentive condition saw that 
for each week they met the “target goal of 10,000 steps per day for at least 5 days (out of 7) OR 
60,000 steps total over 7 days,” they would earn $5 in cash as a bonus reward at the end of that 
week. Finally, in the self-reward condition, participants read that if they met the same target step 
goal, they would earn their choice of a reward they define and will give themselves. All individuals 
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were subject to the same enforcement policy I imposed in Study 1, based on the donation “threat” 
to the NRA in the event they failed to redeem their reward.  
For the rest of the incentive period (i.e. the next three weeks), participants completed activity 
logs using the data logged by Moves and claimed any compensation they qualified to earn 
(corresponding to their incentive condition) during their weekly check-ins in addition to the $3 
show-up fee. After the experiment “ended” at the end of the incentive period, the experimenter 
withdrew all extrinsic payment and relayed the same cover story from Study 1 to discourage any 
changes made to the app. Lastly, participants completed an exit survey following the 5-week post-




Randomization check. Comparisons of relevant self-reported characteristics (the same included 
in Study 1, with an added measure of baseline intrinsic interest in walking as a form of activity) 
indicated that random assignment achieved sufficient balance across the four incentive groups, with 
no measures differing significantly by condition (all ps > .1; see Table 2).  
 


































































Table 2: Baseline summary statistics (Study 2). Standard errors are in parentheses below the means for each 
incentive condition. The scales used for each measure are indicated in parentheses. 
 
Attrition. I lost around 6% of the original sample to follow-up over the course of the 
incentive period (again, these were participants who failed to show up to a check-in session). As in 
the first pedometer study, including them in the analyses did not substantially change the results. 
More people attrited, once again, during the post-incentive period (i.e., those who stopped using the 
app as instructed); however, attrition rates did not vary by experimental condition in any week 
during the entire observation window (see Appendix A16 for details on sample size and attrition), 
although again the interpretation of the results for the last two weeks of the post-incentive period is 
less clear due to sample size limitations.  
Goal attainment. Figure 12 shows the proportion of participants who met the step goal of 
60,000 steps a week during the intervention and post-incentive periods. Consistent with Study 1 (and 
indeed to a greater degree), we see higher goal attainment rates among those assigned to the cash 






Figure 12: Percentage of participants who met the step goal (60,000+ steps) each week (Study 2). The vertical 
dotted line denotes the transition window from the incentive to post-incentive period. 
 
In week 1, compared to 16% in the control, 40% and 30% in the monetary and self-reward 
groups, respectively, walked at least 60,000 steps total (χ2(2) = 8.32, p = .016); this difference was 
driven by the overall effect of the two treatment arms (particularly the cash condition) over the 
control. I observed the same pattern for weeks 2 and 3 of the incentive period (week 2: 23%control vs. 
48%cash vs. 24%self-reward; χ
2(2) = 11.37, p = .003; week 3: 10%control vs. 51%cash vs. 27%self-reward; χ
2(2) = 
22.84, p < .001). Across the three weeks comprising the incentive period, then, 46% and 27% of 
participants in the cash and self-reward groups reached the 60,000-step goal, compared to 16% in 
the control. 
Once the post-incentive period began, however, a different picture develops. During week 4, 
compared to 10% in the control, 16% and 22% among those in the cash and self-reward conditions, 
respectively, met the goal. Although this difference was not significant across conditions (χ2(2) = 
2.21, p = .33), it is noteworthy that the sudden drop in performance was substantially more dramatic 
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for participants assigned to the cash condition in particular—no such decline occurred among those 
in the self-reward group. Further, as the incentive period continued, participants in this latter 
condition continued to display higher levels of goal attainment overall (25% on average) relative to 
the control (8%), whereas the same did not hold among those who were incentivized with cash 
(10%) during the intervention.  
Steps walked. Figure 13 displays the total number of steps walked each week on average for 
each incentive condition.  
 
 
Figure 13: Average total steps walked each week (Study 2). The vertical dotted line denotes the transition 
window from the incentive to post-incentive period. Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). 
 
During the first week of the incentive period, the number of total weekly steps walked differed as a 
function of incentive condition (Mcontrol = 39,340 steps [SD = 18,267]; Mcash = 51,400 steps [20,730]; 
Mself-reward = 50,447 steps [19,848]; F(2,179) = 7.02, p = .001). Planned contrasts revealed that both 
incentive treatment arms produced higher step counts relative to the control (cash: t(179) = 3.36, p 
= .001; self-reward: t(179) = 3.12, p = .002). Similar patterns emerged in the other weeks of the 
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incentive period, albeit the effect of incentive condition was muted in week 2 given the higher 
performance levels among the control (see Appendix A17 for a summary of these results).  
Averaging across the incentive period (weeks 1-3), the amount of steps walked varied by 
condition (Mcontrol = 42,984 steps [16,085]; Mcash = 53,224 steps [16,754]; Mself-reward = 50,583 steps 
[15,015]; F(2,169) = 6.46, p < .001), with participants in the cash incentive and self-reward groups 
accumulating more steps than the control (t(169) = 3.51, p = .001) but not differing from each other 
(t(169) = .87, p = .39). Individuals in the treatment conditions walked on average nearly 10,000 more 
steps a week than those in the control, suggesting once more that contingent incentives “worked” as 
expected from economic theory.  
How well do people maintain their performance once the intervention is ostensibly over? I 
again analyzed the pivotal transition from week 3 (incentive period) to week 4 (post-incentive 
period) and found that those in the cash incentive treatment suffered a substantial decline, reverting 
to activity levels (M = 41,436 [20,759]) no different from the control (M = 38,233 [18,198]; t(130) 
= .79, p = .43). By contrast, participants exposed to the self-reward intervention maintained their 
improvement in step count (M = 47,734 [17,324]) relative to the control (t(153) = 2.36, p = .02) and 
to the three other conditions combined (t(130) = 2.48, p = .01), a trend that persisted for the rest of 
the post-incentive period. The simple effects analysis of period (i.e., from week 3 to week 4) within 
each condition revealed that all three experimental conditions suffered some degree of performance 
decay (control: F(1,130) = 10.28, p = .002; cash: F(1,130) = 29.71, p < .001; self-reward: F(1,130) = 
5.34, p = .02). However, the extent or magnitude of this decline during this critical window varied as 
a function of incentive type (F(2,130) = 3.33, p = .039), with the cash condition incurring a steeper 
drop compared to the control (t(130) = -1.97, p = .05) and to the self-reward group (t(130) = 2.48, p 
= .01); the latter did not reveal this same discrepancy relative to control levels (t(130) = .57, p = .57). 
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I analyzed the number of steps participants walked as a function of incentive condition, 
averaging over the two periods (incentive and post-incentive). A 3 (incentive condition) × 2 (period) 
mixed analysis of variance revealed a main effect of period (F(1,130) = 108.87, p < .001) qualified by 
a condition × period interaction (F(2,130) = 7.94, p = .001). The simple effects of period found that 
all three conditions indeed experienced some amount of decline23 (control: F(1,130) = 26.77, p 
< .001); cash: F(1,130) = 75.73, p < .001; self-reward: F(1,130) = 15.43, p < .001). However, the 
magnitude of this productivity loss differed according to incentive type (F(2,130) = 7.94, p = .001), 
with the cash condition showing a larger decrease relative to the control (t(130) = -3.1, p = .002) and 
self-reward condition (t(130) = 3.80, p < .001), while the latter displayed equivalent levels of decline 
relative to the control (t(130) = .78, p = .44).  
Again, the discrepancy that arises between goal attainment and step activity (arguably a 
measure more indicative of task engagement) suggests a tendency among cash-incentivized 
participants to “cluster” around a goal (and avoid just missing the mark) when compensation is at 
stake. In the interest of brevity, I omit the presentation of these data (see Appendix A18 for 
graphical details on the distribution of steps).24 
Lay predictions under joint evaluation. I recovered 101 participants (33, 34, and 34 in the control, 
cash, and self-reward conditions, respectively) in my exit survey and analyzed their retrospective 
evaluations. Of particular interest was their preferences for the cash and self-reward incentive 
programs when considered jointly. Choice shares of incentive program differed overall (χ2(2) = 8.94, 
p = .01), with 79%, 65%, and 94% preferring to join the cash-based incentive program among those 
                                                     
23 Perhaps in part due to the increasingly inhospitable weather as winter set in. 
24 Unlike Study 1, I did not detect evidence of “goal gradient” behavior characterized by participants’ tendency to 
accelerate their effort on the last day in the presence of cash, but not noncash, incentives. (Here, the effort streams from 
day to day were relatively constant in all incentive conditions.) It is unclear why this pattern did not manifest in Study 2, 
although particularly strong effects of goal gradient surfaced once more in Study 3.  
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assigned to the control, cash, and self-reward conditions, respectively. Ironically, those who had 
personally undergone the self-reward treatment harbored the strongest opinions in favor of cash.  
The same held with respect to people’s perceived motivational efficacy of the two 
programs—that is, the extent to which they believe each would increase their own walking activity 
levels. A 3 (incentive condition) × 2 (rated program) mixed analysis of variance on perceived 
effectiveness revealed a main effect of program (F(1,98) = 65.43, p < .001), qualified by an 
interaction (F(2,98) = 4.63, p = .01). Regardless of which incentive condition they participated in 
during the first three weeks of the study, participants ascribed greater motivational efficacy to the 
program featuring cash incentives compared to self-rewards (control: Mcash program = 5.09 vs. Mself-reward 
program = 4.06; F(1,98) = 11.23, p = .001; cash: Mcash program = 4.94 vs. Mself-reward program = 3.88; F(1,98) = 
12.22, p = .001; self-reward: Mcash program = 5.41 vs. Mself-reward program = 3.24; F(1,98) = 51.62, p = .001). 
This gap, however, was particularly pronounced among those who rewarded themselves: Not only 
did they attribute more success to cash, but they also expressed greater doubt on the benefits of self-
reward. 
Finally, consistent with Study 1, my interviews with participants assigned to the self-reward 
condition suggest that people had fairly poor insight into their own behavior, with nearly no one 




Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 provide convergent evidence that point to contingent self-reward as 
a viable alternative to cash incentives in improving physical activity.25 I found consistent results on 
                                                     
25 When the externally-prescribed goal or effort threshold is not properly calibrated with the behavior, however, self-
rewards—and indeed any rewards, including monetary ones—may not work. Appendix A22 documents two replication 
attempts in which no incentive effects emerged at all relative to the control, against what is reasonably predicted by 
economic theory, and offers some rationale for why the tested incentive schemes did not move behavior. Specifically, 
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both the extensive margin (goal attainment) and intensive margin (amount of steps walked). In 
short, over the course of the incentive program, participants who faced the prospect of earning cash 
bonuses were more likely to meet the goal than those who gave themselves rewards of their own 
definition. On the other hand, the self-reward group performed, on average, equally well as the cash 
incentive condition in terms of how many steps they walked. When the experiments ended and 
external rewards were discontinued, those in the self-reward treatment continued to do well and 
indeed outperform their cash-incentivized counterparts.  
Note that, as was the case in Study 1, all participants in Study 2 similarly experienced an 
especially conspicuous drop during one week of the post-incentive period. Week 6 in this case 
coincided once again with midterm exams, lending more credence to the assertion that such 
performance decay is more likely attributed to anomalous external factors rather than a general post-
reward dip. 
As evidenced by consistent lay theories that presume cash as “king,” it seems the case that 
people systematically mispredict the motivational efficacy of different incentive systems—even if 
they experienced the effects of self-reward firsthand. These predisposed biases toward cash and 
against self-reward, while not unexpected, are problematic in that they may pose a psychological 
barrier to entry in the adoption of such incentive regimes. More efforts should be paid in service of 
experimenting with alternative marketing strategies to overcome this challenge. 
 
2.8 Study 3: Incentives to Go to the Gym 
 
 
                                                     
when the threshold is set too high, engaging in the behavior may be demotivating across the board. When the threshold 
is set too low, the goal becomes trivial for everyone to achieve, shrouding any benefits of incentives.  
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Both Studies 1 and 2 grapple with the question of how to incentivize people, using different reward 
systems, to perform a virtuous behavior. This objective extends beyond walking, a measure26 that 
may be subject to considerable sources of noise (e.g., individual variation in commute or travel 
schedules). In Study 3, I used a similar paradigm to assess whether the previous results would hold 




Launched in the spring of 2017, Study 3 tested whether contingent self-rewards can help people go 
to the gym more regularly. Following the design of Study 2, I randomly assigned participants to one 
of three conditions (control, cash incentive, and self-reward). I expected that while incentivizing 
people with cash (rather than self-rewards) may cause them to reach the goal more than in order to 
guarantee compensation, self-rewards would lead individuals to do better on a variety of important 
metrics. In particular, participants exposed to the self-reward treatment would display the most 
sustained performance and long-term (i.e., as observed in the post-incentive period) improvement in 
gym attendance frequency and duration. Despite their revealed behaviors, I again expected people to 
attribute a motivational advantage to cash-based over self-reward contracts.  
The incentive period lasted four weeks in total (including the first week of recruitment and 
enrollment), followed by three weeks of observation without externally-imposed incentives. I 
imposed a target amount of effort that was fixed across all participants—visiting the gym at least 
three times per week.27 The vast majority of participants attended the campus gym, although I did 
not constrain them from visiting other off-campus gyms.  
                                                     
26 An arguably pedestrian one besides. 
27 This performance threshold was based on data collected in the two pedometer studies. 
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I distributed rewards at the weekly level and instructed individuals to check-in to the lab 
every week to claim an attendance fee as well as any rewards coinciding to their incentive condition. 
The enforcement policy was identical to that used in the two pedometer field experiments, with the 
exception that I did not first elicit evaluations of the list of nonprofit organizations.  
The number of (separate) visits to the gym during a given week served as my primary 
outcome of interest, with an indicator for whether or not participants attended the gym at least once 
as well as intensity of activity conditional on gym attendance (measured by average time reported 
spent per gym visit) being key secondary outcomes. While the optimal data would have consisted of 
verified check-ins at the campus gym as obtained directly from participants’ swipe data (as was done 
in Charness and Gneezy 2009), bureaucratic restrictions hindered my attempts to gain access to such 
data. Instead, I asked and incentivized participants to provide documentation of their gym 
attendance by logging their gym activities (along with a photo as proof that they indeed made a visit) 
using a fitness tracker mobile application called Runkeeper. This app was free to download for 
iPhone and Android users, allowed for the exporting and access of individual data via an online user 
interface, and featured a built-in camera tool that made it exceptionally convenient to document 




Recruitment and enrollment. Participants consisted of 155 Columbia undergraduate students 
recruited from the Columbia Business School Behavioral Research Lab during a 5-day (Monday to 
Friday) window in the spring of 2017 (average age = 22.5 [SD = 3.7], 35% male). I advertised the 
“gym study” as a month-long study about logging gym activity using a fitness tracker mobile 
application. To qualify, all participants had to own an iPhone or Android smartphone compatible 
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with Runkeeper, an app I used to observe individuals’ self-reported weekly gym activity. Participants 
were instructed to download the application on their phone in advance.  
In the first session, I randomly assigned participants to one of three incentive conditions 
(control, cash, and self-reward). An intake survey measured baseline fitness habits and individual 
characteristics (as in Studies 1 and 2), including current levels of gym attendance and activity. 
Participants read an overview of the study, reiterating that by entering the study they would commit 
to attend the next three weekly sessions. As with the previous studies, these appointments would 
serve as 5-minute check-ins, each awarding a $3 show-up fee (see Appendix A19 for complete 
instructions and stimuli). People read the following:  
To help improve your physical fitness activity by visiting the gym more often, you will be participating in a 
program for the next few weeks.  
 
This program will use a fitness tracking application called Runkeeper, which allows you to easily track and 
log your fitness activities every time you visit the gym. During this study, you will be asked to log your 
gym visits and activities using this app.  
 
Participants were then told to get the attention of the experimenter, who would create and 
set up an alias account for them to connect their individual Runkeeper data to a randomly generated 
account that cannot be traced back to their history. These pre-generated alias accounts were 
randomly assigned to each participant and linked to their Runkeeper app. Because individuals’ 
account data were automatically synced to the Runkeeper server, I could again observe any reported 
activity remotely.  
After setting up their Runkeeper account, all participants were encouraged to visit the gym at 
least 3 times per week (which I specified as “either Dodge Fitness Center here on campus or any 
other gym you attend”). They further read that every time they visit the gym, they will be asked to 
document any activities they completed through the Runkeeper app on their phone, and that if they 
do not visit the gym during a given week, they should also record that information. Afterwards, 
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participants saw instructions specific to the condition they were randomly assigned at the beginning 
of the survey (Appendix A19).  
The incentive specifications and procedure were otherwise identical to those imposed in 
study 2, with participants in the cash and self-reward groups earning the bonus for each week they 
met or surpassed the goal of three or more weekly visits. Specifically, participants assigned to the 
control group read that they would, as part of the program, also receive $5 (in cash) at the end of 
each week. Those assigned to the cash incentive condition read that if they “meet or exceed the 
target goal of going to the gym at least 3 times over the course of the week (7 days),” they would 
earn $5 in cash as a bonus reward at the end of each week. Finally, those in the self-reward condition 
read that if they met or exceeded the same target step goal, they would earn their choice of a reward 
they have defined and will give themselves (i.e., the same instruction wording as in studies 1 and 2, 
namely an indulgent reward they feel they don’t currently afford for themselves). Participants in this 
last group then described a reward satisfying the specified criteria.  
After learning about the condition-specific incentives, participants proceeded to a page 
describing the details for how to use the Runkeeper app (although an instruction packet containing 
the same information would later be provided to them). Specifically, participants read: 
Each week, use the app to track every gym visit, even if you didn’t visit the gym that week. You’ll receive your weekly 
check-in payment ($3) as long as you provide documentation of your visits or lack of visits. 
 
For every gym visit they made during a given week, I asked them to report the date, duration, and 
categories of physical activities they engaged in for that gym session (e.g., running, cycling, strength 
training, etc.). As proof of attendance, they were to submit a photo that best represents the activity 
they completed using a built-in camera function in Runkeeper (see Figure 14). On the other hand, if 
participants did not visit the gym during a week, I instructed them to write a note in the app at the 





Figure 14: Screenshot of Runkeeper app interface with a sample logged activity (Study 3). 
 
I implemented the same enforcement policy used in the two pedometer studies (i.e., 
involving the donation threat to the NRA). Finally, participants provided measures of BMI 
(calculated based on self-reported height and weight), a general self-control trait scale, and basic 
demographic information. After receiving payment for their participation in the first session, they 
received from the experimenter a packet to take home containing instructions and reminders 
corresponding to their assigned condition, as well as detailed instructions on how to document their 
gym activity using Runkeeper.  
Incentive period. Over the next three weeks comprising the incentive period, participants 
documented their activity for each gym visit using the Runkeeper app. Importantly, participants 
were asked to also log any lack of visits during a given week. During each weekly check-in session, 
participants claimed the rewards corresponding to their assigned incentive condition, collected a $3 
additional cash payment simply for showing up, and received a new packet with reminders to take 
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home. Participants received weekly emails reminding them to log their activity (or lack thereof) on 
the app and to “redeem” their rewards by attending each check-in.  
Post-incentive period. Once the study ostensibly “ended” from the participants’ perspective after 
three weeks, all extrinsic rewards were discontinued, and participants were told that they will no 
longer receive any additional rewards, weekly email reminders, or have the “threat” of charity 
donations as an enforcement policy. However, the experimenter instructed people to continue 
documenting their weekly gym activity (i.e., whether or not they went each week) and observed data 
for the foreseeable future until notified, for “data calibration” purposes. To incentivize continual 
logging using the app, I delivered $12 via PayPal to all individuals who did so. As was done in the 
preceding two studies, I continued to remotely access and monitor their gym attendance and activity 
over the course of the next three weeks.  
Finally, following the post-incentive period, I administered one final, 10-minute survey that 
participants could fill out online remotely in exchange for a $5 Amazon gift card to be delivered 
electronically upon completion. The exit survey included the same measures used in the exit surveys 
of the two pedometer studies.  
 
2.8.3 Results  
 
I obtained results that closely parallel those in the pedometer studies. The inferential statistics I 
report for frequency and intensity (duration) of gym visits are based on log-transformed data, 
although the untransformed data yield similar patterns. 
Randomization check. Comparisons of relevant self-reported characteristics (again, the same 
included in Studies 1 and 2) indicated that random assignment achieved sufficient balance across the 
three incentive conditions, with no measures differing significantly by condition (all ps > .1; Table 3).  
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Table 3: Baseline summary statistics (Study 3). Standard errors are in parentheses below the means for each 
incentive condition. The scales used for each measure are indicated in parentheses. 
 
Attrition. I lost around 5% of the original sample to follow-up over the course of the 
incentive period (i.e., those who failed to attend a weekly appointment; including these participants 
in the analyses did not substantially change the results). Unlike the two pedometer studies, far fewer 
people attrited29 during the post-incentive period (defined as those whose Runkeeper accounts 
recorded no activity, indicating that they had stopped using the app). Attrition rates (see Appendix 
A20) did not vary by experimental condition in any week during the entire observation window.  
More people attrited, once again, during the post-incentive period (i.e., those who stopped 
using the app as instructed); however, attrition rates did not vary by experimental condition in any 
week during the entire observation window (see Appendix A16 for details on sample size and 
                                                     
28 Given the considerably lower incidences of gym attendance observed during the intervention, it seems likely that 
participants were exceedingly optimistic (or else poorly calibrated) in their self-reports of how frequently they go to the 
gym. 
29 I conjecture this comparatively low attrition rate is largely due to a combination of the additional incentive ($12) to 
continue documenting using the app and repeated reminders by the experimenter throughout the intervention. 
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attrition), although again the interpretation of the results for the last two weeks of the post-incentive 
period is less clear due to sample size limitations. 
Goal attainment. Trends consistent with those in the two previous studies emerged when I 
examined goal attainment, quantified as the proportion of participants who met the goal of at least 




Figure 15: Percentage of participants who met the goal (3+ visits) each week (Study 3). The vertical dotted line 
denotes the transition window from the incentive to post-incentive period. 
 
In line with the results from Studies 1 and 2, those in the cash condition were once again the 
most likely to meet the goal. I conducted a series of binary logistic regressions to assess the effect of 
incentive condition on goal attainment. In week 1, compared to 20% in the control, 68% and 41% 
in the cash and self-reward groups, respectively, visited the gym at least three times (χ2(2) = 25.28, p 
< .001). Relative to the control, a greater proportion of participants in both the cash group (B = 
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2.17, SE = .47, χ2(1) = 21.67, p < .001) and the self-reward condition (B = 1.04, SE = .45, χ2(1) = 
5.34, p = .02) visited the gym at least three times. The same pattern was true for weeks 2 and 3 of 
the incentive period (week 2: 12%control vs. 64%cash vs. and 31%self-reward; χ
2(2) = 33.03, p < .001; week 
3: 12%control vs. 64%cash vs. and 33%self-reward; χ
2(2) = 32.71, p < .001). Taking the incentive period in 
aggregate, an average of 65% and 35% of participants in the cash and self-reward groups reached the 
attendance goal, compared to 14% in the control. 
Once more, a different picture surfaces when we consider the post-incentive period. During 
week 4, compared to 4% in the control, 8% and 13% among those in the cash and self-reward 
conditions, respectively, met the goal. Although this difference was not significant (χ2(2) = 3.22, p 
= .20), participants in the cash condition showed a relatively steeper decrease in attendance. The 
advantage of self-rewards over the control and cash incentives during the post-incentive period, 
while directionally present, appeared much weaker than observed in the pedometer interventions. I 
speculate that this muted effect may be due in part to an overall more challenging goal: Most of my 
participants may find consistently visiting the gym three times in a week to be a fairly difficult task.  
I also computed for each individual whether they attended the gym at least once for a given 
week; this measure, also used in previous research (e.g., Charness and Gneezy 2009), is intended to 
capture the willingness to exert some minimum level of effort. Figure 16 displays the proportion 





Figure 16: Percentage of participants who made at least 1 visit (Study 3). The vertical dotted line denotes the 
transition window from the incentive to post-incentive period. 
 
On this measure, participants in the self-reward condition performed equally well during the 
incentive period compared to their counterparts in the control and cash incentive groups (weeks 1-3) 
and markedly better once the experiment formally ended (weeks 4-6). 
Gym attendance frequency. Figure 17 shows the number of times participants visited the gym on 
average for each of the three conditions. During the first week of the incentive period, the number 
of visits made to the gym varied across incentive conditions (Mcontrol = 1.18 [1.23]; Mcash = 2.18 
[1.40]; Mself-reward = 1.91 [1.50]; F(2,152) = 7.19, p = .001). Planned contrasts revealed that compared 
to the control group, each of the incentive treatment arms led to more visits (cash: t(152) = 3.66, p 
< .001; self-reward: t(152) = 2.71, p = .007). Combined, both treatment conditions generated more 
frequent gym visits than the control (t(152) = 3.68, p < .001) and did not differ from each other 
(t(152) = 1.01, p = .32). Similar patterns emerged in the next two weeks of the incentive period (see 







Figure 17: Average total gym visits each week (Study 3). The vertical dotted line denotes the transition window 
from the incentive to post-incentive period. The horizontal dotted line denotes the prescribed goal of 3 visits 
per week. Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). 
 
Averaged across the incentive period (weeks 1-3), gym attendance rates differed by condition (Mcontrol 
= .99 [.91]; Mcash = 2.27 [1.22]; Mself-reward = 1.85 [1.40]; F(2,148) = 14.98, p < .001), with both the 
cash and self-reward groups frequenting the gym more often than the control (t(148) = 5.21, p 
< .001) but not differing substantially from each other (t(148) = -1.75, p = .08).   
The post-incentive (weeks 4-6) data again reveal a steeper (and immediate) performance 
decline among those in the cash condition. On average, those assigned to the self-reward treatment 
logged almost twice as many gym visits (M = .87 [1.08]) compared to the control (M = .44 [.70]; 
t(147) = 2.54, p = .01) and cash (M = .43 [.73]; t(147) = 2.54, p = .01) groups, which did not differ 
from each other (t(147) = -.043, p = .97).  
Goal gradient behavior. The dynamics of gym attendance among cash-incentivized participants 
revealed evidence suggestive of the same goal gradient behavior documented in Study 1. Figures 18 
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and 19 display the number of visits made on average on a daily basis during the incentive and post-




Figure 18: Average gym visits each day during the incentive period (weeks 1-3; Study 3). Error bars are 






Figure 19: Average gym visits each day during the post-incentive period (weeks 4-6; Study 3). Error bars are 
standard errors (±1 SEM). 
 
A 3 (incentive) × 2 (period) mixed analysis of variance on the incremental number of visits on the 
last day (i.e., day 6 to 7) revealed an interaction (F(2,143) = 6.10, p = .003): Whereas attendance did 
not vary across periods for those in the control (Mincentive= .00 vs. Mpost= .03; F(1,143) = .22, p = .64) 
and self-reward (Mincentive= -.03 vs. Mpost= .01; F(1,143) = .35, p = .56) conditions, cash-incentivized 
participants logged more visits on the very last day during the incentive period but not afterwards 
(Mincentive= .17 vs. Mpost= -.04; F(1,143) = 13.88, p < .001). 
Gym activity intensity. Conditional on going to the gym, did participants who rewarded 
themselves spend more time per visit? I computed this metric for each individual based on self-
reported duration data aggregated across all activities logged using the Runkeeper application; these 





Figure 20: Average time (minutes) spent per gym visit each week (Study 3). The vertical dotted line denotes the 
transition window from the incentive to post-incentive period. Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). 
 
Compared to the control (M = 39.80 [15.48]) and cash (M = 37.69 [15.57]) conditions, participants 
in the self-reward treatment spent on average more minutes per visit (M = 51.60 [25.72]; t(117) = 
3.08, p = .003) during the incentive period. Not surprisingly, this lift in performance tended to be 
fairly smooth over the course of the entire observation window. When the intervention concluded, 
those in the self-reward condition (M = 50.87 [25.85] maintained their greater intensity of gym 
activity relative to the control (M = 42.36 [25.91]) and cash groups (M = 33.44 [15.88]; t(73) = 2.37, 




Study 3 tested the effectiveness of a self-reward incentive contract, relative to a (non-contingent) 
control and a contingent cash incentive system, in a second domain—that of gym attendance and 
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activity. I discovered similar patterns to the previous two field experiments that incentivized people 
to walk more. Although participants who could earn cash were the most likely to meet the goal, they 
did not appear especially motivated to exceed that benchmark (indeed, because their reward 
depended on simply going to the gym three times and no more). Further, cash-incentivized 
individuals were more likely to exhibit goal gradient behavior, suddenly accelerating their effort right 
before they are due to receive compensation.  
Those who rewarded themselves (bearing the full cost of their self-defined rewards), by 
contrast, not only rivaled their cash-incentivized counterparts in goal attainment but surpassed them 
in the longer-term, continuing to visit the gym after the intervention officially ended (and doing so, 
moreover, in a smoother fashion over time). Finally, these same participants scored particularly high 
on an additional measure of task engagement supplied in this study: They reported spending more 
time per visit exercising. In short, the consistency with which I observed these trends across all three 
applications suggest that, at least in the contexts I surveyed, an incentive program centered on self-
reward can serve as a compelling (as well as efficient) self-control strategy.  
 
2.9 General Discussion 
 
 
2.9.1 Summary and Implications  
 
In this chapter, I compared the efficacy of different incentive schemes in motivating short- and 
longer-term behavior under realistic (albeit relatively noisy) environments. Studies 1 and 2 examined 
people’s daily walking activity, while Study 3 looked at gym-going behavior. Across these three 
experiments, several recurring motifs may be discerned:  
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 (i) Goal attainment. Over the course of the reward program (i.e., while incentives were in play), 
people who could earn cash were most likely to meet the pre-specified goals dictated by the 
program. This is consistent with the idea that participants viewed cash as a currency of 
“compensation,” one that was contingent on meeting a quota but not surpassing a minimum effort 
threshold.  
(ii) Engagement in focal activity. However, on metrics arguably more indicative of meaningful 
task engagement, such as how many steps people walked and how often they attended the gym, self-
rewards were equally effective as cash during the incentive period and more effective afterwards. 
(And, in the case of going to the gym, participants who rewarded themselves spent more time 
exercising per visit compared to those rewarded with cash both during and after the intervention.) 
As most prominently shown in Study 1, the inclination of cash-incentivized participants to exhibit 
certain discontinuities around the goal (so as to avoid narrowly missing it) is further suggestive of a 
single-minded focus on reaching a minimum prescribed effort criterion to secure payment—but to 
stretch no farther. 
(iii) Persistence and habit formation. Perhaps most importantly, what happens once external 
incentives are removed? In all three cases, those who faced cash incentives promptly dropped to 
control levels of performance. By contrast, self-rewards led participants to persist more, generating 
comparatively more sustain over multiple weeks. 
(iv) Disconnect between behaviors and intuitions. The motivational advantages participants assigned 
to cash incentives when directly weighed against self-rewards appeared distinctly at odds with their 
revealed behaviors. Despite an objectively superior performance, the same individuals who 
completed the self-reward contract believed that they would not only have preferred but also done 
significantly better under an incentive program that offered cash. 
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These data contribute to a growing literature on the role of incentives in shaping habit 
formation and self-control without the accompanying “crowding out” effect sometimes observed in 
the presence of monetary rewards. Practically, the present research has implications for the design of 
incentive schemes that target longer-term behavioral change. By specifically defining and treating 
themselves to rewards that they would otherwise not tend to afford for themselves, such a system 
may in effect allow people to “earn the right to indulge” (Kivetz and Simonson 2002a) and thereby 
satisfy both “extremes” of self-control.30 Moreover, by their very nature, self-rewards are scalable, 
impose zero cost for the program sponsor, and can be implemented according to the individual or 
circumstance: Anyone can design their own commitment contract.  
 
2.9.2 Limitations and Extensions  
 
The empirical evidence documented in this chapter leaves considerable room for integrating more 
psychological insights into the design of personally motivating incentive structures. I outline only a 
few possibilities below. 
The data collected remain relatively agnostic to the question of why self-rewards seem to 
confer an advantage with respect to engagement and longer-term persistence.31 Did participants in 
the self-reward treatment perform well because of the intrinsic, self-imposed nature of the incentive 
contract, or perhaps because they defined a personally relevant reward that complemented the effort 
criterion? To get a better sense of the causal mechanism(s) behind the success of self-rewards and to 
systematically measure their relative influence, I intend to calibrate the current design so as to isolate 
                                                     
30 That is, the coexistent myopic and hyperopic “selves.” This effect may be akin to the “mere token effect” documented 
by Urminsky and Kivetz (2011), where tethering an immediate gratification of a short-term desire encouraged people to 
exercise greater self-control than they otherwise would. 
31 Nor did the participants themselves have clear insight as to the reason, with the majority predicting cash-based 
incentive programs to outperform ones using self-rewards. 
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the ways in which the cash, noncash, and self-reward conditions differ (e.g., fungibility, personal 
relevance, self-determination, among other dimensions). One possibility is to test a broader range of 
noncash incentives beyond hedonic rewards, including necessities, credit cards, promotions, rebates, 
and hybrid (e.g., point-based) systems that combine monetary and nonmonetary features. Another 
useful comparison to the self-reward group would be a separate condition that allows participants to 
define tangible rewards worth a given amount (say, $20) which would then be externally 
administered by the experimenter.  
As well, several aspects of the study design used in the three studies would benefit from 
further experimentation. To more rigorously replicate and iterate on the results from the field 
experiments, follow-up studies should include a pre-incentive period, during which all participants 
are asked to self-monitor their activities sans any incentives. More generally, it would be instructive 
to identify a handful of factors governing when self-rewards are likely to outperform cash incentives. 
For example, I would expect their relative success to diminish in contexts that are less conducive to 
habit formation—as in the case of single-shot tasks compared to repeated-choice settings, or when 
facing lump-sum compared to piecemeal rewards.  
Note that participants assigned to the cash incentive group across all three interventions 
faced a compensation schedule based on a discrete rather than continuous measure of 
performance—that is, people were paid only if they met a minimum prescribed goal and earned 
nothing otherwise. In reality, there exists a wider assortment of incentive structures and tiers that 
could potentially help these individuals attain more incremental stretch goals.32 Future work should 
                                                     
32 Nevertheless, whenever “true” engagement and effort are not directly observable or measurable, I would predict self-
rewards to maintain their motivational advantage over cash incentives. We might imagine, for example, that paying 
people to stay at the gym, rather than to visit the gym, may indeed result in more minutes accrued per visit. However, 
without rigorous enforcement or documentation, these same participants may have opted for easier, if not trivial, 
activities during their stay (e.g., a trip to the sauna over a cardio session). I test this predicted predilection for less 
challenging tasks more directly in Chapter 3.  
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also explore the implications of relaxing the fixed goal requirement by either varying effort levels or 
allowing individuals to set their own performance standards.  
Finally, although walking and gym attendance constitute different behavioral outcomes, they 
both relate to physical fitness and, to a broader degree, health. How would the findings described in 
this chapter generalize to other domains, such as academic performance or financial decision 
making? A related issue concerns the characteristics of the sample pool. Because the recruiting 
material in all three field experiments mentioned exercise, the samples I ultimately obtained were 
likely more homogeneous and less representative of the general population than would be ideal. 
Furthermore, given that my participants were predominantly young college students motivated to 
stay active (the majority of whom rated themselves to be at least moderately active), no doubt there 
is some degree of self-selection. Would these findings, therefore, hold for other populations (e.g., 
large salesforces, children, etc.), or for populations for whom the effort domain is more personally 
relevant (e.g., diet programs among those who struggle with obesity)? Reflecting on the broader 
notion of compensation focus and crowding out effects: What are the developmental origins of 
intrinsic motivation, and to what extent might receiving different rewards in the formative stages of 
development shape our future sensitivity to different incentive regimens?33 More data is needed to 
explore these and other questions.  
 
2.9.3 Conclusion  
 
The studies chronicled in this chapter underscore a need for continued research into more 
intrinsically motivating incentive systems—ones that encourage habit formation, that are less reliant 
                                                     
33 A longitudinal study on the behavior and decisions of young children would be instructive in this regard. For example, 
an interesting question here is whether there exist discernible long-run effects of giving people monetary compared to 
nonmonetary allowances while growing up. 
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on external reinforcement, and that focus individuals on engaging in the focal activity as opposed to 
meeting a minimum goal. As a first step toward this overarching goal, I have documented three 
instances where people seem to have successfully created their own commitment contracts to 
engage in a “virtuous” behavior using as rewards the very “vices” they would otherwise feel guilty 
about consuming in isolation. Designing and enacting initiatives that, at minimal cost to the 
sponsoring agent, enable individuals to help themselves presents an opportunity for marketers and 
policymakers who wish to improve the behaviors of their constituents. Future research will more 










3.1 Some Peculiarities of Cash Incentives 
 
 
Chapter 2 documented three cases in which incentive mechanisms that used self-rewards—indulgent 
awards defined and imposed by the individual—outperformed cash-based programs with respect to 
task engagement and longer-term habit formation. While these data are a testament to the 
motivational potential of self-rewards, they also point toward a few idiosyncrasies with cash in 
particular—idiosyncrasies that render it a disincentive in its own right. Recall that across both the 
pedometer and gym applications, individuals assigned to the cash group (compared to the self-
reward and noncash treatment arms) exhibited a propensity to cluster or “peak” just slightly above 
the prescribed performance threshold (and drop sharply thereafter). The same individuals also 
displayed considerably less “smoothness” in their day-to-day effort streams, with participants 
tending to accelerate their effort as they approach the reward toward the end of each week (i.e., a 
goal gradient effect).  
In this chapter, I contend that these behaviors are part and parcel of a broader umbrella of 
interrelated effects in goal pursuit, all of which can be categorized as manifestations of compensation 
focus. Not only can a heightened emphasis on securing compensation lead to the distortions in 
behavior observed among cash-incentivized participants in the field experiments, but—as I later 
propose—it can also give rise to undesirable consequences when it comes to choosing incentive 
structures, setting goals, and performing tasks with integrity. To analyze this more closely, I 
conducted a series of studies under more controlled environments in which (i) rather than observe 
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repeated behaviors over a period of time, I examined decisions under single-shot contexts; and (ii) 
rather than look at novel types of incentive schemes such as self-reward, I focused on a tighter 
comparison—namely, between cash incentives and noncash tangible rewards of equivalent retail 
value. Note that the field experiments reported in Chapter 2 did not allow participants the 
opportunity to choose between different incentive programs or to set their own goals and effort 
thresholds. Nor did the design present easy opportunities for people to cheat on the focal activity. In 
Chapter 3, I proceed to relax these constraints to study precisely the effects of incentive structure on 
what kinds of rewards people prefer, what goals and effort streams they opt for, and how much they 
are willing to cheat or act dishonestly to acquire their payment.  
 The current investigation contributes to a recent and growing body of work on the 
psychological effects of money and monetary rewards, which has uncovered a set of (arguably) 
adverse consequences on choice and behavior. One line of inquiry has advanced some psychological 
consequences of exposure to money and monetary prospects. For example, activating the concept of 
money may potentially shift behavior and the nature of social interactions and relationships (Fiske 
1991), rendering people more self-sufficient, less altruistic, and more likely to endorse free-market 
values (Caruso et al. 2013; Vohs, 2015; but cf. some work questioning the reliability of money-
priming effects, e.g., Klein et al. 2014; Rohrer, Pashler, and Harris 2015). Other research on the 
affective psychology of risk contrasts valuations of monetary with nonmonetary outcomes (e.g., a 
gamble consisting of losing $50 vs. incurring an electric shock) and suggest that the former, being 
less “affect-rich,” makes people more sensitive to changes in probability within the extremes of 
certainty and impossibility (McGraw, Shafir, and Todorov 2010; Pachur, Hertwig, and Wolkewitz 
2014; Rottenstreich and Hsee 2000) and to variations in scope (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004).  
 Rather than prime concepts of money or look at people’s joint evaluations of monetary and 
nonmonetary prospects, in the present research I contrast cash incentives to similarly extrinsic, 
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tangible noncash rewards (and unrewarded controls) to explore a variety of interrelated (but hitherto 
unintegrated) motivational effects under settings where individuals must, or are expected to, expend 
effort. These comparisons span hypothetical scenarios, incentive-compatible choices, as well as real-
effort tasks with consequential incentives.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: First, I proceed to develop predictions for 
how cash incentives (compared to noncash rewards and no-incentive controls) can shift preferences 
and behavior toward riskless, immediate, and easier alternatives—specifically as they relate to the 
domains of choice, goal setting, and integrity. I then present seven sets of studies that provide some 
evidence on the varied demotivating effects of contingent cash incentives. The empirical findings 
indicate that, consistent with inducing a compensation focus, offering cash in return for investing 
effort moved priorities toward receiving payoff and away from engaging in the activity: People 
become focused on ensuring, and avoiding any delay in, their reward. Moreover, cash incentives 
drove individuals to cheat more on real-effort tasks in order to gain compensation. I conclude by 
discussing the compensation-driven psychology underlying monetary incentives and its implications 
for motivation, self-control, and welfare. 
 
3.2 Compensation Focus: Consequences for Choice, Goal Setting, and Integrity 
 
 
As relayed in Chapter 2, the fact that cash as a currency is so far removed from any behavior or 
effort domain makes it perhaps the most extrinsic kind of reward imaginable. The universality of 
cash, together with its almost inherent association with transaction and labor exchange in the 
marketplace (e.g., Fiske 1991), makes any monetary incentive system likely to increase people’s focus 
on securing compensation for their effort. I further advance that this conceptualization of cash 
increasing focus on compensation (relative to equally extrinsic noncash rewards) leads to a general 
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attraction to options that promise smaller but guaranteed, immediate, and easy-to-obtain rewards—a 
pattern that holds important consequences for goal pursuit.  
Although compensation focus may instantiate itself in multiple ways, in this chapter I 
highlight three general domains relevant to motivation: (i) choices involving probabilistic and 
delayed rewards, in which a tradeoff exists between a reward’s magnitude and its certainty or 
temporal delay; (ii) choices involving goals or activities of varying effort levels, in which a tradeoff 
exists between a task’s difficulty and the likelihood of receiving a higher payoff; and (iii) cheating 
behaviors. The first and second areas speak to the effect of cash (vs. noncash but similarly extrinsic) 
incentives on preferences for incentive structures that promise certainty, immediacy, and ease; the 
second area looks at how incentivizing people with cash to complete real-effort tasks can skew 
actions toward cutting corners by cheating more. 
A central hypothesis here is that people who are asked to expend effort in exchange for cash 
may expect and desire a short and certain path by which to obtain the prize. Rather than opt for 
larger effort-contingent rewards that are either probabilistic or require waiting longer, they are likely 
to become more attracted to smaller and easier cash amounts that promise certainty and immediacy. 
Further, when receipt of the cash is not guaranteed or is contingent on exerting considerable effort, 
the same individuals may even resort to less ethical means of accomplishing the focal goal precisely 
because the outcome of expending effort (i.e., getting the incentive) is viewed as more important 
than the effort stream itself. 
The experiments in Chapter 2, which address habit formation, demonstrated that people 
incentivized with cash were more likely to meet the minimum goals required to earn the bonus; 
however, on (perhaps less conspicuous) metrics such as engagement in the focal activity and longer-
term persistence, they performed decidedly worse. I briefly summarize below some key predictions 
corresponding to the three relevant areas of behavior that we will explore. 
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Choice of reward contract. First, I consider people’s choices between different reward 
specifications as a function of the incentive type (monetary or nonmonetary): How do they tradeoff 
the magnitude of a reward with its risk (e.g., probability) or delay? If indeed cash incentives are likely 
to incite concerns about compensation (more so than noncash incentives of equivalent monetary 
value), then I expected individuals who could earn cash to gravitate toward reward contracts that 
allow them to attain a payment with certainty (i.e., for sure) and with haste (i.e., now)—even when 
another contract offers a payment with greater expected value or net present value but at the cost of 
uncertainty or delay, respectively.  
Goal setting. Relatedly, the same compensation focus induced by cash incentives has 
implications for the kinds of goals and effort streams that people set or choose. Specifically, 
compared to noncash hedonic rewards, individuals faced with cash incentives should tend to impose 
easier goals for themselves—goals with lower effort thresholds that minimize the risk of failing to 
attain their compensation. By the same logic, they will tend to opt for easier tasks (that offer smaller 
rewards) with over harder tasks (that offer larger rewards) in the interest of guaranteeing nonzero 
payoff. 
Integrity. Lastly, turning to people’s behaviors exhibited during the course of goal pursuit, I 
predicted that providing a cash incentive (as opposed to no incentives or a noncash tangible 
incentive) to complete a task will shift people’s focus to attaining the reward rather than the means 
by which they attain it. Consequently, individuals become more willing to cut corners when given 
the opportunity to do so, for the sake of maximal monetary gain: They may cheat more. 
 
 





I tested the above propositions in multiple studies that compare the effects of cash against noncash 
rewards in shaping choices and behavior. Convergent evidence across six sets of studies suggests a 
heightened focus on compensation when individuals encounter cash, compared to noncash hedonic, 
contingent rewards.  
Study Series 1 and 2 investigated how people make tradeoffs between the magnitude of a 
reward and its risk and delay, respectively, as a function of the type of rewards (monetary or 
nonmonetary) they face. Prior work suggests that the preference for immediacy in intertemporal 
choice and the preference for certainty in risky choice are connected (e.g., Mischel and Grusec 1967; 
Prelec and Loewenstein 1991; Rotter 1954; see also Urminsky and Kivetz 2011); I therefore analyzed 
decisions under both paradigms. To preface the key results, I found that contingent cash incentives, 
relative to noncash (but extrinsic) hedonic prizes of equivalent monetary value, led participants to: (i) 
choose contracts offering a certain but smaller (vs. uncertain but larger) reward (Studies 1a-1c); (ii) 
opt for contracts offering an immediate but smaller (vs. delayed but larger) reward (Studies 2a-2b); 
and (iii) set, as well as select, easier performance goals and tasks (Studies 3a-3d).  
I subsequently identified two factors under which the above preferences are less likely to 
hold: (i) the withdrawal of effort requirements or incentive contingency (Studies 4a-4b); and (ii) the 
removal of absolute certainty or immediacy in gaining a focal reward (Studies 5a-5b). Study Series 6 
further examined a behavioral consequence of “compensation focus” in the form of reduced 
integrity when completing a task. Across three incentivized, real-effort paradigms, I found that 
people cheated more when they faced the prospect of earning cash as opposed to noncash, hedonic 
rewards for exceeding a given performance threshold (as well as compared to unrewarded controls).  
Finally, I elicited individuals’ lay predictions under joint evaluation—that is, when people can 
choose directly between cash-based and noncash-based alternatives. Despite their revealed 
preferences and behaviors, the vast majority stated that they would prefer incentive contracts whose 
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rewards are denominated in cash (vs. hedonic prizes) and would find such contracts more 
motivating. 
The studies reported herein feature responses from paid U.S. workers recruited from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) with at least a 96% approval rating. I excluded data from 
individuals who failed an attention check, although the results I report throughout are robust to their 
inclusion. All eligibility and exclusion criteria were determined in advance. 
 
3.4 Study Series 1: Cash Incentives Increase Preference for Guaranteed Rewards 
 
 
People frequently trade off how likely they are to earn a reward with how much they can earn. In such 
circumstances involving tradeoffs between magnitude and probability, I argue that a key—and, in 
some sense, definitional—aspect of a greater compensation focus (as laid out in Section 3.2) is the 
expectation of receiving something “for sure” in return for expending effort. How might people’s 
relative preference for a smaller but certain incentive differ as a function of the type of rewards (cash 
or noncash) they face?  
In Study Series 1, I tested the hypothesis that when people are offered cash, relative to 
nonmonetary (e.g., hedonic) rewards, as an incentive for meeting a specified performance level or 
goal, they are more likely to prefer contracts with guaranteed incentives—even at the cost of lower 
earnings. To quantify how individuals trade off the magnitude and probability of a reward, I used a 
risky choice paradigm where participants chose between two programs (presentation order 
counterbalanced) intended to increase their daily walking activity: (i) Program A, which featured a 
certain but smaller reward; and (ii) Program B, which featured an uncertain but larger reward. These 
incentives were framed either in monetary (i.e., cash) or in hedonic terms (i.e., as a gift catalog 
consisting of 11 hedonic items, from which participants could select one prize, each with retail value 
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equivalent to the cash incentive). These items, selected based on responses from a pretest, included 
rewards such as a gift card to Starbucks Coffee, a box of gourmet chocolates, a gift card to an AMC 
movie theater, and a Groupon “Spa Day” gift card (see Appendix B1). 
 
3.4.1 Study 1a: Exercise Programs 
 
Method. Participants consisted of 327 respondents randomly assigned to either a cash 
incentive or noncash (hedonic) incentive condition. As part of a “Preferences and Evaluations” 
survey, I presented participants with a scenario where they could choose which of two exercise 
programs they preferred to join. Both programs lasted four weeks and encouraged members to walk 
at least 60,000 steps each week. For each week that a member met or exceeded the target goal of 
60,000 steps, s/he would earn an incentive denominated in a given currency—either cash (in the 
cash incentive condition) or noncash (in the noncash incentive condition). 
Specifically, participants assigned to the cash incentive condition read about Program A, 
which offered a smaller but certain reward ($5 in cash), followed by Program B, which offered a 
larger but uncertain reward (entry into a raffle with a 1 in 20 chance to earn $100 in cash).34 For 
those assigned to the noncash incentive condition, the smaller but certain reward consisted of the 
participant’s choice of one smaller item (with retail value of $5) from a predetermined gift catalog, 
while the larger but uncertain reward consisted of an entry into a raffle with a 1 in 20 chance of 
earning the participant’s choice of one larger hedonic reward (with retail value of $100) from the 
same gift catalog. I counterbalanced the order in which these two programs appeared on the page. 
As the primary dependent measure, I asked participants to choose the program they would rather 
join, assuming they could only enroll in one.  
                                                     
34 Programs A and B were presented simultaneously (i.e., on the same page). 
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Results and discussion. The order of presentation did not affect choice shares (χ2(1) = 1.76, p 
= .19) or interact with incentive condition to affect choice shares (χ2(1) = .19, p = .66). Hence, I 
report the rest of the findings collapsed across presentation order. 
Consistent with general risk aversion and the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), 
participants in both incentive conditions were more likely to choose the program offering the 
smaller-certain (over larger-uncertain) reward (80%cash, χ
2(1) = 59.40, p < .001; 69%noncash, χ
2(1) = 
23.73, p < .001). However, this preference for the smaller-certain reward was stronger among those 
in the cash, compared to noncash, group (χ2(1) = 5.09, p = .02)— suggesting that cash incentives 
may prompt greater “stickiness” toward compensation schemes that are guaranteed (but of a smaller 
magnitude). 
 
3.4.2 Study 1b: Language Learning Programs  
 
In Study 1b, I tested whether cash incentives shift preferences toward smaller but guaranteed 
rewards using a different scenario of required effort and goal. 
Method. Participants were 356 respondents, assigned to either a cash or noncash incentive 
condition, who chose between two foreign language reward programs (presentation order 
counterbalanced). Both programs lasted eight weeks and required members to take an exam at the 
end of each week covering the grammar and vocabulary taught during that past week. For each week 
a member passed the exam, s/he would earn a bonus reward denominated in either cash (cash 
incentive condition) or hedonic currency (noncash incentive condition). 
Participants who were randomly assigned to the cash incentive condition read about 
Program A, which offered a smaller but certain reward ($5 in cash), followed by Program B, which 
offered a larger but uncertain reward (entry into a raffle with a 1 in 10 chance to earn $50 in cash). 
In the noncash incentive condition, the smaller but certain reward consisted of the participant’s 
86 
 
choice of one small hedonic reward (with retail value of $5) from the same catalog used in study 1a, 
while the larger but uncertain reward consisted of an entry into a raffle with a 1 in 10 chance of 
earning their choice of one larger hedonic reward (with retail value of $50) from the same catalog. 
Again, the dependent measure of interest was which incentive program participants chose to join.  
Results and discussion. Presentation order did not affect choice shares (χ2(1) = .55, p = .46) or 
interact with incentive condition to affect choice shares (χ2(1) = .10, p = .75). Collapsed across 
presentation order and consistent with risk aversion, participants in both incentive conditions were 
more likely to choose the program with the smaller-certain reward over the program with the larger-
uncertain reward (cash condition: 77%, χ2(1) = 51.78, p < .001; noncash condition: 68%, χ2(1) = 
23.01, p < .001). Importantly, however, this tendency to prefer the smaller-certain (vs. larger-
uncertain) reward was stronger among those in the cash condition compared to those in the noncash 
condition (χ2(1) = 3.60, p = .06).  
That a similar pattern of results emerged for both the exercise and foreign language 
scenarios indicates that contingent cash incentives enhanced the preference for guaranteed (but 
lower magnitude) rewards over probabilistic (but higher magnitude) ones. This, I believe, is 
consistent with a greater compensation focus that performance-based monetary rewards induce.   
 
3.4.3 Study 1c: Exercise Programs (Greater Expected Value for the Uncertain Reward)  
 
The previous two studies both featured reward options whose expected values were equivalent (i.e., 
$5 in each case). Do cash incentives lead people to prefer guaranteed reward contracts even when 
they must give up a greater expected value? To test this, Study 1c followed the same procedure as 
Study 1a but adjusted the expected value of the larger but probabilistic reward such that it exceeded 
that of the smaller but certain reward.   
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Method. I randomly assigned 230 participants to either a cash or noncash incentive condition. 
Participants faced the scenario used in Study 1a, choosing between two exercise programs that 
offered a bonus reward for walking at least 60,000 steps each week.  
I increased the magnitude of the larger-uncertain reward, giving it a higher expected value 
relative to the guaranteed reward. Thus, participants in the cash incentive condition read about 
Program A, which offered a smaller but certain reward ($5 in cash), followed by Program B, which 
offered a larger but uncertain reward (entry into a raffle with a 1 in 20 chance to earn $120 in cash; 
i.e., expected value of $6). For those in the noncash incentive condition, the smaller but certain 
reward consisted of the participant’s choice of one hedonic reward (worth $5) from the gift catalog 
used previously, while the larger but uncertain reward consisted of an entry into a raffle with a 1 in 
20 chance of earning the participant’s choice of one larger hedonic reward (worth $120) from the 
same catalog.  
Results and discussion. As with the previous studies, people were overall risk averse, with 
participants in both incentive conditions favoring the program offering the smaller-certain (over 
larger-uncertain) reward (cash condition: 75%, χ2(1) = 28.75, p < .001; noncash condition: 62%, χ2(1) 
= 6.23, p = .013). However, even when the expected value of the guaranteed alternative was lower, 
the tendency to choose the smaller-certain reward over the larger-uncertain reward remained 
stronger among those in the cash condition compared to those in the noncash condition (χ2(1) = 
4.97, p = .026).  
Taken together, the results of Studies 1a through 1c provide evidence that relative to 
noncash hedonic rewards, cash incentives enhance preference for guaranteed rewards: People were 




3.5 Study Series 2: Cash Incentives Increase Preference for Immediate Rewards 
 
 
Using the context of risky choice, Study Series 1 provides evidence of an overall preference shift 
toward smaller but certain incentives over larger, less certain ones—when such incentives are 
denominated in cash rather than noncash (hedonic) terms. I argue that this preference for 
guaranteed (but lower) over probabilistic (but higher) monetary rewards not only reflects an overall 
attraction to alternatives that promise a “safe” payoff but also follows from a greater compensation 
focus.  
Another related consequence of a heighted focus on compensation involves tradeoffs 
involving time. Specifically, I anticipated that individuals preoccupied with being compensated will 
tend to strongly weight incentives that they can receive now rather than later. Under such a mindset, 
people are more likely to believe they are entitled to a reward as due payment for investing effort—
and in particular that they not only should attain it for sure but also immediately.  
Prior work in the behavioral decision-making literature suggests that the preference for 
immediacy in intertemporal choice and the preference for certainty in risky choice are connected and 
may often operate in parallel (e.g., Mischel and Grusec 1967; Prelec and Loewenstein 1991; Quiggin 
and Horowitz 1995; Rotter 1954; see also Urminsky and Kivetz 2011). For example, Quiggin and 
Horowitz (1995) use Rank Dependent Expected Utility as a basic uncertain choice model to derive a 
“natural analogy between risk-aversion and impatience” (p. 37). In the studies below, I tested the 
prediction that analogous to a greater preference for certain over uncertain rewards, cash (relative to 
noncash, hedonic) incentives would enhance the preference for immediate over delayed rewards. 
 




Method. Two-hundred and eighty-two (282) respondents, randomly assigned to a monetary 
incentive or a noncash incentive condition, considered two exercise programs (A and B; order 
counterbalanced) similar to the scenario I used in Study 1a. Both programs lasted one week 
(described as a trial run), and both offered members a reward for walking at least 60,000 steps at the 
end of the week. In the cash incentive condition, participants read about Program A, which offered 
a smaller reward ($20 in cash) that they would receive immediately, as well as Program B, which 
offered a larger reward ($30 in cash) that they would receive in two months after the trial run. In the 
noncash condition, the smaller but immediate reward consisted of the participant’s choice of one 
hedonic item (with retail value of $20) from the catalog used previously, while the larger but delayed 
reward consisted of their choice of one hedonic item (with retail value of $30) from the same 
catalog. Participants then chose the exercise incentive program they preferred to join.  
Results and discussion. Presentation order did not affect choice shares (χ2(1) = .21, p = .65) or 
interact with incentive condition to affect choice shares (χ2(1) = 2.26, p = .13). Whereas 67% of 
participants in the cash incentive condition chose the program with the immediate but smaller 
reward over the program with the delayed but larger reward, only 45% of participants in the noncash 
incentive condition chose the program with the immediate but smaller reward. I found the 
analogous pattern for intertemporal choice as I did under the risky choice paradigm: The tendency 
to prefer the smaller-immediate (vs. larger-delayed) incentive was more pronounced among 
participants in the cash compared to noncash incentive condition (χ2(1) = 12.75, p < .001). In other 
words, cash incentives increased people’s preference for reward contracts with a lower payoff but 
which they can receive now.  
 




 Method. To test whether cash incentives shift preferences toward smaller but immediate 
rewards in a different context, Study 2b repeated the paradigm from Study 2a using the language 
learning scenario. Participants were 353 respondents, assigned to either a monetary or noncash 
incentive condition, whom I instructed to imagine that they were interested in joining a summer 
online language program to increase their knowledge of a foreign language. They subsequently chose 
between two such programs in their area (Programs A and B, order counterbalanced). Each program 
was described to last two months (eight weeks) with a trial run of one week, and as part of the 
curriculum all members would take an exam at the end of each week. If a member passed the exam 
after the first week (trial run), s/he would earn a reward denominated in either cash (cash condition) 
or noncash terms (noncash condition). Program A granted a smaller incentive of $20 (in either cash 
or hedonic prizes) to be received immediately, while Program B offered a larger incentive of $30 (in 
either cash or hedonic prizes) to be received in two months after the trial run. 
Results and discussion. Presentation order did not affect choice shares (χ2(1) = .01, p = .93) or 
interact with incentive condition to affect choice shares (χ2(1) = 1.52, p = .22). Whereas 53% of 
participants in the cash incentive condition chose the program with the immediate but smaller 
reward over the program with the delayed but larger reward, only 38% of participants in the noncash 
incentive condition chose the program with the immediate but smaller reward (χ2(1) = 7.94, p 
= .005). Again, people opted for the alternative that secured them an immediate (albeit lower 
magnitude) payoff. 
 
3.6 Study Series 1-2: Discussion 
 
 
In concert, Study Series 1 and 2 provide evidence consistent with a compensation focus underlying 
the provision of (contingent) monetary incentives. Participants were more likely to favor incentive 
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systems with smaller but guaranteed or immediate rewards over larger but uncertain or delayed 
rewards when these rewards were in the form of cash compared to noncash, hedonic prizes. 
One possibility that may account for these results is that people simply perceived $5 in cash 
as more valuable or “worth more” than those who were presented with the same amount in a gift 
card. This may lead participants to construe the difference in attractiveness between the larger and 
smaller hedonic rewards as greater than the difference in attractiveness between the larger and 
smaller cash incentives (a case of asymmetric scope sensitivity). However, prior research and my 
own data cast some doubt on this explanation. First, evidence on the affective psychology of value 
(Hsee and Rottenstreich, 2004; Rottenstreich and Hsee 2000) suggests that, if anything, individuals 
tend to be more scope sensitive to changes in monetary units than nonmonetary (i.e., typically more 
affect-laden) ones. Second, previous work comparing consumers’ evaluations of cash and noncash 
rewards found preference reversals in which people favored cash under joint evaluation but gave 
higher ratings to the noncash alternative under separate evaluation (e.g., Kivetz and Simonson 2002b; 
Shaffer and Arkes 2009).  
Lastly, to more directly examine the “differential valuation” account, I ran a posttest on a 
separate pool from the same sample. Participants (N = 269) assigned to one of two incentive 
conditions (cash vs. noncash) read information about the same two reward programs used in the 
exercise scenario from Study 1a. Rather than asking people to choose between the contracts, 
however, I had them evaluate the bonus reward offered by each. Specifically, participants indicated 
on a 3-item scale to what extent they found the bonus attractive, desirable, and rewarding (1 = Not 
at all; 5 = Very much). I counterbalanced the order in which participants viewed the two programs 
(i.e., one with a small but certain reward, the other with a larger but uncertain one).  
I averaged the three scale items to obtain an index of perceived attractiveness (αsmall-certain 
= .96; αlarge-uncertain = .93). Because order of presentation affected participants’ responses on this 
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measure for both programs (small-certain: F(1,265) = 7.87, p = .005); large-uncertain: F(1,265) = 
11.01, p = .001) and interacted with condition (small-certain: F(1,264) = 5.10, p = .025; large-
uncertain: F(1,265) = 3.08, p = .08), I consider only the between-subjects effect on the first program 
participants evaluated (see Figure 21).  
 
 
Figure 21: Perceived attractiveness (indexed) of bonus reward offered in each incentive contract used in Study 
1a. Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). 
 
Participants in the noncash incentive condition rated the small but certain bonus as equally 
attractive compared to those who saw the equivalent amount in cash (Mnoncash = 3.80, Mcash = 3.59; 
F(1,134) = 1.21, p = .27). The same was true among those who rated the contract with the large but 
uncertain bonus (Mnoncash = 3.88, Mcash = 4.00; F(1,131) = .71, p = .40). Hence, at least under the 
separate evaluation paradigm I used in Study Series 1 and 2, cash does not appear to be inherently 




3.7 Study Series 3: Cash Incentives Increase Preference for Easier Goals 
 
 
The first two study series found that relative to noncash hedonic rewards, cash incentives led 
individuals to prefer incentive contracts with guaranteed or immediate (but lower magnitude) 
rewards over contracts with probabilistic or delayed (but higher expected value or net present value) 
ones. In other words, when they could earn cash, people were willing to sacrifice how much they 
could attain in favor of attaining their compensation for sure and immediately.  
A related question is whether varying the effort stream itself produces similar effects to 
changing the probability of a reward. Easier goals tend to give rise to more certain outcomes, 
whereas harder goals typically come with greater risks. Does imposing a more challenging goal—i.e., 
that demands greater effort—operate analogously to injecting uncertainty into the reward itself (as I 
did previously when the uncertain alternative consisted of a lottery)? To test this, Study 3a framed 
the tradeoff between magnitude and probability in terms of the effort expenditure required to earn a 
focal reward. 
 
3.7.1 Study 3a: Choosing Easier Goals 
 
Method. Participants were 178 respondents assigned to either a cash or a noncash incentive 
condition. Following the same scenario from Study 1a, I asked people to choose between two 
exercise incentive programs in their area. In the cash incentive condition, they chose between 
Program A, which offered a smaller reward ($5 in cash) for meeting a relatively easier weekly step 
goal (30,000 steps), and Program B, which offered a larger reward ($10 in cash) for meeting a 
relatively harder weekly step goal (75,000 steps). Participants in the noncash incentive condition saw 
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the same information except that they were offered their choice of a hedonic item (with equivalent 
retail value) from a gift catalog.  
Although both exercise programs featured contingent rewards that were non-probabilistic in 
nature (in contrast to the lottery-based options in Study Series 1), meeting the 30,000-step 
requirement of Program A is considerably easier and more feasible (if not guaranteed) than meeting 
the 75,000-step requirement of Program B—an assumption I corroborated in a separate posttest 
(see Appendix B2). Hence, people should be more likely to view Program A’s incentive contract as 
smaller but essentially certain compared to Program B’s larger but more uncertain contract. 
Results and discussion. Whereas 56% of participants in the cash incentive condition chose the 
program with the smaller reward but easier step goal over the program with the larger reward but 
harder step goal, only 36% of those in the noncash incentive condition did so (χ2(1) = 7.20, p 
= .007). This effect of incentive currency on choice indicates that, consistent with the findings 
described in Study Series 1, cash incentives induce a preference for rewards that are guaranteed—in 
this case by virtue of being easy (or trivial) to obtain. Such behavior may be detrimental to goal 
pursuit, as it effectively signals a willingness to opt for safer courses of action that award lower 
earnings for accomplishing less challenging tasks. 
 
3.7.2 Study 3b: Setting Easier Goals (Open-Ended)  
 
 Method. Study 3a’s results suggest that cash incentives shift choices toward incentive 
contracts that are considered safer insofar as they ensure receipt of the effort-contingent reward. In 
Study 3b, I extend this idea by explicitly asking participants to state a target goal that would 
determine whether they are eligible to receive a focal reward. One hundred and sixty-three (163) 
participants, randomly assigned to either a cash incentive or a noncash incentive condition, 
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considered a month-long exercise incentive program in their area that encouraged members to walk 
“a certain number of steps each week that they set for themselves at the beginning.” The target 
program offered members a reward for meeting their self-specified target step goals; this reward 
consisted of $5 denominated in either cash or hedonic currency corresponding to the incentive 
condition. As the dependent measure of interest, I asked participants to indicate, in an open-ended 
question, a weekly target step goal for themselves. 
Results and discussion. Participants in the cash incentive condition specified a lower effort 
threshold for themselves (i.e., a goal consisting of fewer steps) compared to those in the noncash 
reward condition (Mcash = 23,496 steps vs. Mnoncash = 34,534 steps; Mann-Whitney U = 2570.50, p 
= .017). Figure 22 illustrates this discrepancy. 
 
 
Figure 22: Distribution of self-imposed step goals (Study 3b). Each dot is an individual’s response. Average 




Looking at the entire distribution of self-stated step goals, we see that the majority of 
participants specified nonzero step goals. However, albeit sparse, the data toward the lower extreme 
of the distribution suggest that the prospect of cash incentives increased the likelihood of providing 
economically rational—but unrealistic—responses. Four participants in the cash incentive condition 
indicated a step goal below 100 steps, while no participants in the noncash condition set a goal 
within this range (Fisher’s exact: unadjusted odds ratio = 1.05, 95% CI [1.00, 1.11]), p = .056). 
Similarly, 16% of those in the cash condition specified below 1,000 steps per week, compared to 5% 
in the noncash condition (χ2(1) = 4.70, p = .017). 
To summarize, the effect of incentive currency on self-determined step thresholds indicates 
that compared to noncash hedonic rewards, cash incentives led individuals to set easier goals for 
themselves (i.e., with relaxed effort requirements) to guarantee receipt of the accompanying reward. 
In this regard, cash may disincentivize incremental effort expenditure and demotivate people from 
aspiring to attain stretch goals. 
 
3.7.3 Study 3c: Specifying Easier Goals (Closed-Ended) 
 
 Method. In Study 3c, I attempted to replicate and further build on the previous two studies. 
Would we see the same shift toward “safer” regimens under contingent cash incentives when people 
can indicate their preferred threshold of effort expenditure in a closed-ended (rather than open-
ended) format? Although the results of Study 3b were robust to outliers, it is reasonable to assume 
that people may not have a good sense of how much they are capable of walking. To impose some 
bounds on the range of responses, the present study followed an identical procedure to Study 3b 
except that participants could choose from a preselected list of minimum step thresholds with 
varying levels of difficulty and, hence, varying (implicit) probabilities of attaining the reward. 
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 I randomly assigned 157 participants to either a cash incentive condition or a noncash 
incentive condition. Again, I asked everyone to imagine that they were interested in joining an 
exercise incentive program and subsequently had them read about one such month-long program. 
Program members were encouraged to walk “a certain number of steps each week that they set for 
themselves at the beginning” and would earn a reward for each week that they met or exceeded their 
self-specified target step goal. 
In the cash incentive condition, the reward consisted of $5 in cash, whereas in the noncash 
incentive condition, it consisted of the participant’s choice of one item (with retail value of $5) from 
the same hedonic gift catalog used in previous studies. As the dependent measure, I asked 
participants to select a minimum weekly target step goal for themselves out of 11 options presented 
in a multiple-choice question. The options ranged from “5,000+ steps each week” to “100,000+ 
steps each week” in 10,000-step increments (apart from the gap between the first two options given 
by “5,000+ steps” and “10,000+ steps”).  
Results and discussion. Participants randomly assigned to the cash incentive condition tended to 
select options that corresponded to lower effort thresholds (i.e., consisting of a lower minimum step 
goal) compared to participants assigned to the noncash reward condition (Mcash = 17,911 steps vs. 
Mnoncash = 27,647 steps; Mann-Whitney U = 2246, Z = -1.75, p = .08). Examining the distribution of 
responses (see Figure 23) reveals that as the minimum step goal increases, the direction of the 
differences between the cash and noncash incentive conditions reverses: Whereas individuals who 
could earn cash were more likely to select effort thresholds up to 40,000 steps per week than those 
who could earn a noncash hedonic reward, the opposite pattern emerged for thresholds of 50,000 
steps per week or higher. In particular, 91% of participants in the cash incentive condition selected 
minimum goals below 50,000 steps per week compared to only 68% in the noncash reward 





Figure 23: Choice shares of selected step goals (Study 3c). 
 
In keeping with the idea that monetary rewards induce greater compensation focus, the 
above results further demonstrate that compared to noncash (hedonic) rewards, cash incentives 
caused people to set lower (i.e., easier and less ambitious) effort thresholds as a means of 
guaranteeing their contingent compensation. 
 
3.7.4 Study 3d: Choosing Easier Tasks  
 
The preceding studies in this series examined people’s stated preferences between, on the one hand, 
easier tasks that come with smaller rewards and, on the other hand, harder tasks that come with 
larger rewards. Notably, these studies imposed this tradeoff in the context of hypothetical scenarios 
in which effort is involved but not actually expended. Would the same pattern hold under incentive-
compatible conditions—that is, with consequential choices and real effort expenditure? To answer 
this, Study 3d tested whether people faced with cash (vs. noncash) performance incentives are more 
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likely to choose safer (i.e., low-risk but low-reward) alternatives when they must invest effort to earn 
real incentives. I additionally had individuals retrospectively evaluate how much they were focused 
on challenging themselves to complete the task (reflecting a “process”-oriented attitude) relative to 
how much they were focused on simply attaining the incentive (reflecting an “outcome”-oriented 
attitude). In accordance with a greater compensation focus, I posited that people incentivized with 
cash (vs. hedonic rewards) would focus more on the outcome of attaining the incentive than on the 
process of engaging with the task itself. 
Method. I randomly assigned 223 participants to one of three conditions: a no-incentive 
control condition, a cash incentive condition, and a noncash incentive condition. Rather than asking 
people to imagine a hypothetical scenario about joining an exercise or language learning reward 
program, I gave participants the choice of working on one of two ostensibly “randomly selected” 
tasks related to cognitive perceptions. 
All participants proceeded to a “Word Search Puzzles” page detailing the task (see Appendix 
B3 for a comprehensive tabulation of stimuli). The instructions indicated that they would be asked 
to solve a word search puzzle of their choice with a pre-generated topic category (e.g., “Sports”) by 
finding as many target words as they could within a given amount of time. I defined target words as 
valid English words hidden in the word search puzzle that belong to (i.e., are examples of) the given 
category; such words could appear horizontally, vertically, or diagonally, be oriented forwards or 
backwards, and could occasionally share letters across different words. Participants read that “[t]he 
word search will display the total number of target words in that puzzle but NOT the words 
themselves” and that the difficulty level would range from easy to difficult depending on the puzzle, 
with larger grid sizes corresponding to more difficult puzzles. Finally, I displayed a screenshot of a 
sample word search puzzle with a “moderate difficulty rating” (composed of a 10×10 grid of letters) 




Figure 24: Sample preview of word search puzzle task (Study 3d). 
 
After reading the instructions, participants saw information about two different word search 
puzzles on which they could choose to work. The first (“Word Search Puzzle M”) featured a 
difficulty rating of “Easy”, with an 8×8 grid size, 10 target words, and a time limit of nine minutes), 
while the second (“Word Search Puzzle R”) carried a difficulty rating of “Hard”, with a 14×14 grid 
size, 10 target words, and the same time limit). Participants randomly assigned to the control group 
saw no other information before indicating their choice between the two puzzles and proceeding to 
the selected task. Prior to making their choice, participants randomly assigned to either of the two 
incentive conditions learned about a performance-contingent reward offered for each of the puzzles. 
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In the cash incentive condition, Puzzle M offered participants $5 in cash if they correctly identified 
at least 80% of the total target words, whereas Puzzle R offered $10 for reaching the same 
performance threshold. Those in the noncash incentive condition read the same information except 
that the reward would be their choice of one item with retail value of $5 or $10 (corresponding to 
the easy or difficult puzzle, respectively) from the hedonic catalog used in the prior studies. Choice 
shares of the difficult word search puzzle (over the easy one) served as the primary dependent 
measure. 
I equated the two word search puzzles on all parameters except for the grid size, which 
governed the difficulty level. Both puzzles used “Animals” as their category, contained the same 10 
target words, and allotted nine minutes before the page advanced. Upon completing their chosen 
word search, participants rated how difficult they perceived the task to be, as well as the extent to 
which they were “more focused on challenging yourself to complete the task” (1) or “more focused 
on receiving the reward” (7). (For individuals in the control condition, who did not read about any 
incentive, the “reward” was the noncontingent participation fee for completing the survey.) Those in 
the two incentive treatments who correctly identified at least 80% of the words received the 
incentive corresponding to their condition and puzzle choice. 
Results and discussion. Choice shares of the more difficult word search puzzle differed by 
incentive condition (χ2(2) = 7.64, p = .02), with 35%, 32%, and 53% of participants in the control, 
monetary incentive, and noncash incentive conditions, respectively, choosing to work on the hard 
puzzle over the easy one. Those who could attain cash incentives were equally as likely as those in 
the control condition to select the difficult puzzle (p = .77) and less likely to select the difficult 
puzzle than those in the noncash incentive condition (p = .01), who were in turn more likely to do 
so than those in the control condition (p = .02). 
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Responses to the “outcome versus process focus” scale varied by incentive condition 
(F(2,220) = 17.60, p < .001). In particular, participants in the cash incentive condition attended more 
to the outcome of receiving the incentive itself (M = 4.51 [SD = 2.13]) compared to their 
counterparts in the control (M = 2.55 [1.87]; t(220) = 5.81, p < .001) or noncash incentive condition 
(M = 3.18 [2.18]; t(220) = 3.94, p < .001). Those in the latter group scored directionally higher on 
the “outcome versus process focus” measure than those in the control condition (t(220) = 1.86, p 
= .06); however, in both cases, participants’ responses fell below the scale midpoint (control: t(74) = 
-6.73, p < .001; noncash: t(73) = -3.25, p = .002), indicating an overall focus on process over 
outcome. In contrast, responses among those assigned to the cash incentive condition fell above the 
scale midpoint (t(73) = 2.07, p = .04), indicating an overall focus on outcome over process. 
Altogether, these patterns suggest that tasks which feature incentives denominated in monetary 
currency (vs. noncash currency or no bonus incentive at all) shift individuals’ emphasis toward the 
outcome of attaining the reward and away from the process of engaging in a given task. 
How do these perceptions break down based on participants’ chosen task? A 3 (incentive 
condition: control vs. monetary vs. hedonic) × 2 (choice: easy puzzle vs. difficult puzzle) factorial 
ANOVA indicated a main effect of incentive condition (F(2,217) = 23.40, p < .001), qualified by an 





Figure 25: Self-reported focus on the outcome of receiving the reward (7) as opposed to the process of 
engaging in the puzzle task (1) (Study 3d). Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). 
 
Specifically, among participants assigned to the control condition, reported “outcome” (as 
opposed to “process”) focus was higher for participants who chose the easy puzzle (Measy = 3.06 [SD 
= 1.95], Mhard = 1.58 [1.24]; F(1,217) = 9.25, p = .003). In the cash incentive condition, this pattern 
reversed, such that participants who chose the difficult puzzle reported a higher outcome focus than 
those who chose the easy puzzle (Measy = 4.20 [2.09], Mhard = 5.17 [2.12]; F(1,217) = 3.75, p = .05). In 
contrast, those in the noncash condition scored equally low on this measure regardless of whether 
they chose the easy or difficult puzzle (Measy = 3.51 [2.15], Mhard = 2.87 [2.19]; F(1,217) = 1.88, p 
= .17). These patterns offer some insight into what participants valued conditional on what they 
chose. Absent any bonus, people who chose the difficult (vs. easy) puzzle reported directing their 
attention more to engaging themselves in a challenging task, consistent with a baseline intrinsic 
motivation effect. This pattern was attenuated for participants who could earn hedonic prizes: Those 
who selected the difficult task became more focused (relative to participants in the control 
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condition) on reward attainment. However, consistent with generating a greater compensation focus, 
cash-incentivized participants who selected the difficult puzzle did so primarily to receive the (larger) 
reward rather than to challenge themselves. 
In sum, the above findings reveal that, in line with the results of Studies 3a-3c, the use of a 
cash currency increased people’s tendency to select easier goals and tasks that promised a smaller 
payoff but greater odds of receiving the reward. These data also furnish some insight into the 
psychological mechanism by which cash incentives can demotivate people from pursuing harder 
goals—by evoking a preoccupation with compensation where they become more focused on the 
outcome of attaining an incentive rather than the process of engaging in the task or activity at hand. 
Whether choosing between reward contracts or selecting their own performance goals and 
effort streams, participants were more attracted to smaller but guaranteed incentives when these 
incentives consisted of cash as opposed to hedonic rewards of equivalent retail value. Taken 
together, cash incentives appeared to not only enhance choice shares of smaller but guaranteed or 
immediate rewards at the expense of larger but uncertain or delayed rewards (Study Series 1-2) but 
also shift choices toward goals and tasks that are less challenging to complete—thereby making 
reward-attainment more likely (Study Series 3). Such behavior, I propose, typifies a key aspect of a 
heightened compensation focus: the emphasis on “settling for” rewards that are assured and easily 
won. 
 
3.8 Study Series 4: The Role of Effort Requirements on Reward Preference 
 
 
The decisions I have investigated up until now have consisted of scenarios involving the provision 
of incentives that are contingent on some effort expenditure—whether that be in the form of steps 
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walked, exams passed, or word search puzzles solved. A natural question here is whether similar 
results would emerge if I were to sever the dependency between incentive and effort. 
Recall that, as I posited in Section 3.2, the compensation focus elicited by monetary 
incentives implies a desire to secure more “bang for the buck.” This proposition encompasses an 
output-oriented component on the one hand, involving calculative considerations aimed at 
maximizing the magnitude of the reward (“What am I getting out?”), and an input-oriented element 
on the other hand, involving considerations aimed at minimizing costs and effort (“What am I 
putting in?”). An increased focus on compensation, I argue, entails a mental comparison between 
output and input when evaluating whether a focal reward justifies a given level of effort (see also 
Rottenstreich and Kivetz 2006). Judgments of the value of a cash incentive, then, are likely to be 
made in a transactive sense relative to the effort requirements in place. In the presence of such 
requirements, I predicted that people should be attracted to incentive structures that offer rewards 
they can get quickly and for sure (as “due payment” or “entitlement” for their efforts). However, 
sans any effort-reward contingency, cash-incentivized individuals—who are more likely to be 
focused on compensation—should be more likely to shift considerations toward maximizing 
expected (or net present) value and, in doing so, show less aversion to larger but uncertain or 
rewards. 
Using the case of loyalty programs, Kivetz (2003) found that in the context of risky choice 
(i.e., when trading off the magnitude and probability of a reward), consumers were more likely to 
prefer sure, small rewards over uncertain, large rewards when earning the rewards was contingent on 
expending a given amount of effort compared to when the rewards were given as free gifts. In other 
words, when there exists an effort-reward contingency, people seem to prioritize obtaining the 
incentive for sure (as opposed to risking the possibility of leaving empty-handed). In line with the 
hypothesis that cash incentives give rise to greater compensation focus, I predicted this kind of 
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expectation based on effort to be stronger when an incentive is denominated in cash (compared to 
noncash) terms. 
 
3.8.1 Study 4a: The Effect of Effort Requirements on Preference for Guaranteed Rewards 
 
Method. Participants were 211 respondents randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 
2 (incentive type: cash vs. noncash) × 2 (effort requirement: effort required vs. no effort required) 
between-subjects design. Following the risky choice exercise scenario from Study 1c, participants 
decided between a program offering a certain but smaller reward ($5, in either cash or hedonic 
currency, corresponding to the incentive type condition) and one offering an uncertain reward with 
greater expected value (1 in 20 chance to receive $120, in either cash or hedonic currency). Both 
programs encouraged members to walk at least 60,000 steps per week. I further randomized 
participants within each incentive type condition to one of two “presence of effort” conditions. In 
the “effort required” condition, individuals read that they would earn the focal reward only if they 
meet the weekly 60,000-step goal (identical to the instructions from Study Series 1). Those in the 
“no effort required” condition read, however, that they would earn the focal reward regardless of how 
many steps they walk. 
Results and discussion. A binary logistic regression on the choice share of the smaller-certain 
incentive contract revealed a (directional) main effect of the “presence of effort” factor (B = .56, SE 
= .41, χ2(1) = 2.61, p = .11), qualified by a presence of effort × incentive type interaction effect (B = 





Figure 26: Choice share of exercise incentive program offering the smaller-certain (over larger-uncertain) 
reward (Study 4a). 
 
Specifically, when effort was required (i.e., when attaining the reward was contingent on meeting the 
step goal), participants were more likely to select the smaller-certain reward when offered cash as 
opposed to a noncash reward (87%cash vs. 60%noncash; χ
2(1) = 11.47, p = .001)—replicating the 
patterns observed in Studies 1a and 1b. However, when effort was not required (i.e., when members 
could earn the incentive regardless of how many steps they walked), this effect was eliminated: If 
anything, participants were slightly less likely to select the smaller-certain reward when they were in 
the cash as opposed to the noncash incentive condition (58% vs. 73%; χ2(1) = 2.39, p = .12). 
In other words, only when the incentive was contingent on reaching a performance 
threshold (necessitating a substantial degree of effort expenditure) did people facing cash incentives 
exhibit a stronger tendency to trade off reward magnitude for reward certainty. Absent this 
contingency, people who could earn a cash (vs. hedonic) incentive were more likely to focus on 




3.8.2 Study 4b: The Effect of Effort Requirements on Preference for Immediate Rewards 
 
In Study 4b, I assessed the analogous hypothesis for intertemporal choice—namely, that the 
relative greater preference for smaller-sooner (vs. larger-later) rewards induced by cash incentives 
would be diminished when the incentives are no longer contingent on performance. In particular, 
when I offer individuals a cash payment regardless of their effort expenditure, they should be more 
likely to opt for contracts that offer greater earning potential or net present value. 
Method. I randomly assigned 356 respondents to one of four conditions in a 2 (incentive type: 
cash vs. noncash) × 2 (presence or absence of effort: effort required vs. no effort required to attain 
the incentive) between-subjects design. As in Study 2a, participants again chose between two 
exercise incentive programs, both of which encouraged members to walk at least 60,000 steps: one 
offered a smaller but immediate reward of $20 immediately (denominated in either cash or hedonic 
currency), while the other offered a larger but delayed reward of $30 in two months (in either cash 
or hedonic currency). In the “effort required” condition, participants could earn the reward only if 
they met or exceeded the 60,000-step goal. In contrast, those in the “no effort required” condition 
read that they could earn the reward regardless of how many steps they walked. 
Results and discussion. A binary logistic regression on the choice share of the smaller-immediate 
incentive revealed a main effect of incentive type (B = .78, SE = .30, χ2(1) = 3.42, p = .06), qualified 
by an interaction between presence of effort and incentive type (B = -.77, SE = .43, χ2(1) = 3.18, 
p = .075; see Figure 27). When the incentive was contingent on effort, participants were more likely 
to select the smaller-immediate reward when they encountered monetary incentives as opposed to 
hedonic rewards (59%cash vs. 40%noncash; χ
2(1) = 6.91, p = .009)—replicating what we observed in 
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Study Series 2. However, when I removed any incentive contingency, this effect vanished (48% vs. 
47%; χ2(1) = .002, p = .96). 
 
 
Figure 27: Choice share of exercise incentive program offering the smaller-immediate (over larger-delayed) 
reward (Study 4b). 
 
Studies 4a and 4b together highlight the importance of effort-reward contingency when 
people make tradeoffs between a reward’s magnitude and its probability and delay. Only when the 
incentive depended on reaching a goal or standard of effort investment did individuals motivated 
with cash (compared to those motivated with hedonic rewards) appear more willing to trade off 
reward magnitude in return for certainty (Study 4a) and immediacy (Study 4b). Absent such a 
contingency, cash incentives seemed to focus people more on expected value and net present value 
calculations that favored the larger but delayed alternative.  
Recall the alternative account raised earlier, based on perceived desirability or attractiveness, 
which contends that participants in the noncash incentive condition may have been more willing to 
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select larger-uncertain rewards because they experienced greater scope sensitivity in their valuation 
of the hedonic items.  If this were indeed the case, then we would expect to observe the same 
pattern of results in the “effort required” and “no effort required” conditions—which we did not.  
Thus, the above findings lend further support to an explanation based on compensation: When no 
labor is necessary to “earn” a reward (and hence nothing to compensate someone for), individuals 
incentivized with cash no longer become as tempted by the prospect of receiving the reward for sure 
or immediately.    
 
3.9 Study Series 5: The Certainty and Immediacy “Premium” 
 
 
The results of Study Series 4 indicate that the requirement to expend effort can moderate when cash 
(compared to noncash) incentives increase the preference for smaller but certain, as well as smaller 
but delayed, rewards. In the next set of studies, I examine whether people evaluate these tradeoffs in 
the same way even when none of the offered incentives allow for complete certainty or immediacy.  
Compensation focus, I have proposed, leads individuals to try and guarantee the receipt of an 
incentive as due payment in return for their effort. In doing so, they tend to place the certainty and 
immediacy of a reward above other considerations, such as its magnitude or expected value. However, 
offering a cash incentive with merely a greater probability (but not certainty) or temporal proximity 
(but not immediacy) may not be sufficiently enticing to override considerations of expected value. 
That is, when neither alternative gives the possibility of receiving something for sure or immediately, 
I expected people to exhibit greater attraction toward cash rewards that feature greater uncertainty 




3.9.1 Study 5a: Preference for Absolute Certainty 
 
Method. I randomly assigned 346 respondents to one of four conditions in a 2 (incentive type: 
cash vs. noncash) × 2 (choice set: certainty present vs. certainty absent) between-subjects design. 
Under the same risky choice paradigm used in Study 1c, participants chose between two exercise 
programs that offered members a weekly reward (denominated in either cash or noncash, hedonic 
currency) conditional on meeting a target goal of 60,000 steps per week. I further assigned half of 
the participants in each incentive type condition to one of two choice sets. In the “certainty present” 
condition, participants faced the same choices as those in the “effort required” condition in Study 
3a—that is, between one program with a smaller but completely certain reward ($5, in either cash or 
hedonic currency) and a second program with a larger but uncertain reward (a 1 in 20 chance of 
$120, in either cash or hedonic currency). Those assigned to the “certainty absent” condition 
confronted the same choice except that the program with the smaller reward also featured 
uncertainty, albeit to a lesser degree (1 in 10 chance to earn $55). 
Results and discussion. A binary logistic regression on the choice share of the smaller, less 
uncertain incentive revealed an incentive type × choice set interaction (B = -.93, SE = .48, χ2(1) = 
3.87, p = .049), with no main effects of either factor (see Figure 28). Among those in the certainty 
present condition, directionally more people exposed to the cash incentive (vs. noncash incentive) 
chose the program with the smaller-certain reward (75%cash vs. 68%noncash; χ
2(1) = .86, p = .36). Yet, 
when both rewards were probabilistic, fewer participants in the cash incentive condition chose the 
smaller, less uncertain option compared to those in the noncash incentive condition (62%cash vs. 
75%noncash; χ
2(1) = 3.64, p = .056). While choice shares of the smaller, less uncertain reward did not 
differ by choice set among those who faced a hedonic reward (χ2(1) = .94, p = .33), those who faced 
a cash incentive were more likely to select the smaller-certain reward contract when certainty was 





Figure 28: Choice share of exercise incentive program offering the smaller but less uncertain (over larger but 
more uncertain) reward (Study 5a). 
 
Overall, the above pattern indicates that cash incentives are more likely to induce a 
preference for effort-contingent rewards that are assured (with 100% certainty) as opposed to 
rewards that merely have a relatively higher, but not certain, probability of being realized—even 
after the required effort has been expended. Such behavior is again consistent with a greater 
compensation focus—one that leads people to privilege rewards that are certain, but which prompts 
them to attempt to maximize expected returns when certainty becomes impossible. 
 
3.9.2 Study 5b: Preference for Absolute Immediacy 
 
I next tested, in Study 5b, whether a similar pattern would emerge for tradeoffs involving time. Here 
I predicted that when an immediate, contingent cash incentive is no longer available as an option, 
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people would be more likely to select the larger but more delayed reward in the interest of 
maximizing net present value.  
Method. Participants were 348 respondents randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 
2 (incentive type: cash vs. noncash) × 2 (choice set: immediacy present vs. immediacy absent) 
between-subjects design. Following the scenario I described in Study 2a, I again asked participants to 
choose between two exercise incentive programs in their area, both of which offered a reward—
denominated in either cash or hedonic currency—for walking at least 60,000 steps. I assigned half of 
the participants in each incentive type condition to one of two choice sets. In the “immediacy 
present” condition, people chose between a program with a smaller reward of $20 (in either cash or 
hedonic currency) to be received immediately, and another program with a larger reward of $30 (in 
either cash or hedonic currency) to be received in two months. Paralleling the design of Study 5a, 
those assigned to the “immediacy absent” condition read the same information except that the 
program offering the smaller reward also featured delay, albeit to a lesser degree ($24 to be received 
in one month).35  
Results and discussion. I found an analogous pattern to the risky choice when participants 
traded off between reward magnitude and delay. A binary logistic regression on choice share of the 
smaller but less delayed incentive revealed an incentive type × choice set interaction (B = .93, SE 
= .45, χ2(1) = 4.24, p = .039), with no main effects of either factor (see Figure 29). Among those in 
the immediacy present condition, directionally more people exposed to the cash incentive (vs. 
noncash hedonic incentive) chose the program with the smaller-immediate reward (69%cash vs. 
51%noncash; χ
2(1) = 6.13, p = .13). When both incentives lacked complete immediacy, however, equally 
                                                     
35 Note that in both choice sets, the larger, more delayed reward offers a higher net present value than the smaller, less 
delayed reward assuming an empirically reasonable range of discount rates (e.g., indifference between $20 now and $30 in 
two months, and between $24 in one month and $30 in two months, implies annual exponential discount rates of 243% 
and 267%, respectively). 
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many participants in the cash and noncash incentive conditions chose the less delayed, smaller 
incentive (54% vs. 57%; χ2(1) = .18, p = .67). While choice shares of the smaller, less delayed reward 
did not differ by choice set among those incentivized with the noncash reward (χ2(1) = .63, p = .43), 
those incentivized with cash were more likely to select the smaller-immediate reward when 
immediacy was present as opposed to absent (χ2(1) = 4.60, p = .03). Thus, when reward immediacy 
is impossible (i.e., when both options are delayed), a greater compensation focus may induce 
individuals to be less willing to sacrifice a reward’s magnitude for a comparatively smaller time delay. 
 
 
Figure 29: Choice share of exercise incentive program offering the smaller but less delayed (over larger but 
more delayed) reward (Study 5b). 
 
To conclude, the data from Study Series 4 and 5 suggest that the effect of cash incentives on 
attraction to immediate or sure—yet smaller—rewards is less pronounced when the incentives (i) are 
not contingent on effort (Studies 4a and 4b) and (ii) are not attainable without accepting some level 
of risk or delay (Studies 5a and 5b). In this regard, monetary incentives may cause individuals to 
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assign a “premium” to options that promise absolute certainty and immediacy of a reward (at the cost 
of its expected, or net present, value). Such preferences provide additional evidence of a 
compensation focus elicited by cash incentives: When people need to work to earn a monetary 
award, they tend to privilege contracts that allow them to receive that prize with 100% certainty and 
with no delay. 
 
 
3.10 Study Series 6: Cash Incentives Increase Cheating on Real-Effort Tasks 
 
 
3.10.1 Compensation Focus and Cheating Behavior 
 
The empirical evidence I have laid out so far implicate a compensation focus in the presence of cash 
incentives that affects tradeoffs involving risk and time. Specifically, incentivizing people with cash, 
compared to hedonic rewards with equivalent monetary value (and to unrewarded controls) appears 
to enhance their preference for guaranteed and immediate incentive systems. This attraction toward 
greater certainty and immediacy was, moreover, associated with lower effort streams, a relationship 
reflected in the marketplace: Higher performance thresholds and harder goals typically require more 
effort investment and entail riskier, more delayed incentives.  
A separate but related question is whether greater compensation focus—the same force I 
posit as responsible for lowering people’s willingness to expend effort and tolerate risk and delay in 
reward attainment—can also influence behaviors during goal pursuit, such as the integrity 
characterizing individuals’ performance and effort investment. To the extent that cash incentives 
(and the compensation focus they evoke) lead people to care less about how a desired outcome is 
achieved (as the reported “outcome vs. process” focus measure in Study 3d attests), they may 
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similarly cause individuals to be tempted by shortcuts that guarantee and expedite payment: People 
may cheat more.  
Recall that in Study 3b, participants who faced the prospect of earning a cash (vs. noncash 
hedonic) bonus for walking a self-determined number of steps per week were more likely to, in 
some sense, “game” the system by indicating excessively low weekly step counts that would 
guarantee them compensation (e.g., below 1,000 or even 100 steps—unreasonable estimates barring 
extreme cases of sedentarism). Although these kinds of responses are not tantamount to cheating per 
se, they nevertheless hint at the possibility that monetary rewards can blunt people’s willingness to 
put forth an honest attempt that follows the spirit of the prescribed incentive scheme. 
The corruptible effects of money on individuals’ ethical behavior has, indeed, some support 
in the money priming literature. For example, participants exposed to abundant wealth or the 
concept of money (e.g., after seeing 7,000 dollar bills instead of 24 dollar bills) cheated more 
frequently (Gino and Pierce 2009; see also Gino and Mogilner 2014). In my studies, however, I 
focus on cheating behavior as a function of effort-contingent incentives rather than activating 
reminders of money in the symbolic sense. As Study Series 3 suggests, the effects of a greater 
compensation focus—as shown by a pronounced preference for guaranteed and immediate 
rewards—is likely to only manifest in the presence (rather than absence) of effort-reward 
contingency. Whereas prior work has largely contrasted money primes with either neutral primes, 
the absence of money (e.g., scarcity), or other resources (e.g., time), I assessed the differential effects 
of contingent cash incentives with noncash hedonic rewards (of equivalent monetary value), and 
with unrewarded controls, on cheating behavior.  
In the next series of studies, I use real-effort tasks with real incentives to test the hypothesis 
that participants incentivized with cash will be willing to cheat more compared to those who faced 
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no incentives (i.e., in a control condition) or those who faced hedonic rewards of equivalent 
monetary value. 
 
3.10.2 Study 6a: Counting Zeros 
 
Method. Study 6a assessed whether cash incentives, relative to noncash hedonic rewards, 
incite more cheating in an effort-contingent activity. I randomly assigned 279 participants to one of 
three incentive conditions (control vs. cash incentive vs. noncash incentive); the survey was 
ostensibly about “cognitive perceptions and processes” (see Appendix B4 for complete instructions 
and stimuli). In the control condition, participants received only a baseline fee of $0.90 for 
completion. Those in the incentive treatments received the same fee but could also earn a bonus 
reward if they scored in the top 5% of all participants. The performance-contingent bonus consisted 
of either $10 cash (in the cash incentive condition) or the participant’s choice of one hedonic item of 
equivalent retail value from a gift catalog (in the noncash incentive condition). Because I explicitly 
stated the monetary value of the hedonic reward, any difference that arises between the two 
performance-based incentive conditions is unlikely to be purely due to money priming. 
All participants worked on a “counting zeros” task (adapted from Abeler et al. 2011) that 
involved counting the number of zeros appearing in a series of five tables (consisting of 15 rows × 
29 columns) made up of randomly ordered 0s and 1s (see Figure 30). I allotted participants only 90 





Figure 30: Sample table in Counting Zeros task (Study 6a). 
 
After entering their answer for each table, participants read that a new table would be randomly 
generated on the next page. This was done in the interest of task realism and to decrease any 
suspicion that the tables were “rigged” in any way. In actuality, all participants saw the same five 
tables. 
Importantly, I cautioned them to “try to count the zeros using just your eyes instead of with 
the help of external tools like the find in page search command.” This last instruction drew 
participants’ attention to the possibility of cheating on the task, since the exact number of zeros in a 
given table could be easily obtained by either navigating to their browser menu and selecting “find in 
page” or by entering the “CTRL+F” command on their keyboard (which opens the same search 
function). Because the time limit I imposed rendered correct responses (i.e., exact answers) highly 
unlikely without the aid of these shortcuts (an assumption I validated empirically), I interpreted 
higher performance scores on the task as evidence of greater cheating. 
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Results and discussion. For each participant, I calculated a score given by the total number of 
tables for which they “correctly” counted the number of zeros. I normalized this measure using a 
log transformation (the untransformed data yield similar results36). The average number of tables 
counted “correctly” varied by incentive condition (F(2,276) = 4.34, p = .01; see Figure 31). 
Specifically, those in the cash incentive condition “cheated” more on this metric (M = 1.01 [SD = 
1.58]) relative to those in the control condition (M = .53 [1.21]; t(276) = 2.44, p = .015) and relative 
to those in the noncash reward condition (M = .47 [1.09]; t(276) = 2.62, p = .009); there was no 
difference between the control and noncash reward groups in the average number of tables 




Figure 31: Number of tables (out of 5) counted exactly correctly (Study 6a). Error bars are standard errors (±1 
SEM). 
 
                                                     




Further, a greater proportion of participants provided the exact solution in the cash incentive 
condition relative to the control or noncash incentive conditions for each table (see Figure 32). 
Although the absolute incidence of cheating was fairly low in the aggregate,37 a consistently higher 
proportion of participants did so in the cash incentive condition compared to their counterparts in 
the control and noncash incentive conditions (table 1: 20%cash vs. 11%control vs. 6%noncash, χ
2(2) = 8.13, 
p = .017; table 2: 8% vs. 1% vs. 5%, χ2(2) = 4.61, p = .10; table 3: 26% vs. 14% vs. 11%, χ2(2) = 6.75, 
p = .034; table 4: 24% vs. 12% vs. 10%, χ2(2) = 6.84, p = .033; table 5: 24% vs. 15% vs. 14%, χ2(2) = 




Figure 32: Percentage of participants who provided the exactly correct solution to each table (Study 6a). 
 
                                                     
37 That most people did not cheat is perhaps not too surprising (and reassuring in some sense), given the explicit 
instructions to not use shortcuts. 
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A potential alternative explanation for the pattern above is that participants who could earn 
cash (compared to noncash rewards) were simply more motivated to do well on the task and 
genuinely performed better on the task. To address this concern, I conducted a posttest on a 
separate sample (N = 280) using an identical procedure except that I removed the opportunity to 
cheat on the task. Specifically, cheating was rendered impossible because I presented each table to 
the participants as an image pasted on the screen that was not searchable using the “find in page” (or 
“CTRL+F” command) command. As a result, people could only “manually” count the number of 
zeros in each table (by visually inspecting the table, i.e., actually investing effort without cheating). I 
imposed the same time limit of 90 seconds per table before the screen automatically advanced.  
If cash incentives led people to cheat more and hence count more tables “correctly,” then 
when participants can no longer use any shortcuts to automatically detect the number of zeros in a 
table, performance should no longer be higher in the cash incentive condition compared to the 
unrewarded control or noncash incentive conditions. I tested this prediction and found no effect of 
incentive type or condition on the number of tables counted (exactly) correctly (F(2,277) = .41, p 
= .66). Figure 33 illustrates these results in conjunction with those obtained in Study 6a (when 





Figure 33: Number of tables (out of 5) counted exactly correctly when cheating was impossible compared to 
possible (Study 6a). Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). 
 
As I anticipated, those in the cash incentive condition gave equally few correct solutions (M 
= .14 [SD = .47]) as did those in the control condition (M = .07 [.25]) or in the noncash reward 
condition (M = .16 [.76]), suggesting that the participants in Study 6a were indeed more likely to 
cheat on the counting zeros task under the provision of cash incentives (vs. no incentives or 
noncash hedonic rewards). Note that the averages I observed in the posttest are lower compared to 
those in each of the corresponding incentive conditions in Study 6a, indicating that participants 
there likely cheated across the board when the opportunity to do so was present.  
 
3.10.3 Study 6b: Solving Anagrams 
 
Study 6a contributes initial evidence that cash incentives can increase cheating behavior relative to 
noncash, hedonic rewards of the same retail value and to no-incentive controls. In Study 6b, I tested 
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whether this finding would emerge in a different paradigm that measured dishonesty. Specifically, I 
adapted an anagram task from Wiltermuth (2011), which allows participants the opportunity to cheat 
by falsely over-reporting their performance to increase their chances of receiving a contingent 
incentive. I again predicted that presenting individuals with cash incentives (compared to no 
incentives or noncash hedonic rewards) would increase the frequency of cheating due to invoking in 
people’s minds a greater preoccupation with securing monetary gain. 
Method. I randomly assigned 176 participants to one of three incentive conditions: a no-
incentive control, a cash incentive condition, and a noncash (hedonic) incentive condition. 
Participants read that they would complete a task related to cognitive perceptions; those in the cash 
as well as noncash incentive groups further learned that they would have the chance to receive an 
additional bonus reward depending on their performance (see Appendix B5 for stimuli).  
Next, I directed all participants to a page with instructions for an “Unscrambling Words” 
puzzle that tasked them with unscrambling a series of jumbled words (i.e., anagrams) on a page in a 
given amount of time. (I defined “unscrambling” here to mean rearranging the letters such that the 
resulting word forms a valid English word containing all the letters of the original scrambled word.) 
The instructions specified the same scoring mechanism whereby they would earn 10 points for each 
anagram they report successfully solving in order from the beginning. Adopting the language used in 
Wiltermuth (2011), I emphasized this order aspect: “This means you should try to solve the jumbles 
in the order they appear. So, for example, if you successfully unscramble the first 3 word jumbles 
but not the 4th, you will earn points only for the first 3—even if you also successfully unscramble 
the 5th, 6th, and 7th word jumbles.” I also added a cautionary note to “use only your mind, and no 
other tools, to solve the jumbles.” Participants assigned to the two incentive conditions additionally 
read information about the bonus reward, which they would earn if their total score fell within the 
top 5% of participants. In the cash incentive condition, this reward consisted of $30 in cash; in the 
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noncash incentive condition, it consisted of the participant’s choice of one hedonic item (worth $30) 
from the gift catalog used in previous studies. 
I presented nine anagrams on a single page. For each anagram, participants indicated 
whether they successfully unscrambled that anagram by checking either a “Not Solved” or “Solved” 
button. To remove any perception of external monitoring by the researcher, I did not ask them to 
write their solutions at any point.  A timer appeared at the bottom of the page that counted down 
from 420 seconds (seven minutes), after which the page automatically advanced. Of the nine 
anagrams, eight could be unscrambled without excessive mental effort to form fairly common words 
such as “house” and “jumping.” However, the third anagram (“UNAAGT”) could only be solved to 
spell taguan, an obscure word for an Asiatic species of flying squirrel. Previous pretesting conducted 
by Wiltermuth (2011) confirmed that correctly identifying this solution is exceedingly unlikely, with 
not a single participant able to successfully unscramble the “UNAAGT” jumble in the original study. 
Further, while it is conceivable that people could turn to online anagram solvers despite our 
instructions, I found no programs that returned taguan as a solution. Participants could therefore 
“cheat” by falsely reporting that they had solved this third anagram; doing so would allow them to 
considerably increase their total score (and hence improve their chances of winning the incentive for 
those assigned to either of the two incentive conditions) by earning credit for the subsequent six 
anagrams. Therefore, I examined the frequency with which participants reported successfully solving 
the third practically-impossible (“UNAAGT”) anagram as the primary dependent measure.  
Results and discussion. The incidence of cheating was relatively high in the aggregate, with 63% 
of participants reporting having solved the third “impossible” anagram. However, a binary logistic 
regression revealed that the frequency of cheating varied across incentive condition (χ2(2) = 13.64, 
p = .001), with 79%, 62%, and 45% of participants in the cash incentive, noncash incentive, and 
control conditions, respectively, indicating that they successfully solved the third anagram (see 
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Figure 34). Those in the cash incentive condition cheated more on this metric than those in the 
noncash incentive condition (p = .029) and more than those in the control (p < .001); participants in 
the noncash incentive group in turn cheated directionally more than those in the control (p = .08).  
 
 
Figure 34. Percentage of participants who reported solving the third (“impossible”) anagram (Study 6b). 
 
To summarize, although the incentive to act dishonestly overall was present for all 
participants given the lack of external monitoring, it appears that the incidence of cheating was most 
pronounced among those who could attain compensation that was denominated in cash. 
 
3.10.4 Study 6c: Guessing Marbles 
 
To further test the replicability of the previous results, in Study 6c I looked at a similar metric—
degree of overreporting one’s performance—using a third, novel paradigm that I devised to measure 
cheating behavior.  
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Method. Participants consisted of 321 respondents, randomly assigned to one of three 
incentive conditions (no-incentive control vs. cash incentive vs. noncash incentive). I asked 
participants to complete an online survey ostensibly about how people “visually perceive objects”; I 
further told them that to help researchers test this cognitive process, they would be playing a 
“marble guessing game” that involves estimating how many marbles appear in a series of cubes, or 
“boxes.”  
Specifically, participants read that they would see a series of five boxes, each with a 
“randomly generated number of marbles (represented by colored spheres) inside,” and that their 
task is to estimate the number of marbles in each box. (In actuality, I presented everyone with the 
same stimuli; see Figure 35 for a sample problem.) Participants learned that they would have 15 
seconds to examine each box and type their answer before the screen automatically advanced. I 
displayed a timer counting down from 15 seconds on each page. Further, I informed participants 
that they will be given feedback on the accuracy of their responses for each box (i.e., their own guess 
and the correct answer), and to therefore “make sure to take notes somewhere separately in order to 
keep track of how many points you scored (if any) based on that feedback.”  
 
 




All participants read that their score would be determined by how many points they receive 
for each box, according to the following distribution: Each exactly correct answer (i.e., if they guess 
the exact number of marbles depicted) would give them 20 points; each answer within 10, 20, and 30 
marbles from the actual number depicted would give them 10 points, 5 points, and 1 point, 
respectively; and all other responses would award no points. I included two questions about the 
scoring system as a comprehension check.  
After reading the instructions, participants assigned to the control condition proceeded to 
the focal task (for which they received a baseline fee of $0.80, regardless of their performance). 
Those assigned to each of the other two conditions read that they had the opportunity to earn a 
reward (on top of the baseline participation fee of $0.80) depending on their performance on the 
marble guessing game—specifically, if they scored within the top 10% of all participants in the 
study. In the cash incentive condition, this incentive consisted of $10 in cash, while in the noncash 
incentive condition it consisted of the participant’s choice of one item (with retail value of $10) from 
a similar hedonic gift catalog used in previous studies. Those in the noncash incentive group chose 
one item from the catalog as their preferred reward. 
How could participants cheat? I gave them the opportunity to misreport their performance 
toward the end of the survey. Specifically, after they completed the marble guessing game, all 
participants saw a “final score calculation” page displaying their guesses for each of the five boxes, 
along with a reminder of the scoring rules (i.e., how many points they would gain if their estimate fell 
within 0, 10, 20, and 30 marbles from the true answer). As the primary dependent measure, I asked 
participants to state directly how many points they earned for each box. That is, participants read 
that “since the actual correct answers to the specific boxes you saw were not recorded as part of this 
survey for technical reasons,” they should fill out the table with their points scored to the best of 
their recollection as they kept track during the task (i.e., based on the feedback given). In the cash 
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and noncash incentive conditions, I emphasized to participants that whether they earn the incentive 
($10 cash or their selected hedonic prize of equivalent retail value, respectively) will depend on the 
total score calculated based on their self-reported points.  
Note that I designed the task to be sufficiently challenging given the time constraint (only 15 
seconds allotted per estimate) and large number of marbles depicted (167, 97, 221, 182, and 288 
marbles in the boxes, in each of the five boxes, respectively). Compounded with the visual clutter of 
the boxes (i.e., marbles overlapped with each other to make counting each one very difficult), the 
design of the task ensured that identifying the exact number of marbles in any given box would be 
exceedingly unlikely. A well-educated guess could, however, fall within wider margins of error, such 
as the 10, 20, or 30 marbles range; less precise estimates would in turn offer diminishing returns (i.e., 
fewer points which in turn translate to a lower chance of scoring in the top 10% of participants).  
Unbeknownst to participants, I kept a record of each individual’s responses relative to the 
correct solution. This allowed me to objectively measure cheating as given by the amount of points 
reported over and above the true score. Finally, participants completed basic demographic 
questions; those in the two incentive conditions (cash and noncash) who scored in the 90th 
percentile (top 10%) subsequently received the relevant incentive. 
Results and discussion. I report results for the untransformed data (a nonparametric analysis 
yielded similar results). Participant’s actual scores did not differ significantly across the three 
conditions (Mcontrol = 3.16 [SDcontrol = 4.46]; Mcash = 5.22 [11.53]; Mnoncash = 3.21 [4.57]; F(2,318) = .98, 
p = .38), indicating that participants performed equally poorly across the three conditions. For each 
participant, I computed a deviation measure by subtracting that participant’s total true score—i.e., 
points accumulated across the five rounds—from the total number of points that they reported for 
themselves. A positive deviation score, therefore, indicates the likely presence of cheating (i.e., 
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overreporting one’s own performance), with higher positive scores indicating a greater magnitude of 
cheating.  
The total amount of points overreported across the five boxes—that is, the amount of 
cheating—varied by incentive group (Mcontrol = 9.70 [18.23]; Mcash = 16.98 [28.75]; Mnoncash = 11.14 
[23.07]; F(2,318) = 2.88, p = .058). In particular, a planned contrast revealed that participants 
assigned to the cash incentive condition overreported more total points than did those assigned to 
the control (t(318) = 2.27, p = .024) and (albeit less so) those assigned to the noncash reward 
condition (t(318) = 1.79, p = .075), which did not differ between each other (t(318) = .44, p = .66). 
Participants who faced cash incentives hence “cheated” more compared to those in the other two 
incentive conditions combined (t(318) = 2.35, p = .019).  
However, the above pattern of results appeared to be driven primarily by a greater 
magnitude of cheating conditional on having cheated at all (i.e., on the intensive margin) rather than 
a greater incidence of having cheating at all. Decomposing this effect, I coded each participant’s 
responses according to whether the participant overreported his/her score by any positive amount 
for a given box. As shown in Figure 36, the proportion of participants who cheated at all did not 
differ by condition for any box (box 1: χ2(2) = 3.78, p = .15; box 2: χ2(2) = 2.85, p = .24; box 3: χ2(2) 
= 1.26, p = .53; box 4: χ2(2) = 1.85, p = .40; box 5: χ2(2) = 2.68, p = .26), nor did it differ in a 





Figure 36: Percentage of participants who overreported any points at all (Study 6c).
 
 
The total amount of points overreported conditional on having overreported at all varied by 
incentive group (Mcontrol = 15.67 [SDcontrol = 20.12]; Mcash = 28.01 [31.72]; Mnoncash = 17.33 [25.52]; 
F(2,209) = 4.62, p = .01; see Figure 37). Specifically, participants randomly assigned to the cash 
incentive condition overreported their points by a higher margin compared to those assigned to the 
control condition (t(209) = 2.81, p = .005) and to the noncash reward condition (t(209) = 2.42, p 
= .017), which did not differ from each other (t(209) = .38, p = .71). Again, participants who faced 
cash incentives “cheated” more compared to those in the other two incentive conditions combined 





Figure 37: Average number of points overreported conditional on having overreported at all (Study 6c). Error 
bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). 
 
Finally, as an approximate baseline measure of noise that partially captures the extent to 
which people may have forgotten or misjudged their true performance, I calculated for each 
individual whether s/he underreported his/her scores. The proportion of participants who 
underreported their scores remained low for each box overall and did not vary as a function of 
incentive condition (box 1: 2%control vs. 0%cash vs. 0%noncash; box 2: 0% vs. 2% vs. 2%; box 3: 4% vs. 
3% vs. 5%; box 4: 11% vs. 10% vs. 12%; box 5: 3% vs. 1% vs. 1%; all ps > .1).  
All in all, the above findings impart additional evidence for the hypothesis that cash 
incentives, relative to noncash hedonic rewards or a no-incentive control condition, incite greater 
cheating. In this respect, a heightened compensation focus may lead people to privilege attaining 




3.10.5 Study Series 6: Discussion 
 
The convergent pattern of results across the three studies I have described in this section suggests 
that performance-contingent cash incentives (relative to noncash hedonic rewards and to no-
incentive controls) can indeed lead to disincentivizing effects in the form of increased cheating. 
Ultimately, I argue that such behavior falls in line with the symptoms of greater compensation focus, 
one that places the ends (i.e., attaining a cash incentive) above the means (i.e., integrity in the process 
of attaining the prize). 
 
 




In Study Series 1 through 5, I demonstrated that relative to noncash hedonic rewards of equivalent 
retail value (and relative to unrewarded controls), cash incentives tend to increase preferences for 
alternatives that offer smaller but certain, immediate, and easy to obtain rewards (over larger but 
probabilistic, delayed, and hard to obtain rewards). Study Series 6 further shows that cash incentives 
can cause people to cheat more in the course of goal pursuit (i.e., completing a focal task or activity). 
These findings together highlight the deleterious effects of monetary incentives on individuals’ 
motivation and performance. 
When facing a direct choice between cash and noncash rewards, however, which incentive 
system would most people prefer? What kind of compensation scheme would they predict to be 
more motivating? To test this, I presented people with two incentive programs that offered a reward 
of equivalent expected value but denominated in different currencies (cash vs. hedonic). In line with 
previous research that suggests the dominance of monetary over nonmonetary incentives in 
individuals’ stated preferences (e.g., Jeffrey 2009; Kivetz and Simonson 2002b), I similarly expected 
that reward programs offering cash-based performance incentives (vs. hedonic rewards of equivalent 
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retail value) would generate more lay appeal, both in terms of enrollment preferences and perceived 
motivational force. 
Method. I randomly assigned 339 participants to one of two “presence of certainty” 
conditions (either “both options certain” or “both options uncertain”). Following the procedure 
used in the risky choice study series, I asked people to consider the same exercise scenario where 
they could choose between two reward programs (presentation order counterbalanced). Both 
programs lasted one month (four weeks) and awarded a weekly bonus for members who walked at 
least 60,000 steps each week.  
Rather than varying the incentive type (cash vs. noncash) between-subjects as I did in Study 
Series 1-5, here I directly juxtaposed the two currencies for each individual. Participants randomly 
assigned to the “both options certain” condition faced a choice between Program A, which awarded 
members who met the step goal with $5 in cash, and Program B, which awarded them with their 
choice of a hedonic reward (with retail value of $5) from the gift catalog used in previous studies. By 
contrast, participants in the “both options uncertain” condition chose between Program A, which 
offered eligible members a 1 in 20 chance of earning $100 in cash, and Program B, which offered 
them a 1 in 20 chance of earning their choice of a hedonic reward (with retail value of $100). After 
choosing the program they preferred to join, participants indicated: (i) which of the two programs 
they would prefer to join, one that offered cash incentives or another that offered hedonic rewards; 
and (ii) which incentive program they believe would motivate them to expend more effort and walk 
more steps. 
Results and discussion. Examining first the responses to the enrollment preference measure, I 
found that participants were more likely to choose the cash incentive program when it was listed 
first compared to second (86% vs. 78%; χ2(1) = 3.89, p = .049), although presentation order did not 
interact with the “presence of certainty” factor to affect choice shares (χ2(1) = .25, p = .62). The 
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chosen incentive program also did not vary based on presence of certainty: 80% and 85% of 
participants in the “both options certain” and “both options uncertain” groups, respectively, chose 
the cash over the noncash incentive program (χ2(1) = 1.74, p = .19). Notably, the vast majority 
preferred to join the program offering the cash incentive rather than the hedonic reward, with 83% 
selecting the former over the latter (χ2(1) = 146.69, p < .001). 
Presentation order did not affect responses on the perceived motivation measure (χ2(1) = 
2.64, p = .10), although participants were slightly more likely to select the cash incentive program as 
the more motivating of the two when it was listed first (85%) rather than second (80%). Whether 
the incentives were presented in certain or probabilistic terms did not affect choice shares of the 
program offering the cash incentive as the more motivating program: 81% and 85% of participants 
in the “both options certain” and “both options uncertain” groups, respectively, indicated the cash-
based program as more motivating (χ2(1) = 1.74, p = .19), nor did condition interact with 
presentation order to affect choice shares on this measure (χ2(1) = .013, p = .91). Paralleling the 
responses for enrollment preference, people were considerably more likely to identify the cash 
incentive program as more motivating than the noncash incentive program, with 83% favoring the 
former (χ2(1) = 149.34, p < .001).  
Yet, these stated preferences do not completely align with the choices observed in Study 
Series 1, where incentivizing people with cash led them to select “safer” alternatives with an easier-
to-achieve goal but lower payoff (Study 3a), to explicitly set lower performance thresholds (Studies 
3b and 3b), and to opt for easy over challenging tasks (Study 3d). People’s stated preferences in 
Study 7 are similarly inconsistent with the choices observed in Study Series 2, where cash incentives 
led participants to select immediate but smaller (over delayed but larger) rewards. Finally, individuals’ 
lay beliefs about the motivating power of cash incentives are at odds with their revealed behaviors, 
as evidenced by the greater frequency of cheating and dishonesty in Study Series 6. Cash incentives, 
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in this regard, give rise to a “say versus do gap”: People’s stated preferences and beliefs 
overwhelmingly favor cash, but their actual behaviors suggest that cash instead tends to impede 
effort investment, goal aspiration, and task integrity. 
 




3.12.1 Summary and Implications 
 
Cash incentives are used everywhere in the marketplace to motivate customers, employees, 
salespeople, and managers. While money certainly has its benefits in terms of its superior fungibility, 
flexibility, and lay appeal, we know less about the psychological influences and consequences of cash 
incentives in direct comparison to other types of common rewards (e.g., hedonic items and 
experiences).  
The current research investigates how cash incentives—and the compensation-centric mode 
of reasoning they instill—shape people’s preferences, choices, and behaviors. The findings I have 
presented demonstrate that contingent cash incentives, relative to hedonic rewards of equivalent 
monetary value, may shift preferences toward alternatives that maximize how likely, as well as how 
soon, one’s earnings are received (while sacrificing reward magnitude and higher goal achievement). 
The preference for guaranteed or immediate rewards over uncertain or delayed ones (Study Series 1-
2) reflects an overall attraction to alternatives that afford a safer payoff route. However, the 
tendency to select smaller but certain or immediate monetary compensation schemes appears to be 
attenuated when (i) the reward no longer depends on meeting an effort threshold (Study Series 4), 
and (ii) both rewards are probabilistic or delayed (Study Series 5). In the context of hypothetical 
scenarios as well as consequential tasks with real rewards, incentives denominated in cash 
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consistently led individuals to specify lower performance goals and effort thresholds, as well as to 
choose easier over difficult activities (Study Series 3).  
Offering people cash incentives, as opposed to hedonic rewards or no incentive at all, also 
led them to cheat more on a number of tasks in the interest of helping them attain compensation for 
their efforts (Study Series 6). Finally, despite the selection of safer and easier alternatives when 
incentivized with cash (as opposed to with hedonic rewards), when given a direct choice between 
the two incentive types, people overwhelmingly preferred cash and believed it to be more motivating 
(Study 7). 
Conceptually, this research program attempts to understand the compensation-centric 
motive induced by monetary incentives, the varied motivational consequences it engenders, and the 
factors that drive when it is more likely to prevail. Designing and enacting more personally 
motivating incentive systems presents an opportunity for marketers and policymakers who wish to 
improve the decisions and behaviors of their constituents. 
 
3.12.2 Limitations and Extensions 
 
The questions we have probed in this chapter open a variety of interesting (I believe) avenues of 
future research. It would be useful to further test the mediating role of compensation focus in 
shaping people’s attraction to certain, easier, and immediate rewards.  While Study 3d suggests that 
individuals who face monetary incentives (vs. no incentives or noncash hedonic rewards) do report 
attending more to the outcome of receiving the contingent reward as opposed to the process of 
earning it, direct evidence of what I call compensation focus (or “mindset”) may also be discerned in 
other, perhaps subtler, ways. One source of information, for example, could consist in people’s 
intuitive reactions to contracts offering different incentives. With the aid of text analysis tools to 
137 
 
code participants’ open-ended reasoning, I would expect to see a more singular focus on concepts 
related to certainty, immediacy, and compensation for those facing cash (relative to noncash) 
rewards. Further, holding the amount of effort constant, cash incentives should induce people to 
place greater weight on feasibility concerns (“Can I earn the bonus at all?”) over desirability ones 
(“How much can I earn?”). 
Another prediction that merits testing is whether there exists an expectation of a one-to-one 
relationship between effort and outcome among those incentivized with cash. When money enters 
the equation, I expect that people will tend to find contracts and activities acceptable only when the 
amount of possible earnings is proportional to the amount of effort they must expend. Relatedly, 
tasks in which effort is perceived to outweigh the reward’s magnitude should be evaluated as more 
aversive, and met with greater reactance, by these same individuals. An analysis of lay perceptions 
and preferences surrounding tiered loyalty programs (i.e., ones that feature a different distribution of 
effort-reward ratios) would be illuminating in this regard. Ultimately, I predict that information 
which pertains to the relative comparison between input (effort) and output (incentive) is likely to 
command greater attention and consideration when cash incentives, as opposed to noncash rewards, 
are at stake. 
I envision several empirical extensions that would be useful to develop in regard to 
improving individuals’ performance and cheating behavior. First, continuing to compare cash 
incentives to noncash rewards in the context of other cheating paradigms would be useful to test the 
robustness and generalizability of the effects I have so far observed. Second, the findings pertaining 
to cheating behaviors echo a broader notion of “taking the easy way out.” The idea that cash 
incentives increase the tendency to settle for less ambitious goals calls for further work to identify 
real-world situations and domains in which people may be tempted to cut corners or take advantage 
of loopholes (i.e., opportunities to cheat). For example, individuals who face cash incentives might 
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stop persisting in their goal(s) as soon as they encounter a license to give up. Once endowed with 
monetary compensation immediately or midway through the effort stream—and therefore having 
satisfied the desire to be rewarded—, people may be less inclined to work hard or finish the task in 
good faith.  
In the interest of generalization, the present research would benefit from expanding the 
sample pool to other, perhaps more “specialized,” populations such as salespeople, employees, and 
managers. On a similar note, I have limited the study of noncash incentives in this chapter to 
tangible hedonic rewards as a juxtaposition against cash because (i) such rewards are prevalent and 
commonly employed in industry, and (ii) they afford a fairly conservative control, as they are not 
only similarly extrinsic as cash incentives but are explicitly equated in retail value. Nevertheless, 
many other forms of noncash incentives exist, including social incentives (e.g., Bandiera, Barankay, 
and Rasul 2010) and ones that bear on image motivation and reputational concerns (e.g., Ariely, 
Bracha, and Meier 2009). More investigation is needed to disentangle the efficacy of these alternative 
motives relative to cash and similarly extrinsic hedonic rewards. A final (though by no means 
exhaustive) question that I believe merits closer inquiry is whether employing negative 
reinforcement (e.g., inducing penalties or framing incentives as losses rather than gains) will lead to 




The current investigation raises some concerns about the ubiquitous practice of using cash or 
monetary incentives to drive desired behaviors. Across several studies encompassing hypothetical 
choices and real behavior, I found that cash “disincentives” seem to evoke a compensation focus 
that attracts people toward the outcome of attaining an incentive at the expense of truly engaging in 
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the effortful task at hand. Consequently, this fixation can blunt willingness to take risks or tolerate 
delay, stymie motivation to set higher goals or work on more challenging tasks, and even induce 
more cheating.  
Although choosing the “path of least resistance” is a strategy likely to secure sufficient (i.e., 
both desired and immediate) returns, doing so can at times work to the detriment of individuals and 
society in the long run. The findings outlined herein suggest, perhaps, that when people perform or 
pursue work with a focus on compensation (rather than infusing meaning into the work itself), they 
may end up avoiding risk or delay with respect to earnings, choose less ambitious goals, settle for 
safer career paths, and, in extreme cases, resort to less ethical conduct to ensure the payment they 
“deserve.” Deepening our understanding of when and why cash incentives fail—and how 
nonmonetary rewards can better motivate behavior—poses an important challenge for researchers 







Designing cost-effective incentives to motivate desired behaviors and healthy habits is a central area 
of interest for academics, executives, and policymakers. To the extent that incentives are employed 
as a tool for behavior change, the prevailing practice has been to study and rely on monetary rewards 
to alter decision making and performance. This dissertation furnishes some evidence that other 
incentive systems structured around noncash rewards (such as self-rewards or tangible hedonic 
prizes) may lead to less motivational crowding out and more meaningful improvement over the 
course of goal pursuit. In this chapter, I summarize and integrate the main findings from the 
previous two chapters. Extrapolating on these points, I conclude with a few comments and 
meditations on what the emergence of different incentive regimens might mean, at a more abstract 
level, for human progress. 
 
4.1 Review of Key Findings  
 
 
The sequence of results I have chronicled in this dissertation suggests that the provision of cash, 
relative to noncash, incentives can, in several instances, lead to suboptimal behaviors when people 
engage in effortful activities. This is not to say (nor would I claim) that cash is always 
disadvantageous; if anything, the results of the field experiments in Chapter 2 show that people can 
indeed, in the face of monetary incentives, be spurred to meet goals and thresholds at impressively 
high rates—as long as doing so nets them the prize. However, they may compromise other aspects 
of goal pursuit in the interest of attaining their reward, such as the willingness to exert effort above 
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and beyond what is minimally required or the resolve to engage in a task without compromising 
integrity. Thus, in circumstances where compensation is tied to a performance objective,38 looking 
solely at outcomes like goal achievement when gauging the success of an incentive program can 
cause us to overlook its distortionary effects in other relevant (and arguably more important) 
aspects.  
To reiterate the conclusions of Chapter 2, I described three field experiments, each lasting 
over two months, where I implemented a novel incentive mechanism based on self-reward—people 
treating themselves to indulgent rewards of their own definition whenever they meet a goal. I then 
monitored the influence of this system on both performance and task engagement over time. Self-
rewards, I discovered, not only generated the same amount of lift—and at zero cost—compared to 
cash-based programs during the incentive period, but it also led to continued improvements in 
behavior for several weeks afterward. Individuals assigned to partake in a self-reward incentive 
contract continued to walk more and visit the gym during the post-incentive period more than their 
counterparts who had faced monetary incentives. I hypothesized that these patterns emerged in large 
part due to the treatment of cash incentives as “compensation” (i.e., an entitlement or due payment 
for investing effort)—an association likely to be more threatening to intrinsic motivation—as 
opposed to simply a “reward” (i.e., an indulgence for good behavior)  
Chapter 3 builds on this compensation-reward distinction to focus on specific ways that cash 
incentives in particular can affect choice, effort, and integrity. There, I argued that the peculiarities 
we saw surrounding cash-incentivized participants in the field experiments—e.g., the tendency to 
cluster around the goal and to procrastinate reaching it—speaks to a broader psychology underlying 
monetary incentives. The nature of this psychology, I further proposed, can be characterized by one 
                                                     
38 Rather than pure effort investment, which can be difficult to incentivize in many real-world settings (e.g., in the 
workforce, people are generally not paid for how hard they try but how much work. 
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of greater compensation focus, wherein individuals become drawn to the outcome of securing a 
reward as opposed to the intrinsic motivation to engage in the focal activity itself. Thus, in addition 
to chasing payment in return for walking and going to the gym, when I presented individuals with a 
variety of choices and tasks for which they could earn cash (vs. noncash hedonic items), they 
displayed behaviors consistent with desiring compensation: People preferred small but sure bets to 
riskier ones with greater expected value; they opted to work on easier tasks for a smaller reward to 
ensure they leave with something rather than empty-handed; and they cheated more frequently when 
they had the chance.  
Both Chapters 2 and 3, therefore, implicate compensation focus in the realization of 
individuals’ preferences and behaviors. The tendrils of this heightened fixation on being 
compensated—a “show me the money” mindset, as it were—are felt in each quadrant of behavior 
pertaining to goal pursuit that we have scrutinized thus far. I summarize these, in brief, below:  
Habit formation. Compared to individuals enrolled in the self-reward program, those 
incentivized with cash were more likely overall (compared to those incentivized with self-rewards) to 
meet the minimum goals required that would earn them the bonus. However, consistent with greater 
crowding out of intrinsic motivation, these same participants performed worse in terms of 
meaningful engagement in the focal activity (i.e., walking more steps, going to the gym more times, 
and staying at the gym for longer periods) as well as persistence over time (i.e., maintaining progress 
after the intervention is over).  
Choice of reward contract. When asked to choose between incentive contracts where they must 
tradeoff the magnitude of a reward with its risk or delay, people preferred smaller but certain and 
immediate rewards (over larger but uncertain or delayed ones) when these incentives were 
denominated in cash (vs. a noncash, hedonic currency). These tendencies diminished when 
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compensation was no longer contingent on effort expenditure and when the possibility of complete 
certainty or immediate was precluded.  
Goal setting. Similarly, when they had the opportunity to choose between different tasks and 
goals of varying effort levels, people preferred (or imposed on themselves) easier but lower-payoff 
options over more challenging options that awarded a higher payoff.  
Integrity. In line with a greater focus on compensation, people incentivized with money (vs. 
unrewarded controls and noncash hedonic prizes of equivalent market value) cheated more—by 
either taking advantage of shortcuts or falsely inflating their score—on several real-effort tasks.  
Stated beliefs versus revealed behaviors. Finally, evidence across both chapters indicates a persistent 
misalignment between what people do and what they intuit. Even the experience of undergoing a 
self-reward incentive program for multiple weeks appeared insufficient to overcome people’s 
apparent biases in favor of cash. Whether in the context of walking, going to the gym, or completing 
experimenter-defined tasks, people strongly preferred cash-based (over noncash) incentive programs 
and predicted the former to be more motivating.  
In aggregate, these findings contribute to our understanding of how incentives play a part in 
four important areas of human behavior: habit formation, choices involving risk and delay, goal 
setting, and integrity. Further, these results—including the potency of self-rewards as I have 
depicted across three applications—carry actionable consequences for marketers, managers, and 
policymakers in the way of offering alternative motivational levers (in the marketplace and 
workforce alike) to cash defaults. Lastly, while I have attempted to identify and integrate a diverse 
range of consequences that follow from (over)attending to compensation, this treatment has been 
far from comprehensive. Future research would benefit from continued exploration of other 
potential behavioral spillovers that are relevant to individual motivation, as well as a closer 
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inspection of the mechanisms and bounds that govern when nonmonetary incentive schemes are 
more likely to thrive. 
 
4.2 Concluding Remarks  
 
 
We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon […] and do the other things,  
not because they are easy, but because they are hard;  
because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills,  
because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept.  
– John F. Kennedy (1962) 
 
Some of the most remarkable triumphs and feats of human achievement—sending mankind to the 
moon, eradicating smallpox, and testing the limits of athletic endurance,39 to list only a few—are 
owed to the staunch resolve of individuals to pursue challenging problems in the wake of 
tremendous adversity and uncertainty. Although most of us harbor somewhat more modest 
ambitions in our everyday lives and professions,40 we all contend with situations in which we must 
choose between an easier route on the one hand—that promises fewer setbacks and demands less 
sweat—and a harder course, on the other, that offers greater rewards but whose payoff (much like 
the momentous occasions I referenced earlier) is far from assured, usually not immediate, and often 
accompanied by uncertainty. To walk the path of least resistance is no doubt quite enticing, as it 
ensures, at minimal cost, some amount of goal attainment and payout. However, placing all of one’s 
chips into the “high-risk high-reward” alternative can at times lead to greater satisfaction and 
fulfillment in the long run. 
                                                     
39 Including, among countless other sources of inspiration, record-breaking accomplishments like scaling K2 (Lino 
Lacedelli and Archille Compagnoni, 1954), free soloing El Capitan (Alex Honnold, 2017), and exploring the Antarctic 
deep seas (Blue Planet 2 team, 2016). 
40 And most likely prefer not to flirt openly with dangers belonging to the high-altitude climbing or space exploration 
category of vocation. 
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One element common to the types of achievements I introduced earlier is that they were not 
the product of an interest in monetary gain or any pecuniary motives. Such examples embody a drive 
to invest effort for its own sake—the notion of scaling a mountain “because it is there” (e.g., 
Loewenstein 1999). Unlike endeavors that lend themselves naturally to intrinsic motivation, the 
behaviors featured in this dissertation, I argue, distill to self-control problems in the course of goal 
pursuit. Individuals, for example, prefer to improve their physical fitness but struggle to do so in the 
absence of any external inducement. The nonmonetary incentives I have used—even ones based on 
self-reward—are fundamentally extrinsic: They do not reflect a person’s inherent desire to perform an 
activity (such as going to the gym) but rather lie outside that activity. Even so, however, that 
meaningful differences persisted relative to cash currencies suggests that moving away from a purely 
monetary frame may be sufficient to change behavior in a direction more tolerant of risk and 
delayed gratification.  
Perhaps, then, taking the findings of this dissertation to their logical (and admittedly 
speculative) conclusion, what is necessary—if we are to continue achieving new, paradigm-shifting 
heights as a society—is a general transition from incentive regimes that reinforce compensation to 
ones that resonate more with intrinsic motivation. And, more than ingenuity alone, we may need to 
rely on the willingness of individuals to confront the unknown, replete with its risks and perils, and 
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Using a principal-agent model to formally quantify the hidden costs of extrinsic incentives, Bénabou 
and Tirole (2003) offer a contract theory view of crowding-out phenomena that seeks to reconcile 
the psychological and economic perspectives. The authors posit that under asymmetric information 
(in which the principal is privately informed about the task or the agent’s talent and the agent is 
unsure about his ability to perform a task), rewards are weak positive reinforcers of performance in 
the short term and negative reinforcers in the long term. Since the principal might reasonably offer 
more compensation for less pleasant tasks, uninformed agents may infer bad news from the 
presentation of high-powered incentives, either about the focal task or their own ability. The 
reduction of intrinsic motivation when facing incentive schemes in such contexts would be quite 
rational per this analysis. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) give one example of the signaling value of 
incentives; they found that offering community members monetary compensation to tolerate the 
presence of a nuclear waste repository decreased their inclination to do so. 
In addition to explanations based on overjustification or inferences and signaling, a number 
of other contextual features of the decision environment (e.g., default options and framing effects), 
may promote counterproductive results in the presence of monetary incentives. Kamenica (2012) 
reviews several instances in which “standard” incentives can backfire from their intended effect, 
while interventions that leverage choice architecture work. He argues, for example, that in some 
cases nonstandard preferences such as loss aversion explain why people do not react to monetary 
incentives in expected ways, as when they treat a default alternative as their reference outcome (e.g., 
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Thaler 1980). In other cases, because incentive schemes can affect the technology of production, 






Appendix A2: Pretest of Step Comparison Between Moves and Fitbit Device 
 
To test the absolute and relative accuracy of the Moves app compared to a more standard wearable 
device, I conducted a pretest on a separate sample from the same population (i.e., Columbia 
undergraduate students) prior to implementing the study proper. I recruited eleven participants from 
the lab (average age = 23.2, 45% male, average BMI = 22.4) who downloaded the Moves app on 
their mobile phone prior to the session.  Each participant had their phone (with the Moves app 
running in the background) in one pocket and a Fitbit device hooked to their other pocket as they 
walked at their normal pace along a straight, flat path in an empty area of the Columbia campus 
outside Uris Hall. All participants counted their steps aloud as the experimenter counted along with 
them. Following the recommendation of Åkerberg, Lindén, and Folke (2012), participants first 
walked 20 steps in a calibration phase (allowing us to measure their stride length), followed by 200 
steps. I counterbalanced which side of the body each device was located across participants.   
The results of the pretest suggest that using Moves yielded overall accurate data, although it 
tended to underestimate the number of steps walked compared to Fitbit (which instead tended to 
overestimate them). On the 20-step test, a one-sample t-test against 20 revealed that while Fitbit 
recorded slightly more steps than the true amount (M = 21.91 [SD = 3.21], t(10) = 1.97, p = .08), 
Moves recorded steps that did not differ from the truth (M = 19.09 [2.95], t(10) = -1.02, p = .33). 
The mobile app recorded slightly (but not significantly) fewer steps compared to its gadget 
counterpart (t(10) = 1.99, p = .07).  
On the 200-step test, whereas Fitbit recorded more steps than the true amount (M = 202.64 
[3.78], t(10) = 2.32, p = .04), Moves recorded slightly fewer steps than the truth and with higher 
variance (M = 191.73, p = 15.55, t(10) = -1.76, p = .11). The app recorded fewer steps compared to 
Fitbit (t(10) = 2.60, p = .03); Moves underestimated the number of steps walked for 9 out of 11 
participants, while Fitbit overestimated it for 10 out of 11 participants. Despite the tendency of the 
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mobile app to underreport steps, I deemed its overall accuracy sufficient and preferable to using a 




Appendix A3: Pretest of Nonprofit Organizations  
 
To pretest the nonprofit organizations (including the National Rifle Association) later used in 
Studies 1 through 3, I surveyed the opinions of 31 participants recruited from the Columbia 
Behavioral Research Lab. Specifically, as part of a standard consumer behavior study ostensibly 
interested in gauging “how people feel about different organizations and companies,” each 
individual was tasked with rating a series of 16 different nonprofit organizations (presented in 
randomized order). Participants indicated how much they liked or disliked each organization using a 
1 to 7 Likert scale (1 = dislike very much; 7 = like very much). 
 Figure A3 shows the average “liking” of each nonprofit. Although substantial heterogeneity 
in preferences existed across nonprofits, the NRA in particular was very negatively received and 
indeed viewed in the least favorable light. (This is perhaps not surprising, given the demographics 
and overall more progressive political leanings of the sampled population.)   
 
 
Figure A1: Perceived liking for 16 organizations (1 = dislike very much; 7 = like very much). Error bars are 
standard errors (±1 SEM). 
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Appendix A5: List of Nonprofit Organizations 
 
 








Appendix A6: Individual Chronic Trait Measures 
  
  



























Appendix A7: Weekly Exercise Log 
 





Appendix A8: Joint Evaluation of Incentive Programs in Exit Survey   
 


















Figure A2: Sample size over time (Study 1). The vertical dotted line denotes the transition window from the 
incentive to post-incentive period. 
 
Figure A2 shows the sample sizes over the course of the entire observation window in Study 1. 
Attrition rates did not differ by incentive condition for each week (enrollment to week 1: χ2(3) = .67, 
p = .88; week 2: χ2(3) = 1.63, p = .65; week 3: χ2(3) = 1.71, p = .64; week 4: χ2(3) = 2.09, p = .56; 
week 5: χ2(3) = 4.48, p = .21; week 6: χ2(3) = 2.84, p = .42; week 7: χ2(3) = 1.02, p = .80; week 8: 




Appendix A10: Randomization Check for Participants Lost to Attrition (Study 1) 
 
  
























































































Table A1: Baseline summary statistics of those lost to attrition at the end of week 3 (Study 1). Standard errors 
are in parentheses below the means for each incentive condition. The scales used for each measure are 
indicated in parentheses.  
 
Table A1 shows baseline statistics among participants who attrited toward the end of week 3 (i.e., the 
last week of the incentive period). Note that standard errors were considerably larger here due to 
low cell sizes. None of the individual difference measures differed as a function of incentive 





Appendix A11: Sample Self-Rewards Defined (Study 1) 
 
Common archetypes of self-rewards defined by participants: 
 
“this week i would want to binge watch TV shows at the end of the week as a time to relax and zone 
out and disconnect from what i “should” be doing.”  
 
“The reward I don’t normally afford for myself would be a trip to the movies with candy and a 
slushie. I very rarely feel like the money for a movie, especially in New York, is worth it even though 
I love going to the movies and the experience of watching a movie with a friend and a room full of 
strangers.” 
 
“Read a book because I haven’t read for pleasure in a long time.” 
 
“I will reward myself by taking a day to sleep in as late as I want, no alarm. I haven’t done this in 




Appendix A12: Steps Walked During Week 2 and Week 3 of Incentive Period (Study 1) 
 
During the second week of the incentive period, the number of total weekly steps walked differed as 
a function of incentive condition (Mcontrol = 43,569 steps [SDcontrol = 14,911]; Mcash = 53,313 steps 
[15,590]; Mhedonic = 52,405 steps [14,914]; Mself-reward = 50,583 steps [16,395]; F(3,210) = 4.33, p 
= .006). Planned contrasts revealed that compared to the control group, each of the incentive 
treatment arms yielded a greater step count (cash: t(210) = 3.30, p = .001; hedonic reward: t(210) = 
2.91, p = .004; self-reward: t(210) = 2.31, p = .02). Combined, the three treatment conditions lead to 
more steps walked than the control (t(210) = 3.46, p = .001). 
During the third (and last) week of the incentive period, the number of total weekly steps 
walked differed as a function of incentive condition (Mcontrol = 43,336 steps [SDcontrol = 14,550]; Mcash 
= 53,300 steps [14,657]; Mhedonic = 53,249 steps [16,600]; Mself-reward = 54,095 steps [15,736]; F(3,195) 
= 5.53, p = .001). Planned contrasts revealed that compared to the control group, each of the 
incentive treatment arms yielded a greater step count (cash: t(195) = 3.27, p = .001; hedonic reward: 
t(195) = 3.19, p = .002; self-reward: t(195) = 3.48, p = .001). Combined, the three treatment 






Appendix A13: Distribution of Steps Walked, Weeks 1-2 (Study 1) 
 
 
Figure A3: Distribution of steps in week 1 (Study 1). Each dot is an individual. Average number of steps for 
each incentive condition are overlaid. Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). The horizontal dotted line 
denotes the prescribed goal of 50,000 steps per week. 
 
 
Figure A4: Distribution of steps in week 2 (Study 1). Each dot is an individual. Average number of steps for 
each incentive condition are overlaid. Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). The horizontal dotted line 




Appendix A14: Supplementary Analyses of Individual Difference Measures (Study 1) 
 
Perceived physical activity: 
 
I conducted a regression using incentive condition, a continuous measure of perceived physical 
activity scores (as collected during the enrollment phase), and their interaction to predict the number 
of steps walked across the incentive period (weeks 1-3). The results of this moderation analysis 
found a main effect of incentive condition (B = 5819, SE = 2869, t(195) = 2.03, p = .04) and of 
perceived physical activity (B = 6695, SE = 7459, t(195) = 2.43, p = .02), but no interaction (B = -
1179, SE = 1074, t(195) = -1.10, p = .27). Participants who indicated higher levels of physical 
activity indeed walked more compared to those who indicated lower levels of activity; however, this 
individual difference did not go on to differentially affect performance across the four incentive 
conditions.  
Self-reward categorization: 
To better understand which types of self-rewards, if any, are more effective in motivating 
performance, I categorized the responses of participants assigned to the self-reward incentive 
condition along two dimensions: (i) “experiential,” where the reward defined was coded as 1 if it was 
experiential and as 0 if it was tangible; and (ii) “monetary,” where the reward defined was coded as 1 
if it was monetary (i.e., required purchasing with money to acquire or consume) and 0 otherwise (i.e., 
did not cost money to acquire or consume).  
A regression analysis found that neither of these factors significantly predicted the number 
of steps participants walked during week 1 (experiential: B = 759.67, SE = 4046.41, t(52) = .19, p 
= .85; monetary: B = -2890.53, SE = 4088.10, t(52) = -.71, p = .48). Similar patterns held for the 
remaining weeks of the experiment. Taken together, these results suggest that the effectiveness of 
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the self-reward incentive mechanism in improving performance extends above and beyond the exact 
nature of the rewards defined.  
Gender: 
An analysis of the effect of incentive condition, gender (male = 1, female = 0), and their interaction 
on the number of steps walked across the incentive period (weeks 1-3) revealed a main effect of 
incentive condition (F(3,191) = 9.88, p < .001) and gender (F(1,191) = 19.20, p < .001) but no 
incentive × gender interaction (F(3,191) = .19, p = .91). As expected based on physiological 
differences, male participants tended to walk more on average during the incentive period than their 
female counterparts (Mmale = 55,464 steps [SD = 13,415] vs. Mfemale = 46,728 steps [13,340]); 
however, gender did not differentially affect performance across the four incentive conditions 
(males: Mcontrol = 45,260 steps [13,133], Mcash = 58,708 steps [11,514]; Mnoncash = 58,833 steps [17,178]; 
Mself-reward = 59,053 steps [17,556]; females: Mcontrol = 38,713 steps [11,854], Mcash = 50,247 steps 




Appendix A15: Pretest of Lay Predictions Under Joint Evaluation (Study 1) 
 
In this pretest, I surveyed 57 respondents from the lab and presented them with a hypothetical 
choice between three different incentive contracts (cash, noncash, and self-reward) similar to those 
experienced by participants in the first pedometer study. In this case, the monetary value of the cash 
and noncash rewards was $10 (rather than $20). 
Again, people displayed a strong predilection toward cash: 63.2% of respondents chose the 
cash incentive program, compared to 22.8% and 10.5% who chose the noncash and self-reward 
alternatives, respectively (χ2(2) = 49, p < .001; see Figure A5). (I excluded from analysis the two 
participants, making up 3.5% of respondents, who chose a “none of the above” option.)  
 
 
Figure A5: Choice shares of reward program. 
 
The perceived effectiveness of the three reward programs also differed from each other 
(F(2,112) = 39.17, p < .001, with all post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons significant 
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at p < .001). Interestingly, people tended to rate the cash reward as more motivating for them 
compared to the average person (t(56) = 2.52, p = .015), the same effectiveness for the noncash 
reward (t(56) = -1.16, p = .25), while they rated the self-reward as if anything slightly more effective 









Figure A6: Sample size over time (Study 2). The vertical dotted line denotes the transition window from the 
incentive to post-incentive period. 
 
Figure A6 shows the sample sizes over the course of the entire observation window in Study 2. 




Appendix A17: Steps Walked During Week 2 and Week 3 of Incentive Period (Study 2) 
 
The second week of the incentive period revealed a similar trend with respect to walking activity as 
the first, but the effects of incentive condition on total weekly steps did not differ significantly 
(Mcontrol = 45,094 steps [SD = 19,738]; Mcash = 51,633 steps [19,259]; Mself-reward = 49,897 steps 
[18,791]; F(2,177) = 1.85, p = .16). Planned contrasts revealed that both incentive treatment arms 
produced (marginally) higher step counts relative to the control (cash: t(177) = 1.85, p = .07; self-
reward: t(177) = 1.38, p = .17). 
During the third (and last) week of the incentive period, the number of total weekly steps 
walked differed as a function of incentive condition (Mcontrol = 44,241 steps [16,842]; Mcash = 54,313 
steps [20,868]; Mself-reward = 52,456 steps [15,060]; F(2,165) = 5.28, p = .006). Planned contrasts 
revealed that both incentive treatment arms produced higher step counts relative to the control 





Appendix A18: Clustering Around the Goal (Study 2) 
 
 
Figure A7: Distribution of steps in week 3 (Study 2). Each dot is an individual. Average number of steps for 
each incentive condition are overlaid. Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). The horizontal dotted line 
denotes the prescribed goal of 60,000 steps per week. 
 
Figure A8: Distribution of steps in week 4 (Study 2). Each dot is an individual. Average number of steps for 
each incentive condition are overlaid. Error bars are standard errors (±1 SEM). The horizontal dotted line 
denotes the prescribed goal of 60,000 steps per week. 
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Figure A9: Sample size over time (Study 3). The vertical dotted line denotes the transition window from the 
incentive to post-incentive period. 
 
Figure A9 shows the sample sizes over the course of the entire observation window in Study 3. 
Attrition rates did not differ by incentive condition in any week. Note that because all participants 
were additionally incentivized (via a lump-sum payment of $12) to simply keep documenting 
through the post-incentive period, I retained a significantly higher proportion of participants in this 




Appendix A21: Steps Walked During Week 2 and Week 3 of Incentive Period (Study 3) 
 
During the second week of the incentive period, the number of visits made to the gym varied across 
incentive conditions (Mcontrol = .84 [1.14]; Mcash = 2.22 [1.39]; Mself-reward = 1.71 [1.68]; F(2,149) = 
12.08, p < .001). Planned contrasts revealed that compared to the control group, each of the 
incentive treatment arms led to more visits (cash: t(149) = 4.85, p < .001; self-reward: t(149) = 3.10, 
p = .002). Combined, both treatment conditions generated more frequent gym visits than the control 
(t(149) = 4.60, p < .001) and did not differ substantially from each other (t(149) = 1.81, p = .07).  
 During the third (and last) week of the incentive period, the number of visits made to the 
gym varied across incentive conditions (Mcontrol = .96 [1.26]; Mcash = 2.35 [1.33]; Mself-reward = 1.92 
[1.48]; F(2,145) = 13.50, p < .001). Planned contrasts revealed that compared to the control group, 
each of the incentive treatment arms led to more visits (cash: t(145) = 5.07, p < .001; self-reward: 
t(145) = 3.50, p = .001). Combined, both treatment conditions generated more frequent gym visits 
than the control (t(145) = 4.96, p < .001) and did not differ from each other (t(145) = 1.56, p = .12).  
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Appendix A22: Replication Attempts for Pedometer-Based Intervention 
 
 
I conducted two other pedometer studies that did not find any significant differences across 
conditions. In particular, contrary to expectations and prior literature, both revealed no evidence for 
any incentive effect among the treatment groups (cash, noncash, and self-reward) relative to the control. 
I discuss the differences in design parameters featured in these studies and analyze the reasons that 
may account for their failure to replicate the previous effects. 
 The first of these experiments was conducted between late-September and early-December 
of 2015 (Fall to Winter) on a separate sample of the same population (220 Columbia-affiliated 
students from the Columbia Business School Behavioral Research Lab). I used the same incentive 
specifications as Pedometer Study 1 with the following exceptions: (i) I included an additional 
experimental condition, self-reward free, which simply asked participants to define their own reward 
but, unlike those in the self-reward condition, did not specify the nature of the reward; (ii) participants 
first monitored their baseline performance for one week (week 0) prior to the introduction of 
contingent rewards during the incentive period (weeks 1-4), followed by the post-incentive period 
(weeks 5-8); (iii) I reduced the magnitude of the payment amount and bonus rewards from $20 to $5 
those in the control, cash, and noncash conditions; (iv) and, perhaps most notably, those in the four 
treatment conditions only received the weekly bonus reward if they walked at least 70,000 steps per 
week. 
 As anticipated, people indeed walked more steps during the incentive period (weeks 1-3) 
compared to the baseline week (week 0). However, this did not interact with condition: Those in the 
control group exhibited activity levels no different from those in each of the four treatment groups 
(cash, noncash, self-reward, and self-reward free) in both periods. This was true both for the number 
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of steps walked and the proportion meeting the goal; further, I detected no difference in 
performance across conditions in the post-incentive period.  
Why did no incentive effects emerge in this attempted replication? I argue that a key reason 
is because the rewards were simply not incentivizing enough relative to the amount of effort I asked 
(or expected) of participants. Recall that in Pedometer Study 1 (February - April 2015), I encouraged 
participants to walk at least 50,000 steps per week; in this study, however, I not only increased the 
target performance criterion to 70,000 steps (averaging to 10,000 steps a day, a nontrivial feat given 
that the baseline average tended to hover around only 44,500 steps) but did so at a time in which 
doing so proved especially difficult due to the colder and less hospitable weather. Indeed, during the 
incentive period (weeks 1-4), no condition averaged above a 26% goal attainment rate, and, 
aggregating across all conditions, only 16% of participants met the goal. Participants walked a 
combined average of less than 49,000 steps, over 21,000 steps below the prescribed effort threshold.  
By artificially ramping up the degree to which individuals needed to work hard in order to 
earn a (what may seem comparatively trivial) reward or payment, I may have curtailed the amount of 
“breathing room” people had to rest each week, in turn suppressing motivation during the incentive 
period. Indeed, previous theory on the value of flexibility suggests that individuals may prefer and 
perform better when they are given a greater margin for “failure” (Beshears et al. 2017; Cochran and 
Tesser 1996; Polivy 1976; Sharif and Shu 2017; Soman and Cheema 2004). By comparison, I found 
incentive effects in a study, similarly conducted from October to December 2016 (fall to winter), in 
which I reduced the effort threshold to 60,000 steps per week, thereby providing some measure of 
flexibility and “hope” for participants to obtain the goal. 
In the second experiment (late-March to mid-May of 2016), I recruited Columbia students 
from the lab (N = 180) under similar incentive specifications as those in Pedometer Study 2. The 
key difference, however, again consisted in the target performance threshold required to earn the 
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contingent rewards: Here participants in the treatment groups were incentivized to walk 50,000 steps 
each week. I again found no difference in performance levels (either in steps walked or proportion 
meeting the goal) as a function of condition in either the incentive or post-incentive period, with 
those in the control displaying activity levels as high as those in each of the two treatment groups 
(cash and self-reward).  
I speculate that here the rewards were similarly not incentivizing enough—but for the 
opposite reason, since in retrospect people may have not perceived the rewards to be challenging in 
any capacity across the board given the low level of effort required to achieve them. This effect was 
likely driven in large part by the considerably warmer weather that prevailed during the incentive 
period (average temperatures were considerably higher during the spring to summer compared to 
the winter to spring interval when Pedometer Study 1 was conducted). As a result, any incentive 
effects that may have appeared were likely to have been suppressed, or masked, by the higher-than-
expected performance levels in the control: During the incentive period (weeks 1-3), participants in 
the control group walked around 56,000 steps per week, well above the specified target goal, with 
around 61% meeting the goal. In stark opposition to the results from the first “null” study, which 
yielded the lowest follow-through, here we see the highest rates of goal attainment: each of the three 
incentive conditions averaged above a 60% goal attainment rate, with 63% meeting the goal in the 
aggregate.  
By comparison, the patterns documented in the two field experiments where incentives 
“worked” (relative to control) lay in between these extremes, suggesting that they struck a happy 
medium in the calibration of the effort or goal with the desired behavior. In Study 1 (Section 2.6; 
conducted during the winter with a target goal of 50,000 weekly steps), around 26% of participants 
assigned to the control group met the goal, compared to proportions of over 50% in each of the 
three treatment conditions (leading to a combined average attainment rate of 50%). In Study 2 
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(Section 2.7; conducted during the spring with a target goal of 60,000 weekly steps), around 16% of 
control participants made the goal, compared to 46% and 27% in the cash and self-reward treatment 
arms, respectively (leading to a combined average attainment rate of 30%). 
Taken together, I believe the results of the two studies discussed above likely reflect a failure 
to appropriately tune the target effort threshold in accordance with the actual effort expenditure 
involved during the incentive period. The lack of any incentive effect found among the treatment 
groups relative to the control may have emerged due to an excessively difficult goal criterion in one 
case (first replication attempt) and an excessively easy criterion in the other (second replication 
attempt). In both instances, the lack of alignment between the virtuous effort criterion and the ease 
or difficulty of meeting that criterion (driven in large part by seasonality differences) may have 
contributed to demotivation on both extremes.  
The aforementioned possibility is substantiated by evidence from the goal setting literature 
(for review, see Locke and Latham 1990), which has found that goals that are either too easy or too 
difficult can be counterproductive to positive behavior change and “backfire.” On the one hand, 
setting targets that are perceived as too challenging to achieve (as in the case of “null” experiment 1) 
can contribute to what Cochran and Tesser (1996) refer to as a “what the hell” effect. For example, 
a person striving to keep a diet may succumb to indulgent caloric intake once they have already 
exceeded or violated their prescribed limit. Similarly, participants who feel they cannot reach 70,000 
steps from the beginning may “give up” earlier rather than try to fulfill a goal they cannot feasibly 
attain. Relatedly, diminishing sensitivity in the Prospect Theory value function implies that when 
individuals are far away from, rather than proximal to, their goal and hence perceive little goal 
progress, they can often find the motivation to start a particularly ambitious task (Heath, Larrick, 
and Wu 1999; see also Kivetz et al. 2006).  
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On the other hand, setting targets that are too trivial to achieve (as in the case of “null” 
experiment 2) may also fail to sufficiently motivate people. Instead, individuals tend to work harder 
and more diligently when pursuing specific, more challenging goals (Heath et al. 1999; Locke and 
Latham 1991). As Locke and Latham (1991) report, of 192 studies examining goal difficulty, 91% 
have found that higher goals induce higher performance. Drawing from a perspective that treats 
goals as reference points, Heath and colleagues show that, as predicted by loss aversion, people are 
likely to work harder (indeed, around twice as hard) when they are approaching their goal than when 





Appendix B1: Hedonic Catalog (Study 1a) 
 
 






Appendix B2: Posttest of Perceived Feasibility of Step Goals (Study 3a) 
 
 
Procedure. To elicit a baseline measure of average step count, I surveyed a separate sample of 
115 respondents from the same population and asked them to give their best estimate of how many 
steps they typically walk each week (i.e., across a period of seven days). I informed them that 10,000 
steps is roughly equivalent to five miles. Next, participants read two different scenarios (order 
counterbalanced): In Scenario A, they imagined reading about an exercise program that encourages 
members to walk at least 30,000 steps total each week for a month (four weeks). Scenario B 
presented the same information except that the focal exercise program set a target goal of at least 
75,000 steps each week. I asked participants after each scenario how feasible meeting the step goal 
would be for them (1 = Not at all feasible; 7 = Very feasible), as well as how likely they would be able to 
meet that goal (1 = Not at all likely; 7 = Very likely).  
Results. Participants reported an average baseline step count of 29,825 steps (SD = 32,684). 
Turning to the scenario responses, a mixed-design 2 (scenario) × 2 (order of presentation) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of an indexed measure of perceived feasibility of meeting the goal (M30k steps = 
5.47 vs. M75k steps = 4.42; F(1,113) = 56.63, p < .001), no effect of presentation order (F(1,113) = .22, 
p = .64), and no order by perception difference interaction (F(1,113) = .23, p = .63). I also calculated 
for each participant a difference score given by the gap in perceived feasibility of meeting the goal 
across the two scenarios (i.e., subtracting the feasibility of the 75,000-step goal from that of the 
30,000-step goal). The mean difference score was positive and significantly differed from zero (M = 
1.05, SD = 1.49, t(114) = 7.58, p < .001), indicating greater perceived feasibility of the “easier” (i.e., 
30,000-step) program. Taken together, these data verify the assumption that meeting a 30,000-step 
performance goal should be construed as considerably more feasible (if not guaranteed) than 










































































































Cash incentive condition: 
 





Appendix B5: Stimuli and Participant Instructions (Study 6b) 
 
Anagram task instructions: 
 



















































Sample marble estimation problem: 
 
















Final score self-tabulation (cash incentive condition): 
 
 
 
 
